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  INTRODUCTION   
The conventional wisdom is that the global financial crisis 
of 2007−2008 revealed faults in the ability of international f i-
nancial regulation to contain the problem of systemic risk.1 
Further conventional wisdom suggests that the failure to regu-
late complex financial instruments, especially derivatives, con-
tributed significantly to the crisis.2 As a result, an international 
consensus quickly formed around tightening global financial 
regulation generally and derivatives regulation in particular. 
Moreover, the preferred approach to containing systemic risk in 
the context of derivatives quickly converged on mandatory cen-
tral counterparty clearing.3
 
 1. See, e.g., Philip Stephens, Why Global Capitalism Needs Global Rules, 
FIN. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2008, at 13 (noting that a key message of the financial 
crisis “speak[s] to a growing tension between global integration and a shortage 
of credible international governance. Governments have been left with respon-
sibility without power.”). 
 
 2. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, It’s Time for Swaps to Lose Their 
Swagger, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2010, at BU1 (“Derivatives are responsible for 
much of the interconnectedness between banks and other institutions that 
made the financial collapse accelerate in the way that it did, costing taxpayers 
hundreds of billions in bailouts.”). But see Schuyler K. Henderson, Unintended 
Consequences of Misconceived Reforms, Part III, 28 BUTTERWORTHS J. INT’L 
BANK. & FIN. L. 480, 480 (2013) [hereinafter Henderson, Unintended Conse-
quences III] (arguing that OTC derivatives were not a cause of the 2008 finan-
cial crisis and do not contribute significantly to systemic risk). 
 3. See infra Part II.A (describing the movement towards a mandatory 
clearing regulatory approach). 
  
2014] DERIVATIVES REGULATION 1293 
 
An obstacle to implementing the consensus solution, how-
ever, is the absence of a system of global financial regulation. 
While there are international organizations through which na-
tional actors can meet to deliberate, discuss, and even decide on 
financial regulatory policy, ultimately any such decisions must 
be implemented by national actors with potentially divergent 
incentives. This creates the prospect of “regulatory arbitrage”—
that is, the risk that jurisdictions will reduce regulation to win 
business from regulated entities, leading to a race to the bottom 
among regulatory authorities and the ultimate failure to 
achieve the regulatory goal.4
Alert to the possibility of regulatory arbitrage, policymak-
ers have sought to impose regulatory uniformity through either 
multilateral efforts at harmonization or unilateral assertions of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction.
 In the context of derivatives, if 
U.S. authorities impose a harsh clearing regime, banks may 
shift their derivatives operations to London or, if European and 
American regulation converge, to Hong Kong or Singapore or 
some less highly regulated jurisdiction. The result of this pro-
cess, many argue, is the degradation of regulatory standards 
and the concomitant failure to reduce systemic risk. 
5 In a harmonized regulatory re-
gime, national actors work together to arrive at a shared regu-
latory goal, such as, in this context, mandatory clearing of over-
the-counter (OTC) derivatives transactions.6
Regulatory uniformity, in general, is a highly suspect 
means of addressing systemic risk. Uniformity, by definition, 
means all jurisdictions regulate in the same way, but if finan-
cial market crises have taught us anything, it is that regulators 
often do not anticipate the next crisis. Thus, if all jurisdictions 
regulate in the same way, and if, as has often been the case in 
the past, their chosen regulatory approach fails to account for 
an emergent crisis, then world financial markets will be more 
 In an assertion of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, national actors seek to impose 
their regulatory requirements on entities and transactions out-
side of their borders. Either way of achieving regulatory uni-
formity, however, may compromise the ultimate goal of contain-
ing systemic risk.  
 
 4. See infra Part III.A (refining the concept of “regulatory arbitrage” and 
distinguishing it from “regulatory competition”). 
 5. See infra Part III.B (discussing policymakers’ efforts to implement 
regulatory uniformity). 
 6. See infra notes 254–61 and accompanying text (referring to scholarly 
commentary on the problem of making and enforcing law to address problems 
that cross jurisdictional boundaries). 
  
1294 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:1291 
 
exposed to systemic risk than they might have been had some 
jurisdictions regulated differently. More specifically, recent 
scholarship shows that mandatory clearing is no panacea for 
systemic risk, and once it is imposed on a globally uniform ba-
sis, its flaws will be unchecked, rendering the global financial 
system uniformly vulnerable.7
This Article argues that a better approach to derivatives 
regulation would be to adopt a more supple regulatory super-
structure that encourages a diversity of approaches to achieve 
the objective of minimizing systemic risk. Encouraging a diver-
sity of regulatory approaches, all aimed at containing systemic 
risk, provides a number of benefits. These include the promo-
tion of innovation and the adoption of efficient regulatory struc-
tures as well as the production of information about successful 
and unsuccessful approaches to the problem. Perhaps most im-
portantly, however, regulatory diversity creates fire-breaks in 
the event of contagion so that the failure of one regulatory re-
gime will not necessarily lead to the failure of the world finan-
cial system. This Article advocates the adoption of a regime of 
regulatory diversity in the context of derivatives regulation, 
providing several proposals for achieving such a regime at both 
the national and international levels. 
  
From this introduction, the Article proceeds as follows: 
Part I provides background on derivatives and the problem of 
systemic risk, reviewing the ways in which derivatives were 
and were not implicated in the global financial crisis of 
2007−2008. Part II describes the global regulatory response to 
the systemic risk of derivatives transactions, examining both 
the international regulatory agenda and differences between 
different national actors in implementing it. Part III introduces 
the problem of regulatory arbitrage and highlights attempts to 
combat it by achieving regulatory uniformity, either through 
harmonization or exercises of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Part 
IV critiques regulatory uniformity, detailing both general objec-
tions to uniformity as a means of containing systemic risk and 
specific problems with the clearing mandate in the context of 
derivatives regulation. Part V offers a regulatory alternative, 
aimed at reducing systemic risk by encouraging the prolifera-
tion of regulatory alternatives rather than imposing a uniform 
approach. Part V provides a package of reforms that could be 
implemented at either or both the national and international 
 
 7. See infra Part IV.B (describing the risks of mandatory clearing im-
posed on a uniform basis). 
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levels. The Article closes, finally, with a brief summary and 
conclusion. 
I.  DERIVATIVES AND SYSTEMIC RISK   
Derivatives are all about risk. They are, at their core, noth-
ing more than a contractual means by which parties allocate 
the risk of a fluctuation in price of an underlying reference as-
set.8 The reference asset can be infinitely many things—an in-
terest rate or exchange rate, an index of bonds or mortgage-
backed securities (MBS), commodity prices, or the weather.9 In 
the contract, the two sides, or “counterparties,” commit to one 
or several payments at some time in the future, the amount of 
which will depend upon the value of the underlying reference 
asset at that time.10 This exchange of payments thus allows the 
counterparties to reallocate risk, allowing for risk mitigation—
i.e., hedging11—as well as speculation.12
In providing a means for this transfer of risk, however, de-
rivatives create a second risk—the risk of default on the con-
 
 
 8. See SCHUYLER K. HENDERSON, HENDERSON ON DERIVATIVES 5 (2d ed. 
2010) (“A derivative is, simply, a financial arrangement the value of which is 
‘derived’ from another financial instrument, index or measure of economic val-
ue.”). 
 9. See ROBERT W. KOLB & JAMES A. OVERDAHL, FINANCIAL DERIVA-
TIVES: PRICING AND RISK MANAGEMENT 16–18 (2010) (explaining how struc-
tured products—like securities that result from the securitization process and 
have been successfully created with portfolios of mortgage, automobile, and 
boat loans as well as credit derivatives—relate to derivatives contracts); Nor-
man Menachem Feder, Deconstructing Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 2002 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 677, 687 n.16 (discussing various instruments, such as 
weather derivatives and environmental derivatives). 
 10. See KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 9, at 16–19. 
 11. See id. at 575–82 (discussing the use of derivatives to manage risks 
associated with interest rate fluctuations). 
 12. Both hedging and speculation are vital features of a working financial 
system—hedging because it enables parties to eliminate unwanted risk, and 
speculation because it speeds price discovery and, therefore, market efficiency. 
See generally KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 9, at 57 (describing price discov-
ery as the process by which trading incorporates new information and chang-
ing expectations into asset prices); see also Roberto Blanco et al., An Empirical 
Analysis of the Dynamic Relation Between Investment-Grade Bonds and Credit 
Default Swaps, 60 J. FIN. 2255 (2005) (providing an empirical study showing 
that the credit-default-swap market makes bond pricing more efficient); Artu-
ro Bris et al., Efficiency and the Bear: Short Sales and Markets Around the 
World, 62 J. FIN. 1029 (2007) (providing a cross-sectional time-series analysis 
strongly supporting the view that short selling facilitates efficient price dis-
covery). 
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tract.13 This second risk—counterparty credit risk—is inherent 
in derivatives transactions, and is the basic way in which de-
rivatives contribute to systemic risk.14
Systemic risk refers to the linkages and interdependencies 
between participants in the financial market, such that a sig-
nificant loss initially touching only a small number of partici-
pants can spread and threaten to engulf the entire system, ul-
timately causing a contraction in the real economy.
  
15 Systemic 
risk is an appropriate target for regulatory attention because 
private actors lack adequate incentives to control it.16
 
 13. See ANTULIO N. BOMFIM, UNDERSTANDING CREDIT DERIVATIVES AND 
RELATED INSTRUMENTS 267 (2005) (“In the context of the credit derivatives 
market, counterparty credit risk refers mainly to the chance that a protection 
seller will fail to make good on its promise to make previously agreed-upon 
payments in the event of qualified defaults by reference entities.”). 
 This Part 
analyzes the systemic risk created by derivatives transactions, 
first reviewing the basics of how derivatives work. Then, this 
Part examines derivatives’ role in the global financial crisis of 
2007−2008, for which they received a significant share of the 
blame and as a result of which they became a focus of regulato-
ry attention. 
 14. See generally HENDERSON, supra note 8, at 402–04. 
 15. This basic theme is captured with greater formality as follows: 
[T]he risk that (i) an economic shock such as market or institutional 
failure triggers (through a panic or otherwise) either (X) the failure of 
a chain of markets or institutions or (Y) a chain of significant losses to 
financial institutions, (ii) resulting in increases in the cost of capital 
or decreases in its availability, often evidenced by substantial finan-
cial-market price volatility. 
Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204 (2008). On the abil-
ity of systemic risk to cause losses in the “real economy” as opposed merely to 
the “financial economy,” see Hurting the Real Economy: The Impact of the Fi-
nancial Crisis on Some of the Most Basic Industries, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 15, 
2008), http://www.economist.com/node/12414753.  
 16. See generally ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION 
AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 67–69 (1984) (discussing 
failure of coordination as a justification for regulation); accord Mark J. Roe, 
Clearinghouse Overconfidence, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1641, 1691 (2013) (noting 
that “when guarding against their own failure, [financial institutions] do not 
account for the costs that their failure will inflict on the rest of the economy” 
and providing a numerical example); Roberta Romano, For Diversity in the In-
ternational Regulation of Financial Institutions: Critiquing and Recalibrating 
the Basel Architecture (Yale Law Sch., Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, & Eur. 
Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 452, 2013), available at http://ssrn 
.com/abstract=2127749.  
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A. DERIVATIVES PRIMER  
A sensible first step in understanding how these financial 
instruments contribute to systemic risk is to divide the world of 
derivatives into two broad categories—exchange-traded versus 
over-the-counter derivatives. As the names suggest, the distinc-
tion depends primarily upon the way in which the business is 
transacted.17 Highly standardized derivatives, such as futures 
and many forms of options, may be traded on exchanges, such 
as the Chicago Board of Trade or the London International Fi-
nancial Futures and Options Exchange.18 As a result of their 
standardization, exchange-traded derivatives offer buyers few-
er choices of, for example, underlying assets, settlement 
amounts, maturity dates, and strike prices.19 And, as a result of 
trading on an exchange, these instruments have an intermedi-
ary (the exchange or a related clearinghouse) to provide credit-
support and monitor various trading practices, typically under 
the supervision of a national regulator.20
 
 17. Unlike traditional securities trading, where sellers must either own or 
be able to buy or borrow securities in order to sell them, the sell side of deriva-
tives transactions effectively creates the instrument by agreeing to one posi-
tion or the other on the risk. See Darrell Duffie, The Failure Mechanics of 
Dealer Banks, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 5151, 5155–58 (2010) [hereinafter Duffie, 
Failure Mechanics] (describing the mechanics of trading in over-the-counter 
(OTC) derivatives). 
  
 18. See KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 9, at 21 (explaining that exchanges 
trade standardized-derivatives contracts through a centralized structure that 
is organized to promote liquidity and to mutualize credit risk). 
 19. See Dan Awrey, The Dynamics of OTC Derivatives Regulation: Bridg-
ing the Public-Private Divide, 11 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 155, 161 (2010) [here-
inafter Awrey, Dynamics] (“End-users of exchange-traded derivatives are pre-
sented with a limited menu of underlying and must accept the terms set by 
the relevant exchange, respecting, for instance, settlement amounts, maturity 
dates and strike prices.” (citation omitted)). 
 20. Summarizing the arrangement, Professor Awrey writes: 
Derivatives exchanges typically provide credit support to end-users by 
absorbing counterparty credit and settlement risk via the utilisation 
of centralised clearinghouse and margin mechanisms. Derivatives ex-
changes also typically perform a broader self-regulatory role through 
the promulgation, monitoring and enforcement of rules regarding, in-
ter alia, dealer membership; trading qualifications; order execution, 
clearing, settlement and other trading practices, and the approval of 
new derivative products. Derivatives exchanges generally discharge 
this role under the supervision of national securities regulators such 
as the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and UK Fi-
nancial Services Authority (FSA) or specialist regulatory agencies 
such as the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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The rest of the derivatives world, by contrast, is transacted 
over-the-counter—that is, in the form of privately negotiated 
bilateral contracts without an exchange intermediary.21 Be-
cause “OTC derivatives” are essentially individually negotiated 
contracts, their terms—including the underlying asset, settle-
ment amounts, maturity dates, and other features—are infi-
nitely variable.22 This allows the sellers of OTC derivatives—
typically major financial institutions acting as “dealers”—and 
their buyers—other dealers or “end users,” including commer-
cial parties and hedge funds—to manage or speculate on risk in 
an infinite variety of ways.23 The absence of an exchange in-
termediary, however, means that these instruments will often 
be illiquid and that parties will not necessarily have access to 
credit support or third-party monitoring of their positions.24
Although there are several distinct forms that OTC deriva-
tives may take,
 
25 the principal focus of regulatory attention 
since the crisis has been the “swap.”26
 
 21. See Duffie, Failure Mechanics, supra note 
 In a typical swap con-
tract, counterparties agree to exchange payments based on the 
value of an underlying asset over time. For example, in an in-
terest rate swap, one party pays the other if interest rates rise 
17, at 56–58. 
 22. Awrey, Dynamics, supra note 19, at 162 (“OTC derivatives bestow 
dealers and end-users with virtually unlimited flexibility to structure individ-
ualised terms respecting, inter alia, underlying, price, settlement amounts, 
maturity dates and other more exotic features.”). 
 23. End users are those taking a final position on the underlying risk ei-
ther for purposes of hedging or speculation. Randall Dodd, The Structure of 
OTC Derivatives Markets, 9 FINANCIER 41, 41–44 (2002). 
 24. Awrey, Dynamics, supra note 19, at 162 (“The primary drawbacks of 
OTC derivatives relative to their exchange-traded counterparts stem from a 
potential lack of secondary market liquidity and the absence of a third-party 
clearing house to absorb counterparty credit and settlement risk.”). 
 25. Henderson defines three basic OTC derivatives structures—the swap, 
the forward, and the option—the distinction between which depends, primari-
ly, on the timing and number of payments. HENDERSON, supra note 8, at 39 
(noting that the “fundamental structures underlying OTC derivatives technol-
ogy . . . are the swap, the forward, and the option”). Swaps contemplate a se-
ries of payments over time. Id. at 41–59. Forwards contemplate a single pay-
ment in the future. Id. at 41–59. In option structures—such as caps, collars, 
floors, and swaptions—one party fully performs on the effective date, while the 
other party bears a payment obligation depending upon the value of the un-
derlying reference asset. Id. at 41–59. 
 26. Id. at 41; see also CFTC, 17 C.F.R. pt. 1 (2013); SEC, 17 C.F.R. pts. 
230, 240, 241 (2013) (providing the Commissions’ joint formal definitions of 
“swap” and related terms). 
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and receives payments from the other if interest rates fall.27 In 
this way, a commercial party with interest rate exposure, ei-
ther through borrowing or lending, can effectively cancel out 
this risk by taking the opposite position in a swap, or an inves-
tor who has a view about the likely direction of interest rates in 
the future can use the swap to bet on their prediction.28
Similarly, a credit default swap, the derivative instrument 
most implicated in the recent financial crisis,
 In each 
case, the swap effectively transfers the risk of fluctuation in in-
terest rates from one party to the other. 
29 is an agreement 
that transfers credit risk from one party—the “protection buy-
er”—to another—“the protection seller.”30 The protection buyer 
pays a fee, or “spread,”31 to the protection seller in exchange for 
the seller’s commitment to offset any losses, real or hypothet-
ical, suffered by the protection buyer in the event of a default or 
other credit event of another party, the “reference entity.”32 In 
this way, credit default swaps allow parties to hedge or specu-
late based on the default risk of an underlying entity or index.33
 
 27. In a fixed-for-floating interest rate swap, a firm that is concerned 
about its exposure to interest rate fluctuations, due perhaps to an obligation to 
make payments based on a floating interest rate, might contract with a swap 
dealer to pay a fixed rate of interest in exchange for being paid the floating 
rate. See ROBERT E. WHALEY, DERIVATIVES 652–54 (2006). In this way, the 
firm effectively eliminates its interest rate risk, essentially exchanging a float-
ing for a fixed rate. Id. As the counterparty to the swap, the dealer takes on 
the risk of fluctuations in interest rates but generally not for long, because the 
dealer will typically seek to enter into a second swap, often concurrently with 
the original swap, with a counterparty having risk preferences that are the 
exact opposite of those of the initial firm. Id.  
 
 28. See generally KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 9, at 575–86 (providing 
examples of various instruments that limit risk to buyers with interest rate 
exposure, including an interest rate option that allows the buyer to profit from 
a favorable move in the underlying interest rate while giving protection 
against an adverse move in the underlying interest rate). 
 29. See Jessica Holzer, SEC Proposes New Swaps Rules, WALL ST. J., 
June 30, 2011, at C3 (describing recent proposed rules “aimed at protecting 
investors in some of the complex financial instruments blamed for exacerbat-
ing the financial crisis,” including credit default swaps). 
 30. WHALEY, supra note 27, at 679. 
 31. See id. at 674 (outlining the mechanics of a credit default swap as a 
protection seller who agrees, for an upfront or a continuing premium, to com-
pensate the protection buyer upon a defined credit event). 
 32. See id. at 684 n.6. 
 33. In a typical credit default swap transaction, a fund may hold a large 
number of bonds of a particular debtor, thus exposing it to loss should the 
debtor default on its obligations. To hedge this risk, the fund may enter into a 
credit default swap whereby the risk of default is transferred to the protection 
seller in exchange for a fixed stream of payments. If the debtor defaults, the 
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Returning to the idea that derivatives are all about risk, 
we can now see that all swap transactions (indeed, all deriva-
tives transactions) involve two basic risks: one that is the sub-
ject of the transaction and the other that is inherent in the 
transaction itself. The first is the fluctuation in value of the 
underlying reference asset, the result of which will be to obli-
gate one party or the other to the contract to make payments. It 
is this risk, of course, that is the subject of the derivatives con-
tract in the sense that it is what the parties seek to exchange, 
again either for purposes of hedging or speculation.34
The second risk involved in derivatives transactions, how-
ever, is not the subject of the transaction, but rather is itself 
created by the transaction.
 
35 This is the risk of non-performance 
under the contract—that is, the risk that an insolvent counter-
party will be unable to perform its contractual obligations, leav-
ing the other counterparty to bear a risk that it had sought to 
transfer.36 Because this risk arises principally in connection 
with the insolvency of a counterparty, it is referred to as “coun-
terparty credit risk”—that is, the possibility that the party with 
whom you have contracted is, essentially, out of business and 
therefore unable to make payments under the contract.37
 
protection seller must make the protection buyer whole, typically by paying 
the difference between the par value of the bond and the post-default value. If 
the debtor does not default, the protection seller enjoys the stream of pay-
ments with no payment obligation of its own. As with other forms of deriva-
tives, neither party need hold the reference asset in order to receive payment 
on a credit default swap. Similarly, the protection buyer need not suffer any 
actual loss in order to be entitled to payment under a credit default swap. The 
payment obligation is triggered with regard to the reference entity alone and 
is calculated on the basis of the difference between the current-versus-par val-
ue of the reference entity’s debt without regard to losses suffered (or not suf-
fered) by the protection buyer. See James C. duPont, Comment, A Second 
Chance at Legal Certainty: AIG Collapse Provides Impetus to Regulate Credit 
Default Swaps, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 843, 846–47 (2009) (describing a typical 
CDS transaction where the occurrence of a predefined credit event, such as 
bankruptcy or default on an obligation, allows the protection buyer to trigger 
the contract and affect settlement). 
 De-
 34. See generally Timothy E. Lynch, Derivatives: A Twenty-First Century 
Understanding, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 19 (2011) (“If a counterparty hedges a 
pre-existing risk with the use of a derivatives contract, he obtains insurance 
value from the derivative.”). 
 35. See Schuyler K. Henderson, Unintended Consequences of Misconceived 
Reforms, Part II, 28 BUTTERWORTHS J. INT’L BANK & FIN. L. 439, 441 (2013) 
(describing the transformation as “derivatives . . . convert . . . market risks in-
to credit risk”). 
 36. See Feder, supra note 9, at 689. 
 37. See BOMFIM, supra note 13, at 15. 
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rivatives transactions, because of the potentially long time be-
tween execution of the contract and settlement, create signifi-
cant counterparty credit risk.38
Counterparty credit risk is especially dangerous in the con-
text of credit default swaps. If a protection seller defaults, the 
buyer remains exposed to the risk of default of the underlying 
reference entity.
 
39 If the underlying reference entity is not in 
default at the same time as the protection seller, the protection 
buyer may be able to replace the protection by entering into 
another credit default swap with another counterparty, which 
imposes additional transaction costs but does not otherwise al-
ter the analysis.40 If, however, the reference entity is in default 
at the same time as the protection seller, then the protection 
buyer is confronted with a dangerous scenario, the “double de-
fault,” in which protection is unavailable precisely when it is 
most needed.41 When declines in the credit quality of the under-
lying reference entity and the counterparty are correlated, as 
may be the case in financial crises, protection may thus be illu-
sory.42
 
 38. Robert R. Bliss & Robert S. Steigerwald, Derivatives Clearing and Set-
tlement: A Comparison of Central Counterparties and Alternative Structures, 
FED. RES. BANK CHI. ECON. PERSP. 23 (2006) (noting that “[w]ith derivatives 
 The protection buyer therefore loses both the value of its 
. . . the length of time between the execution of a transaction and settlement is 
essential to the contract” and therefore that “the parties to a derivatives con-
tract are principally dependent upon each other’s creditworthiness to assure 
future performance”). 
 39. Note here that the counterparty risk for the protection seller is not 
parallel because a default of the protection buyer means merely that the pro-
tection seller is not receiving its fixed stream of payments. Its long position in 
the credit of the reference entity is likely unaffected, although it may have to 
unwind its hedge (offsetting short position) if it hedged that risk, but again, 
this is just a transaction cost, not a double default. See BOMFIM, supra note 13, 
at 267 n.1 (noting that, although a protection seller is technically subject to 
the risk that the buyer will fail to make the agreed-upon premium payments, 
the seller’s potential exposure is essentially limited to the marked-to-market 
value of the contract, a function of the difference between the premium writ-
ten into the contract and the one prevailing in the marketplace at the time of 
default by the protection buyer). 
 40. See id. at 268 (noting that the analysis of portfolio credit risk is im-
pacted upon default by the reference entity if that entity either happens to de-
fault at around the same time as the protection seller or defaults after a de-
fault by the seller, and the original contract is not replaced). 
 41. See id. at 10 (defining a protection buyer’s greatest loss as occurring 
when both the protection seller and the reference entity default at the same 
time). 
 42. In the words of one commentator, “protection sellers are least likely to 
pay out at the very moment they’re obligated to: upon someone else’s default.” 
Charles Davi, How to Understand the Derivatives Market, THE ATLANTIC, July 
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derivative contract as well as the value of its investment in the 
underlying reference entity. 
Counterparty credit risk, by its very nature, is difficult to 
hedge.43 Instead, market participants protect themselves prin-
cipally through netting and by taking collateral.44 Netting re-
fers to the process by which counterparties offset positive posi-
tions against negative positions in order to determine residual 
exposure.45 Netting proceeds bilaterally, according to the 
agreement of the counterparties.46 Once all open positions are 
compressed through bilateral netting, parties’ residual expo-
sures to each other are reduced substantially, and it is against 
this reduced exposure that parties typically post collateral.47 
Posting collateral is expensive, however, and therefore the 
amounts pledged typically cover less than the total net expo-
sure between counterparties.48 To account for this gap, market 
participants call for additional collateral after their marked-to-
market exposure to a particular counterparty has risen beyond 
a previously agreed upon threshold level.49
 
16, 2009, http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2009/07/how-to 
-understand-the-derivatives-market/21426. 
 Parties holding in-
adequate collateral can be exposed to significant loss from the 
default of an important counterparty. 
 43. It is difficult to eliminate by hedging since the most obvious means to 
hedge against a weak counterparty is to enter into an offsetting trade with an-
other counterparty which of course results in taking on the risk of that coun-
terparty. Alternatively, a party could simply short its counterparty’s bonds so 
that it will have gains to offset its losses as the counterparty’s credit quality 
declines, but this may be excessively costly and difficult to manage and there-
fore unfeasible for many, if not most, derivatives transactions. Moreover, di-
versification among counterparties would not seem to be an option for mini-
mizing counterparty credit risk since there are, at the dealer level, a very 
small number of potential counterparties whose riskiness is deeply intercon-
nected. 
 44. See BOMFIM, supra note 13, at 27. 
 45. JOHN B. CAOUETTE ET AL., MANAGING CREDIT RISK: THE GREAT 
CHALLENGE FOR GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 75 (2d ed. 2008).  
 46. This agreement is a customary part of swap transactions and typically 
follows the form of the ISDA Master Agreement. See HENDERSON, supra note 
8, at 480–82 (providing contractual overview); id. at 990–98 (tracing evolution 
of contractual terms). 
 47. For example, where Bank A and Bank B have a large number of CDSs 
between them such that Bank A’s exposure amounts to $100 million and Bank 
B’s exposure amounts to $90 million, netting allows for the exposure of Bank A 
to Bank B to be limited to only $10 million, against which considerable collat-
eral might reasonably be taken. 
 48. BOMFIM, supra note 13, at 27. 
 49. Id. 
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Losses from counterparty credit risk are especially likely in 
periods of financial distress, when financial institutions, ren-
dered unstable either by wild swings in the value of the under-
lying reference asset or by losses elsewhere in their portfolio, 
fail.50 The failure of a large counterparty spreads loss through-
out the financial system because other institutions find them-
selves holding unhedged positions precisely when they most 
need protection. In such a situation, the failure of a major coun-
terparty may spread loss throughout the financial system, lead-
ing to a contraction in the real economy.51
Derivatives may contribute to systemic risk in other ways 
as well.
 This, of course, is 
systemic risk, and counterparty credit risk, especially in the 
context of the double default, is the core way in which deriva-
tives contribute to systemic risk. 
52 First, the use of OTC derivatives, especially credit de-
fault swaps (CDS), may be vital to banks’ lending practices, en-
abling them to offload portfolio risk and thereby expand their 
lending activities, such that any event that sharply limited the 
availability of CDS—such as, for example, an economic shock 
or, indeed, overregulation—would also likely curtail lending ac-
tivity or increase the cost of funding, potentially causing a con-
traction in the real economy.53 Second, substantial shocks in fi-
nancial markets might lead to correlated increases in CDS 
values, thereby forcing all CDS writers to post additional col-
lateral.54
 
 50. See Manmohan Singh & James Aitken, Counterparty Risk, Impact on 
Collateral Flows, and Role for Central Counterparties 4 (Int’l Monetary Fund, 
Working Paper No. 09/173, 2009), available at http://www.imf.org/external/ 
pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09173.pdf (“Counterparty risk largely stems from the cre-
ditworthiness of an institution. In the context of a financial sys-
tem . . . counterparty risk will be the aggregate loss to the financial system 
from a counterparty that fails to deliver on its OTC derivative obligation.”). 
 The sudden need to provide this capital—most stand-
ardized contracts require it within twenty-four hours—in the 
form of treasuries or similar assets would likely force CDS 
writers to liquidate other assets in order to post collateral, but 
such coordinated selling, of course, would further reduce asset 
 51. Darrell Duffie et al., Policy Perspectives on OTC Derivatives Market 
Infrastructure 5 (Stan. Graduate Sch. of Bus., Research Paper No. 2046, 2010), 
available at https://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/library/RP2046.pdf. 
 52. I am grateful to Prof. Charles Whitehead for suggesting these addi-
tional ways in which derivatives contribute to systemic risk. 
 53. See Charles K. Whitehead, The Volcker Rule and Evolving Financial 
Markets, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 39, 65–67 (2011). 
 54. Charles K. Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 
323, 353–56 (2001). 
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values on banks’ balance sheets, thus triggering a vicious cycle 
leading to further collateral calls, further loss in asset value, 
and so on.55
Notwithstanding these additional concerns, counterparty 
credit risk is typically seen as the core way in which derivatives 
contribute to systemic risk.
  
56 Systemic risk may thus be seen as 
a negative externality of the OTC derivatives trade.57 Because 
private actors do not have an incentive to internalize costs that 
are borne by the system as a whole, regulators are justified in 
making derivatives a focus of their attention.58
B. DERIVATIVES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
The urge to regulate derivatives, however, did not arise 
spontaneously as a result of sober reflection on the nature of 
counterparty credit risk. It arose, instead, as part of the urgent 
response to the global financial crisis of 2007−2008 for which 
derivatives received a significant share of blame.59 That crisis 
began when the bursting of the bubble in the U.S. housing 
market revealed the overexposure of major financial institu-
tions to housing, principally though securitized products such 
as mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obliga-
tions (CDOs).60
 
 55. See id.; see also infra Part IV.B (discussing this possibility as a signifi-
cant defect of clearing). 
 The collapse of several such institutions and the 
severe weakening of many others reduced the availability of 
 56. Duffie et al., supra note 51, at 4–5 (“Counterparty credit risk rises to 
the level of systemic risk when the failure of a market participant with an ex-
tremely large derivatives portfolio could trigger large unexpected losses on its 
derivatives trades, which could seriously impair the financial condition of one 
or more of its counterparties.”). 
 57. Id. at 13 (“[T]he systemic risk associated with uncleared derivatives 
represents a ‘negative externality’ that may be appropriately treated with reg-
ulatory pressure or incentives.”). 
 58. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 59. Some, notably former CFTC Chair Brooksley Born, had advocated the 
idea of regulating derivatives. The political will, however, was lacking until 
the crisis. See generally Frontline: The Warning (PBS television broadcast Oct. 
20, 2009), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/warning/view/ 
(describing Born’s thwarted efforts to regulate OTC derivatives). 
 60. See Andrea J. Boyack, Laudable Goals and Unintended Consequences: 
The Role and Control of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1489, 
1502–09 (2011) (describing these instruments as the principal means by which 
housing risk spread throughout the economy); see also Darrell Duffie, Innova-
tions in Credit Risk Transfer: Implications for Financial Stability 12–13 (Bank 
for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 255, 2008), available at http://www 
.bis.org/publ/work255.pdf (describing MBSs, CDOs, and securitization general-
ly). 
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credit and led to a sharp contraction in the real economy.61 De-
rivatives were implicated in the crisis in several ways.62
First, derivatives expanded the ability of investors to spec-
ulate on the direction of the U.S. housing market through the 
creation of “synthetic” CDOs—that is, a swap where the under-
lying asset was a pool of CDOs or an index of MBS.
 
63 Moreover, 
because derivatives enable parties to take on risk without ac-
tually owning the underlying asset, these instruments allowed 
“investors to take more exposure to subprime mortgages than 
there were such mortgages.”64
 
 61. See generally THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRI-
SIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE 
CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 
(2011) (attributing the crisis to failures in regulation, excessive risk-taking, 
and failures of governance and ethics). On the distinction between the “real 
economy” and the “financial economy,” see supra note 
 This fueled the credit boom and 
15 and accompanying 
text. 
 62. See René M. Stulz, Credit Default Swaps and the Credit Crisis 3–4 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15384, 2009), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15384 (noting observers’ arguments that deriva-
tives contributed to the financial crisis by (1) enabling the “credit boom”; (2) 
allowing financial institutions to take on massive risk; and (3) providing a to-
tal lack of transparency regarding risk exposures and the resulting strength of 
financial institutions with large positions). 
 63. A synthetic CDO is essentially a credit default swap written on a ref-
erence index of CDOs combined with a pool of high-credit, quality bonds where 
the CDS spread plus the coupon payments from the high-quality bonds make 
the interest payment on the SPV securities. See Gary Gorton, The Subprime 
Panic, 15 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 10, 27 (2009). The resulting CDO is “synthetic” be-
cause it mimics the return of a CDO written on a pool of MBSs (or whatever 
the reference index is) but does not actually hold collateralized debt obliga-
tions. Id. Likewise, in 2006, asset-backed-swap (ABX) indices were introduced, 
representing a basket of CDS contracts on securitized subprime mortgages for 
a prior period (typically the past six months). Id. at 28–29. These indices be-
haved like bond indices, falling when default risk rose and rising when default 
risk fell, and enabled investors to take positions on the underlying market 
without any ownership interest, direct or indirect, in MBSs. See id. at 36–37. 
 64. Stulz, supra note 62, at 11; see also Gorton, supra note 63, at 36–37 
(commenting that investors were subject to greater exposure because of the 
complexity of synthetic CDOs and indexed credit default swaps preventing the 
valuation of the underlying mortgages). The ABX.HE index is a synthetic in-
dex that tracks the price of a single CDS on each of twenty individual sub-
prime mortgage-backed securities. See Richard Stanton & Nancy Wallace, The 
Bear’s Lair: Index Credit Default and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 24 REV. 
FIN. STUD. 3250, 3250–51 (2011). This tool allows market participants to trade 
the credit risk of a portfolio of pools using a single security without having to 
own or borrow the underlying reference assets. See id. at 3251. As a result of 
this structure, the net notional amount of ABX.HE indexed CDSs may signifi-
cantly exceed the underlying principle balances. See id. at 3251–52. 
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the further expansion of risk-taking in these markets.65
Second, derivatives allowed financial institutions to take 
massive but almost entirely opaque positions resulting not only 
in very large losses, but also in the inability of outsiders to as-
sess their financial strength.
 
66 This prompted worried investors 
to withdraw liquidity from institutions dependent on short-
term financing, thereby creating the conditions for a bank 
run.67 By some estimates, the credit default swap market grew 
tenfold in the years leading up to the crisis, swelling from about 
$5 trillion in total notional CDS in 2004 to over $57 trillion in 
June 2008.68 Estimates vary,69 and notional amounts, because 
they fail to take offsetting positions into account, can be mis-
leading.70
 
 65. Derivatives, in other words, significantly expanded the availability of 
the risk asset—in this case subprime mortgages—allowing investors to vastly 
increase their exposures and providing another means by which the exposure 
could spread. This alone, however, does not render derivatives responsible for 
the financial crisis because this is the risk of the underlying reference asset 
and can be hedged. If the risk of the underlying asset is to be blamed for the 
financial crisis, then the fault lies not with derivatives but with the traders 
who made foolish choices or the institutions that failed to hedge. On this point, 
consider the account of AIG offered below. 
 Nevertheless, there is little dispute over the fact that 
 66. See Stulz, supra note 62. 
 67. See Colleen M. Baker, Regulating the Invisible: The Case of Over-the-
Counter Derivatives, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287, 1306–07 (2010) (discussing 
how the opaqueness of the market prevented market participants from know-
ing exactly what the exposures of their counterparties were to these entities, 
such as Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and AIG, which resulted in quick 
“drying up of liquidity”). 
 68. Compare MONETARY & ECON. DEP’T, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, 
OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET ACTIVITY IN THE FIRST HALF OF 2005, at 9 tbl.4 
(2005), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy0511.pdf, with MONETARY & 
ECON. DEP’T, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET AC-
TIVITY IN THE SECOND HALF OF 2008, at 7 tbl.1 (2009), available at http://www 
.bis.org/publ/otc_hy0905.pdf. 
 69. Compare Press Release, Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., DTCC 
Values Additional CDS Contracts in Trade Information Warehouse at $5.7 
Trillion (Aug. 3, 2009), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/08/03/ 
idUS193323+03-Aug-2009+BW20090803 (reporting a smaller $26.5 trillion 
notional value of 2.2 million electronically confirmed CDS contracts in the 
warehouse’s registry in July 2009), with Press Release, Int’l Swaps & Deriva-
tives Ass’n, Inc., ISDA Mid-Year 2009 Market Survey Shows Credit Deriva-
tives at $31.2 Trillion (Sept. 15, 2009), available at http://www.isda.org/press/ 
press091509.html (finding a total notional value of $31.2 trillion). 
 70. See Memorandum from J.P. MORGAN, J.P. MORGAN’S RESPONSE TO 
FASB STATEMENT NO. 161 (FAS 161), Disclosures About Derivative Instru-
ments and Hedging Activities (ASC Topic 815) 5 (2011) (“The information on 
notional amounts could be misleading because the gross presentation does not 
appropriately reflect the effect of some common strategies.”). 
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the CDS market grew considerably in the years leading to the 
crisis and that much of that exposure was housed in financial 
institutions.71 Moreover, the opacity of the OTC derivatives 
market prevented outsiders from assessing these exposures, 
and the resulting fear of a bank run has been cited as a chief 
reason for the government bailout of financial institutions.72
The role derivatives played in the global financial crisis is 
often illustrated by the example of AIG.
 
73 When the massive in-
surer failed as a result of portfolio losses stemming from specu-
lation on subprime mortgages,74 the government moved to bail 
it out, citing as its principal reason AIG’s role as a large CDS 
counterparty.75 Commentators have questioned whether it was 
necessary to bail out AIG for this reason,76
 
 71. See Stulz, supra note 
 considering that 
62, at 27; see also duPont, supra note 33, at 854–
58 (discussing the development of credit default swaps). That it is difficult to 
say how much exposure they in fact bore only demonstrates the difficulty in 
quantifying the exposure of financial institutions during the crisis, which is 
often cited as a significant part of the problem. See, e.g., Stulz supra note 62, 
at 24. 
 72. Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., The Never-Ending Goldman-AIG Saga, WALL 
ST. J., Jan. 27, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405274870 
3906204575027320028402644 (stating that one of the chief reasons for the 
bailout of AIG was fear of a “wholesale run on the nation’s banking system”). 
 73. See Craig Pirrong, The Inefficiency of Clearing Mandates, CATO INST.: 
POL’Y ANALYSIS 2 (2010), available at http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/ 
pubs/pdf/PA665.pdf (noting that AIG has been “routinely trotted out to 
demonstrate the need for clearing”); OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. 
FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, SIGTARP-10-003, FACTORS AF-
FECTING EFFORTS TO LIMIT PAYMENTS TO AIG COUNTERPARTIES (2009), avail-
able at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/aig111609.pdf (ex-
plaining the government’s version of the AIG collapse). See generally duPont, 
supra note 33 (discussing AIG collapse in an argument for increased regula-
tion of CDS); William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 943, 980–81 (2009). 
 74. Richard Squire, Shareholder Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt, 
123 HARV. L. REV. 1151, 1184 (2010) (noting that “the liabilities on AIG’s de-
rivative contracts were not big enough in themselves to break the company”); 
see also Henderson, supra note 2, at 480 (“If AIG FP had not agreed to mark-
to-market collateralization, its CDS exposure would have been troublesome for 
a while but not life-threatening.”). 
 75. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Sept. 16, 
2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/2008 
0916a.htm (announcing the bailout and explaining that “disorderly failure of 
AIG could add to already significant levels of financial market fragility and 
lead to substantially higher borrowing costs, reduced household wealth, and 
materially weaker economic performance”). 
 76. Commentators have also suggested that there may have been other 
reasons. See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews, Fed in an $85 Billion Rescue of an In-
surer Near Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2008, at A1 (“If A.I.G. had col-
lapsed—and been unable to pay all of its insurance claims—institutional in-
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AIG’s swaps counterparties had in fact taken significant collat-
eral77 and that the traditional system of collateral and netting 
worked fairly well when it was allowed to function during the 
crisis.78 Nevertheless, it seems clear that financial policymakers 
were not sufficiently confident in that system to allow the fail-
ure of a large, unhedged, undercollateralized derivatives coun-
terparty at a time when other financial institutions were highly 
vulnerable.79
 
vestors around the world would have been instantly forced to reappraise the 
value of those securities, and that in turn would have reduced their own capi-
tal and the value of their own debt.”); Eric Dash & Andrew Ross Sorkin, 
Throwing a Lifeline to a Troubled Giant, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2008, at C1 
(“A.I.G. was one of the 10 most widely held stocks in 401(k) retirement plans, 
and . . . its collapse could potentially cause an enormous run on mutual 
funds.”); Stulz, supra note 
 As a result, they focused their attention on regu-
62, at 26–27 (“A collapse of AIG would not have 
been a benign event for the markets . . . . AIG would also have defaulted on its 
debt and its commercial paper at a time when there already was a run on 
money markets.”). 
 77. HENDERSON, supra note 8, at 633 (noting that AIG’s counterparties 
had taken $35 billion in collateral by the time of AIG’s ultimate bailout in De-
cember 2008). 
 78. Stulz, supra note 62, at 21; see also Clearing up the Credit Swaps 
Fog—Letting Opaque Markets Grow Unchecked Was Inexcusable, FIN. TIMES 
(London), Oct. 16, 2008, at 10 (“The Depository Trust and Clearing Corpora-
tion, where most CDS trades are registered, now estimates that only about 
$6bn need physically change hands next week when Lehman CDS are settled. 
The vast majority is netted out, and systemic risk appears marginal.”); Stefano 
Giglio, Credit Default Swap Spreads and Systemic Financial Risk 3 (Jan. 
2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.faculty.chicagobooth 
.edu/workshops/finance/past/pdf/giglio_jmp.pdf (performing an analysis of CDS 
spreads and bond prices to find that spikes in CDS spreads in the month be-
fore Bear Stearns’ collapse and after Lehman’s default do not correspond to 
spikes in systemic risk but instead with idiosyncratic default risk of one or a 
small number of banks); Press Release, Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, Inc., 
ISDA CEO Notes Success of Lehman Settlement, Addresses CDS Mispercep-
tions (Oct. 21, 2008), available at http://www.isda.org/press/press102108.html 
(commenting on the success of the CDS settlement system during the Lehman 
default and the continued liquidity of CDS contracts as opposed to their cash 
equivalents); Press Release, LCH.Clearnet, LCH.Clearnet Successfully Man-
ages Lehman Default (Sept. 23, 2008), available at http://www.lchclearnet 
.com/media_centre/press_releases/2008-09-23.asp (commenting on the success-
ful management of Lehman’s default resulting in a 90% decrease in risk expo-
sure). 
 79. See generally Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark, in REGULATO-
RY BREAKDOWN: THE CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN U.S. REGULATION 86 (Cary 
Coglianese ed., 2012) (describing how policymakers feel compelled to react to 
crises). In her words:  
Human nature in this context is that legislators will find it impossible 
to not respond to a financial crisis by “doing something,” that is, by 
ratcheting up regulation, instead of waiting until a consensus under-
standing of what has occurred can be secured and a targeted solution 
then crafted, despite the considerable informational advantage from 
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lation of the OTC derivatives market.80 A regulatory push for 
mandatory central counterparty clearing started in the United 
States, with the President’s Working Group on Financial Mar-
kets, and as described in the next Part, soon went global.81
II.  THE GLOBAL REGULATORY RESPONSE   
  
As the 2007–2008 crisis overran international borders, fi-
nancial policymakers worldwide sought to coordinate their reg-
ulatory response through the G-20, the institutional structure 
through which the finance ministers of many of the world’s 
richest economies meet.82 In the wake of the crisis, the G-20 
Summits became a focal point for financial reform, with signifi-
cant meetings taking place in Washington, D.C. in 2008 and in 
London and in Pittsburgh in 2009.83
 
the latter approach, which would, no doubt, improve the quality of de-
cision making. 
 
Id. at 87. 
 80. See generally Roe, supra note 16, at 1647–51 (describing this environ-
ment). 
 81. The President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, consisting of 
the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairs of the Fed, the SEC, and the CFTC, 
was formed by executive order in the wake of the October 1987 stock market 
crash to enhance the efficiency of financial markets and maintain investor 
confidence. See Exec. Order No. 12631, 3 C.F.R. 559 (1988). The Group’s initial 
post-crisis reports did not feature mandatory central counterparty clearing 
among its core recommendations. See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP. ON 
FIN. MKTS., POLICY STATEMENT ON FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENTS 
(2008), available at http://www.law.du.edu/images/uploads/presidents-working 
-group.pdf; PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., PROGRESS UPDATE ON 
MARCH POLICY STATEMENT ON FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENTS (2008), 
available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-mkts/Documents/ 
q4progress%20update.pdf. By the end of 2008, however, mandatory central 
counterparty clearing had become a core policy objective. See PRESIDENT’S 
WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., POLICY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OTC DERIVATIVES 
MARKET (2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-mkts/ 
Documents/policyobjectives.pdf. It is important to note that this policy deter-
mination preceded the G-20’s Washington, London, and Pittsburgh Summits, 
described below, during which the organization decided upon the same policy 
objective. See infra Part II.  
 82. See Alex M. Brill & James K. Glassman, Who Should the Twenty Be? 
A New Membership System to Boost the Legitimacy of the G20 at a Critical 
Time for the Global Economy, NATIONAL TAXPAYERS UNION (June 14, 2012), 
http://www.ntu.org/news-and-issues/economy/who-should-the-twenty-be.html. 
The G-20, whose ancestors include the G-33, G-22, G-7, and G-8, is a group of 
finance ministers and central bankers representing 19 countries plus the Eu-
ropean Union. The membership criteria and representativeness of the group 
have recently come under criticism. See, e.g., id. 
 83. See infra notes 85, 88. 
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At the Washington meeting, in the midst of a still-
unfolding crisis, the participants succeeded in agreeing only 
that the crisis was one of financial markets, not of capital flows 
or exchange rates, and that they would focus their next meet-
ing on regulating financial markets.84 At the next meeting, in 
London in April 2009, participants agreed to “take action to 
build a stronger, more globally consistent, supervisory and reg-
ulatory framework for the future financial sector.”85 Summit 
participants further undertook “to establish the much greater 
consistency and systematic cooperation between countries” and 
exhorted regulatory authorities to “reduce the scope for regula-
tory arbitrage.”86 The content of these heightened regulatory 
standards was sketched in an Action Plan wherein finance min-
isters agreed, among other things, to: “extend regulation and 
oversight to all systemically important financial institutions, 
instruments and markets.”87
At the Pittsburgh Summit, the G-20 leaders targeted the 
OTC derivative markets and established the clearing mandate. 
The specific G-20 undertaking was that: “All standardized OTC 
derivative contracts should be traded on exchanges or electron-
ic trading platforms, where appropriate, and cleared through 
central counterparties by end-2012 at the latest. OTC deriva-
tive contracts should be reported to trade repositories. Non-
centrally cleared contracts should be subject to higher capital 
requirements.”
 The detailed work, however, was 
left to the next meeting, in November 2009, in Pittsburgh. 
88
 
 84. At the Washington meeting, U.S. representatives resisted the sugges-
tion that the crisis called for a “new Bretton Woods” agreement focusing on 
international capital and rates of exchange, emphasizing that the regulation of 
financial markets, not the exchange rate system, was the area in which re-
forms were needed. See Robert Fauver, The View from Washington, in ANALY-
SIS: THE G20 LEADERS SUMMIT ON FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE WORLD 
ECONOMY (John Kirton ed., 2008), available at http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/g20/ 
g20leadersbook/fauver.html (arguing the financial crisis “is not a problem 
brought about due to capital movements or capital flows” and that “[t]he ex-
change rate system had nothing to do with the crisis”). 
 The Financial Stability Board was tasked with 
 85. G20, LONDON SUMMIT-LEADERS’ STATEMENT (2009), available at 
https://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009communique0402.pdf. 
 86. Id.  
 87. Id. Relatedly, the ministers agreed “to establish a new Financial Sta-
bility Board (FSB) with a strengthened mandate, as a successor to the Finan-
cial Stability Forum (FSF), including all G20 countries, FSF members, Spain, 
and the European Commission.” Id. 
 88. G20, G20 LEADERS STATEMENT: THE PITTSBURGH SUMMIT (2009), 
available at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009communique0925.html. 
These undertakings largely restate the policy objectives of the President’s 
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regularly assessing implementation of these measures and with 
evaluating whether the reforms “improve transparency in the 
derivatives markets, mitigate systemic risk, and protect 
against market abuse.”89
In this way, having become a focal point of the G-20’s 
agenda for financial reform, central counterparty clearing be-
came the globally mandated means of addressing the systemic 
risk of derivatives transactions.
  
90
A. CENTRAL COUNTERPARTY CLEARING 
 The sections that follow de-
scribe central counterparty clearing in greater detail, focusing 
in particular on its potential to mitigate systemic risk, then 
discussing steps taken in jurisdictions around the world to im-
plement it. 
Policymakers and regulators worldwide have focused on 
central counterparty clearing as the solution to the problem of 
systemic risk inherent in derivatives transactions for two basic 
reasons. First, central counterparty clearing promises to en-
hance transparency and regulatory oversight of the market-
place by creating a central institution charged with the moni-
toring and reporting of derivatives transactions.91
 
Working Group on Financial Markets from November 2008. See supra note 
 Second, 
central counterparty clearing seems to promise an effective 
81. 
Interestingly, the policy prescriptions of the G-20 with regard to derivatives 
were not without dissent. See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., REPORT TO HM TREASURY 
ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE RIGHTS ISSUE 
REVIEW GROUP 27, 29 (2010), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ukla/ 
hmt_rirg.pdf. 
 89. G20, G20 LEADERS STATEMENT: THE PITTSBURGH SUMMIT (2009), 
available at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009communique0925.html. 
These goals are parroted almost verbatim in the Dodd-Frank Act. See infra 
note 126. 
 90. The details regarding clearinghouse operation provided in the sections 
that follow are based on regulatory releases made public as of the date of this 
writing (late summer 2013). The relevant rules are at various stages of com-
pleteness, with some final and some still in draft form. See, e.g., infra Parts 
II.B., III.B.  
 91. For cleared and exchange-traded swaps, data will be compiled by the 
relevant clearing organization or exchange. For uncleared swaps, all parties 
must report their trades to a registered swap data repository or, if no such re-
pository exists for the relevant transaction, directly to the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC) or Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
as applicable. 7 U.S.C. § 6r(a)(1) (2012) (requiring that each security-based 
swap not accepted for clearing by a clearing agency or derivatives clearing or-
ganization (DCO) be reported to a swap data repository, or if none exists, to 
the SEC); 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(e) (2012) (stating same). 
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means of mitigating counterparty credit risk, primarily by in-
creasing the power of netting and collateralization.92
Clearing is a common feature of financial transactions, 
from securities trades to derivatives transactions, referring 
generally to post-trade operations such as trade-matching and 
confirmation, features often dismissed as the “‘plumbing’ of the 
financial system.”
  
93 Derivatives transactions, however, because 
of the lag in time between execution and settlement of the con-
tract and the concomitant counterparty credit risk, create spe-
cial risk-management challenges, requiring ongoing monitoring 
of counterparty creditworthiness and the taking of collateral.94 
The parties can undertake these functions themselves, in the 
case of “bilateral clearing,” or these functions can be centralized 
by means of a “central counterparty” that effectively positions 
itself, through contractual novation, between market partici-
pants taking opposite positions on a risk—that is, between 
buyer and seller.95 All transactions are thus run through the 
clearinghouse which comes to function as “the buyer to every 
seller and the seller to every buyer.”96 The hitherto disor-
ganized world of bilateral derivatives trading comes to resem-
ble an orderly hub-and-spoke arrangement with the clearing-
house at the center of every trade.97
The first thing to notice is that the creation of a central 
counterparty creates an obvious nexus for collecting infor-
 
 
 92. Richard Squire, Clearinghouses and the Rapid Resolution of Bankrupt 
Financial Firms, CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming) (point up problems, however, 
with the idea that netting may mitigate counterparty losses). Richard Squire 
has identified a third potential benefit of a clearinghouse: facilitating “faster 
payouts to creditors when a trading firm fails.” Id. 
 93. Michael H. Moskow, Public Policy and Central Counterparty Clearing, 
30 ECON. PERSPS., no. 4, 2006, at 46. In securities transactions, clearinghous-
es, such as the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation, manage counterpar-
ty risk between institutions by “clearing” and “settling” transactions. See HAL 
S. SCOTT & PHILIP A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, 
POLICY, AND REGULATION 904–06 (9th ed. 2002). 
 94. See Bliss & Steigerwald, supra note 38 and accompanying text; see al-
so Viral V. Acharya et al., Regulating OTC Derivatives, in REGULATING WALL 
STREET: THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FI-
NANCE 367, 399 (Viral V. Acharya et al. eds., 2011). 
 95. See Elizabeth Schubert & Antony Bryceson, Mechanics of Derivatives 
Clearing, PRAC. L., http://us.practicallaw.com/9-505-9203 (providing a chart 
that models the relationship between the end user, counterparty, and clear-
inghouse). 
 96. See COMM. ON PAYMENT AND SETTLEMENT SYSS. & TECHNICAL COMM. 
OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SECS. COMM’NS, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, RECOM-
MENDATIONS FOR CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES 1 (2004). 
 97. See Duffie et al., supra note 51, at 5–6 fig.1.  
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mation about the derivatives market. Clearinghouses centralize 
the collection of information and can facilitate making trade 
and pricing information public.98 They also create a central 
monitoring station to evaluate counterparty creditor-
worthiness that may be able to do so more efficiently than dif-
fuse counterparties individually seeking to assess each other’s 
solvency.99 Finally, central counterparties may provide an easy 
point of entry for regulators seeking either to gain information 
in order to determine whether and how to intervene in the 
market.100
More fundamentally, the rearrangement of the derivatives 
market into a hub-and-spoke arrangement has the effect of re-
distributing the risk inherent in derivatives transactions. To 
see this, recall the two basic forms of risk in derivatives: the 
risk of the underlying and counterparty credit risk. First, with 
regard to the underlying, the clearinghouse remains perfectly 
neutral, taking on no risk at all. Instead, it runs a perfectly 
balanced book, offsetting whatever long position it takes from 
the original seller by a corresponding short position with the 
original buyer and so on with every cleared trade. The clear-
inghouse is thus left with zero exposure to the underlying, the 
risk of which is borne entirely by the original transacting par-
ties. 
 
The situation is reversed with respect to counterparty cred-
it risk. By becoming the seller to every buyer and the buyer to 
every seller,101
 
 98. Roe, supra note 
 the clearinghouse effectively undertakes all 
counterparty credit risk while the transacting parties have zero 
exposure to their original counterparties and, as long as the 
clearinghouse remains solvent, no exposure to counterparty 
credit risk. Or, to say the same thing in a slightly different way, 
the clearinghouse steps in to guarantee the performance of eve-
16, at 1657–58, 1678 (but also noting the counterpoint 
that clearinghouses could lead to “worsening opacity” rather than transparen-
cy); see also Craig Pirrong, The Economics of Clearing in Derivatives Markets: 
Netting, Asymmetric Information, and the Sharing of Default Risks Through a 
Central Counterparty 62 (Jan. 8, 2009) (unpublished) available at http://papers 
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1340660 (noting that while it is rea-
sonable to think clearinghouses improve information access, this goal could be 
achieved without them). 
 99. Roe, supra note 16, at 1658. 
 100. Id. at 1659, 1703 (noting also the counterpoint that establishing clear-
inghouses will divert regulators’ “scarce political and professional resources” 
when better methods of avoiding systemic risk exist); see also Pirrong, supra 
note 98, at 62. 
 101. See supra text accompanying note 96. 
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ry cleared trade.102
Netting reduces total exposure by offsetting losing trades 
against winning ones.
 Whether clearinghouses will be able to con-
tain counterparty credit risk thus becomes the all-important 
question. Fundamentally, they have the same basic tools as 
private parties to manage these risks—that is, netting and col-
lateralization—but the clearinghouse context promises to in-
crease the power of each of these fundamental tools. 
103 Netting is possible bilaterally, but net-
ting works better with centralization because it allows winning 
and losing positions to be traded off among a larger number of 
parties—that is, all members of the clearinghouse.104 With cen-
tral counterparty clearing, netting moves from being a funda-
mentally bilateral system to becoming a multilateral system for 
offsetting gains and losses.105 The increased power of netting is 
at its greatest effect if all trades are cleared via a single clear-
inghouse so that all positions of a dealer—that is, different 
types of swaps, different asset classes, different trading part-
ners—can be netted over the same platform.106 As we shall see, 
the power of central counterparty clearing is reduced as soon as 
the one clearinghouse condition is no longer met.107
The second basic tool that parties to derivatives transac-
tions use to manage risk is collateralization. Here too, clear-
inghouses offer advantages.
  
108 Clearinghouses take collateral, 
referred to as margin, from their members in two forms: initial 
margin and variation margin.109
 
 102. See James T. Moser & David Reiffen, Clearing and Settlement, in 
KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 
 Initial margin is the amount of 
collateral that a member must post to the clearinghouse to 
9, at 263; see also CAOUETTE ET AL., supra note 
45, at 72–75. 
 103. See supra text accompanying note 45. 
 104. Roe, supra note 16, at 1660–62; see also, Craig Pirrong, The Clearing-
house Cure, 31 REG. 44, 47 (Winter 2008–2009); Pirrong, supra note 73, at 8, 
23. 
 105. Roe, supra note 16, at 1657–58. 
 106. See Pirrong, supra note 73, at 3–4; Manmohan Singh, Collateral, Net-
ting and Systemic Risk in the OTC Derivatives Market 5–9 (Int’l Monetary 
Fund, Working Paper No. 10/99, 2010), available at http://www.imf.org/ 
external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/wp1099.pdf. 
 107. See infra Part IV.B. 
 108. But see Craig Pirrong, Clearing and Collateral Mandates: A New Li-
quidity Trap?, 24 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 67, 70 (2012) (describing the “more 
mechanical nature of [clearinghouse] margining methodologies” and how its 
“variation margining process is substantially more rigid than is typical 
in bilateral transactions”); Pirrong, supra note 73, at 17. 
 109. See DAVID LOADER, CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT OF DERIVATIVES 35, 
125–29 (2005).  
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clear a trade.110 Variation margin is exchanged daily between 
the clearinghouse and the trader to reflect changes in value of 
the trader’s position over time.111 The amount of initial margin 
will be based upon the risk posed to the clearinghouse from the 
cleared trade—the expected cost to the clearinghouse of settling 
the trade in the event that the defaulting member fails to make 
a required variation payment.112 The initial margin calculation 
thus depends upon the volatility and liquidity of the underlying 
instrument as well as the size of the trade.113 Variation margin, 
as the name suggests, changes depending upon fluctuations in 
the value of the trade. For relatively liquid instruments, such 
as interest rate swaps, the value of the trade can be marked to 
market and the variation margin easily determined by refer-
ence to the current market value.114 For less liquid instruments 
without a readily ascertainable market value, however, clear-
inghouses will be forced to mark to model,115 thus introducing 
the possibility of error inherent in such models.116
 
 110. See ANDREW M. CHISHOLM, AN INTRODUCTION TO CAPITAL MARKETS: 
PRODUCTS, STRATEGIES, PARTICIPANTS 252–56 (2009). 
 Variation 
 111. Id. 
 112. See Duffie et al., supra note 51, at 7. Should a trader default on a re-
quired variation payment, the clearinghouse would liquidate the instrument 
to settle the trade with the holder of the opposite position. Id. Because there 
will be some time lag between the calculation of and default on the variation 
payment, on the one hand, and the liquidation of the instrument, on the other, 
the clearinghouse must set initial margin at an amount equal to potential 
changes in market value during this time lag. See id. (“The initial margin 
should exceed, in most extreme scenarios, the change in market value of the 
derivatives position over this time window.”). 
 113. See id. (“For example, the initial margin for a credit default swap is 
generally greater than that for an interest rate swap of the same notional size 
because of the potential of sudden changes in the credit quality of borrowers 
referenced in most credit default swaps.”). Liquidity is a consideration because 
“the difference between the bid and offer prices for some types of derivatives 
could suddenly increase during a period of financial stress.” Id. 
 114. See Aline van Duyn & Gregory Meyer, Exchange Template for Deriva-
tives Criticised, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c222f2ae 
-c0dc-11df-94f9-00144feab49a.html#axzz1kt6kO3VU (citing a major dealer’s 
estimate that “the most liquid derivative was the 10-year US dollar interest 
rate swap, with just over 500 trades a day” and that “[t]he most liquid credit 
default swaps, used to place bets or hedge against defaults on debt, were con-
tracts on General Electric, and those traded just 15 times per day”). 
 115. See STEVEN ALLEN, FINANCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT 110–20 (2003). 
 116. On the failure of quantitative models and their consequences, see Fe-
lix Salmon, A Formula for Disaster, WIRED, Mar. 2009, at 74 (detailing the 
success and ultimate failure of David Li’s Gaussian copula formula, a model 
described as “instrumental in causing the unfathomable losses that brought 
the world financial system to its knees”). Another famous example would be 
the failure of the quantitatively driven investment fund Long-Term Capital 
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margins can result in the transfer of funds either way—from 
the trader to the clearinghouse or from the clearinghouse to the 
trader—depending upon fluctuations in the value of the in-
strument, but again, the clearinghouse is always net zero in 
variation margin because the gains of one trader triggering a 
clearinghouse margin payment will be exactly offset by the 
losses of another trader triggering a transfer to the margin ac-
count of the clearinghouse. Clearinghouses offer efficiencies to 
the bilateral trading system by providing for a central place to 
monitor and manage margin accounts. Additionally, the margin 
taken by central counterparties necessary to protect against 
dealer default may be less than the amount of aggregate mar-
gin taken by bilateral counterparties due to the increased pow-
er of central counterparty netting to reduce aggregate expo-
sures.117
In addition to netting and collateralization, central coun-
terparty clearing allows clearinghouse members to mitigate 
counterparty credit risk through loss mutualization.
 
118 Most of-
ten clearinghouse loss mutualization is performed via a guar-
anty fund—that is, a reserve account against member de-
fault.119 Each member, upon joining the clearinghouse, makes a 
contribution to the guaranty fund, separate from and in addi-
tion to the establishment of a margin account.120 The guaranty 
fund is then held by the clearinghouse to settle losses from 
dealer default in excess of margin.121 Central counterparty 
clearing provides a mechanism by which dealers can thus cre-
ate pooled reserves and establish orderly default-management 
procedures.122
 
Management. See generally ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE 
RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (2000). 
  
 117. Again, however, this power depends upon there being one central 
clearinghouse. See infra Part IV.B. 
 118. See STEVEN ALLEN, FINANCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT 507–08 (2d ed. 
2013). 
 119. See Duffie et al., supra note 51, at 7 (defining a clearinghouse’s guar-
anty fund as an “additional layer of defense, after initial margin,” for the pur-
pose of covering losses arising out of the failure of members to perform on a 
cleared derivative).  
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 7, 25. 
 122. Clearinghouses may provide for loss mutualization beyond the guar-
anty fund in the form of further member commitments to cover clearinghouse 
losses, but these additional protections create additional complications that 
may make them rare in practice. Duffie et al., supra note 51, at 19–24.  
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Central counterparty clearing has long been available for 
exchange-traded derivatives and, in general, seems to have 
been an effective means of mitigating counterparty credit 
risk.123 It is therefore not surprising that policymakers and reg-
ulators have seized upon it as a means of mitigating risk in the 
OTC derivatives market. While it is true that many specialized 
OTC contracts may lack the necessary liquidity to be centrally 
cleared,124 the conventional expectation is that “as markets for 
particular contracts mature and as standardized forms of 
transacting and standardized contract terms are adopted (as 
has happened in interest rate swaps, for instance), [central 
counterparty] clearing of OTC derivatives [will] become more 
and more feasible.”125
B. INTERNATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION 
 In focusing on central counterparty clear-
ing as the solution to the problem of systemic risk, policymak-
ers and regulators have thus sought to adapt a mechanism of 
the exchange-traded market to the OTC market. 
The U.S. and Europe have both followed highly particular-
ized rule-based approaches to the implementation of the central 
clearing mandate. Other jurisdictions have offered a more flex-
ible standards-based approach. Still others have been slow to 
take any effort to regulate derivatives trading. 
Mere months after the Pittsburgh G-20 Summit, the U.S. 
Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”).126
 
 123. See Bliss & Steigerwald, supra note 
 Title VII of the 
38, at 23–24 (“[M]ost exchange-
traded derivatives and some OTC derivatives are cleared and settled through 
a CCP.”). 
 124. Id. at 26 (“Many OTC derivatives contracts are too specialized to de-
velop the necessary volume to make central clearing feasible.”). 
 125. Id.; see also DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL 70 (2011) (offer-
ing the view that “a large majority of derivatives will find their way to clear-
inghouses and exchanges within a few years” and citing Professor Duffie’s 
prediction that “60 percent would be cleared within a year, [and] 80 percent 
within four years”). 
 126. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 7, 12, and 15 U.S.C.). The speed with which Dodd-Frank was enacted again 
reflects the fact that, at least with regard to OTC derivatives, U.S. regulatory 
objectives were fixed well in advance of the ultimate formation of international 
consensus. See supra notes 81, 88. This suggests at least that U.S. policymak-
ers at the G-20 pushed for the mandatory clearing of OTC derivatives, a posi-
tion U.K. regulators may have initially resisted. See supra note 88. Because G-
20 proceedings are not public, none of this can be known with certainty, but 
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Dodd-Frank Act focuses on OTC derivatives reform, the center-
piece of which is the clearing mandate.127 The Dodd-Frank Act 
is often explicit in designing the architecture of mandatory 
clearing, expressly carving out commercial hedging transac-
tions128 and granting the Treasury department the power to ex-
empt foreign exchange swaps and forwards from clearing.129 
However, much of the detail work in designing mandatory 
clearing was left to the rule-making of the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC) and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC, collectively, the “Commissions”).130 For ex-
ample, the Commissions are left to decide such critical issues 
as which categories of swaps must ultimately be cleared131 as 
well as the setting of margin and collateral requirements for 
cleared and uncleared swaps.132
 
U.S. law-makers certainly did have a fully-formed statute in hand soon after 
international consensus was reached.  
 
 127. Title VII does more than require mandatory clearing. Among other 
things, it mandates that “swaps entities” register with the SEC or CFTC, as 
appropriate, and enacts rules relating to trading facilities and the reporting of 
derivatives transactions. See Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act 
of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1641 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8301 
(2012)). However, because this Article is focused on the containment of sys-
temic risk and the clearinghouse is the central tool to obtain that end, it will 
focus principally on clearing. 
 128. Commodities Exchange Act § 2(h)(7), 7 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); Securities 
Exchange Act § 3C(g), 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(g) (2012). 
 129. Dodd-Frank Act § 721(a)(21), 7 U.S.C. § 1a(47)(E)(i) (2012). The ex-
emption is only for clearing. Foreign exchange swaps will still have to comply 
with trade reporting and business conduct standards. 
 130. The Dodd-Frank Act gives the CFTC authority to regulate “swaps” 
and the SEC authority to regulate “security-based swaps.” Dodd-Frank Act  
§ 721(a)(21), 7 U.S.C. § 1a (amending CEA section defining swaps); Dodd-
Frank Act § 761(a)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (2012) (amending the Securities Ex-
change Act section defining “securities”). 
 131. Dodd-Frank Act § 723(a)(3) and § 763(a) provide for both “top-down” 
determinations whereby the CFTC and the SEC mandate clearing for a par-
ticular swap and for “bottom-up” determinations whereby the CFTC and SEC 
accept for clearing swaps proposed for clearing by clearinghouses. In either 
case, the determinations of the CFTC and the SEC are to be guided by consid-
erations including: (1) notional exposures, trading liquidity, and adequate 
pricing data, (2) available capacity, operational expertise, credit support and 
clearinghouse resources, (3) the effect on the mitigation of systemic risk con-
sidering the size of the market for the swap, (4) the effect on competition, and 
(5) reasonable legal certainty concerning how collateral and other funds would 
be distributed in the event of clearinghouse or member default. Commodities 
Exchange Act § 2(h)(2)(D), 7 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); Securities Exchange Act  
§ 3C(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(b)(4) (2012).  
 132. Commodities Exchange Act § 4s(e)(2)(C), 7 U.S.C. § 19 (2012); Securi-
ties Exchange Act  § 15F(e)(2)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-10 (2012). 
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The Commissions have engaged in extensive rule-making 
on all issues within their regulatory purview, crafting a highly 
particularized set of rules and obligations to govern the deriva-
tives marketplace. For example, with regard to margin and col-
lateral, the Commissions generally require clearinghouses to 
take sufficient collateral to withstand the default of its one or 
two largest members, depending on a set of factors.133 Margin 
requirements are to be determined by “risk-based models,” the 
details of which are left to the clearinghouses themselves,134 but 
regulations require that funds posted as collateral be segregat-
ed, a rule that insulates swaps participants from “fellow cus-
tomer risk” at the likely cost of higher margin requirements 
generally.135
 
 133. The CFTC requires sufficient collateral to withstand the default of the 
single largest member unless the clearinghouse is “systemically important,” in 
which case it must be able to withstand the default of its two largest members. 
See Derivatives Clearing Organization General Provisions and Core Princi-
ples, 76 Fed. Reg. 69,334, 69,334–45 (Nov. 8, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pts. 1, 21, 39, 140). On the factors for deeming an institution to be “systemical-
ly important,” see 12 U.S.C. § 5468 (2012). The SEC requires clearinghouses to 
“maintain sufficient financial resources to withstand, at a minimum, a default 
by the two participants to which it has the largest exposures in extreme but 
plausible market conditions” unless the clearinghouse does not clear CDS, in 
which case it need withstand the default only of its single largest member. See 
Clearing Agency Standards for Operation and Governance, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 64,017, 76 Fed. Reg. 14,472, 14,479 (proposed Mar. 16, 2011) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
 Finally, for uncleared swaps, the regulations re-
quire significant posting of initial and variation margin and 
limit margin collateral to cash and a very small subset of safe 
 134. Clearing Agency Standards for Operation and Governance, 76 Fed. 
Reg. at 14,479; see also Derivatives Clearing Organization General Provisions 
and Core Principles, 76 Fed. Reg. 69,334, 69,365 (Nov. 8, 2011) (codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 1, 21, 39, 140). The CFTC offers a bit more detail, requiring that 
the clearinghouses “appropriately address jump-to-default risk” but leaving all 
details up to the discretion of the clearinghouses themselves. Risk Manage-
ment Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 
3698, 3704 (proposed Jan. 20, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 39). Jump-
to-default risk is “the risk that the sudden onset of a credit event will cause an 
abrupt change in a firm’s CDS exposure.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OF-
FICE, GAO-09-397T, SYSTEMIC RISK: REGULATORY OVERSIGHT AND RECENT 
INITIATIVES TO ADDRESS RISK POSED BY CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS 3 (2009). 
 135. CFTC, Protection of Cleared Swaps Customer Contracts and Collat-
eral; Conforming Amendments to the Commodity Broker Bankruptcy Provi-
sions, 17 C.F.R. pts. 22, 190 (Feb. 7, 2012). Rule-making providing for the seg-
regation of customer accounts was required by the Dodd-Frank Act. § 724(a), 7 
U.S.C. § 6d (amending the CEA by requiring clearinghouses and members to 
segregate customer collateral and not use the collateral of one customer to 
cover the obligations of another). 
  
1320 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:1291 
 
securities to be independently held and subject to reinvestment 
restrictions.136
The clearinghouse mandate in the U.S. has thus taken the 
form of a highly detailed, largely prescriptive set of require-
ments. The implementing regulations are rules as opposed to 
standards. Moreover, in some cases, the rewriting of deriva-
tives regulation has been used to advance policy agendas that 
depart from or are otherwise tangential to the minimization of 
systemic risk, such as domestic energy policy,
  
137 general mar-
ketplace fairness,138 and other structural issues concerning the 
derivatives market.139
The European Union, like the U.S., has adopted a highly 
particularized, rule-based approach to derivative regulation. 
The principal legislation aimed at reforming the OTC deriva-
tive market—the European Market Infrastructure Regulation 
(EMIR)–was adopted by the European Parliament in March 
2012
 
140 and will be effective in all member states once imple-
menting regulations are adopted, a process projected to be 
complete before the end of 2013.141
 
 136. Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Ma-
jor Swap Participants, 76 Fed. Reg. 23,732 (proposed Apr. 28, 2011) (to be cod-
ified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 23) (such safe securities include U.S. Treasuries and, for 
initial margin only, government agency securities). 
 Consistent with the pre-
 137. See Aggregation, Position Limits for Futures and Swaps, 77 Fed. Reg. 
31,767 (proposed May 30, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 151) (empower-
ing the CFTC to impose position limits on certain physically-settled deriva-
tives contracts, including gasoline and oil, to prevent speculative activity from 
raising prices in U.S. markets); see also Brief for Senator Levin et al.  as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Defendant in ISDA v. CFTC,  No. 12-5362, 2013 WL 
1739657 (explaining position limits rule as motivated to prevent speculation 
from driving up oil prices). 
 138. For example, the “real time clearing” rule. See CFTC, FACTSHEET: 
CUSTOMER CLEARING DOCUMENTATION, TIMING OF ACCEPTANCE FOR CLEAR-
ING, AND CLEARING MEMBER RISK MANAGEMENT, available at http://www.cftc 
.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/ccd_tac_cmrm_factsheet_ 
final.pdf. 
 139. An example of the last of these is DCM Core Principle No. 9, which 
generally requires futures and options transactions to be executed in an open 
and competitive fashion. However, industry participants have complained that 
the rule’s requirement that 85% of a product’s trading volume take place on 
the centralized market within one year’s time stifles innovation and has the 
perverse effect of pushing products off of exchanges into the more opaque 
world of bilateral trading. Anonymous Industry Interview (June 22, 2012). 
 140. Position of the European Parliament of 29 March 2012, EUR. PARL. 
DOC. (COD/2010/0250) (2012). 
 141. Other proposed European regulations touching on derivatives market 
reforms include MiFID (Dec 2010), Revised MiFID (October 2011), and MiFIR 
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scriptive rule-based approach of U.S. regulation, EMIR imposes 
minimum capital requirements for clearinghouses142 and pro-
vides for margin requirements and other prudential standards 
to be further specified in implementing regulations.143 A segre-
gation rule is contemplated by the European legislation, but it 
does not appear to be fully aligned with the segregation rule re-
cently adopted in the U.S. by the CFTC.144 Finally, as in the 
U.S., the European legislation allows the technical regulators—
there, the European Securities and Markets Authority 
(ESMA)—to decide the scope of what ultimately must be 
cleared.145 Thus, although there are some differences between 
the two regulatory regimes and the potential for greater regu-
latory divergence going forward, currently the U.S. and Euro-
pean approaches are closely aligned, both in substance and in 
form as highly prescriptive, rule-oriented regimes.146
Apart from the U.S. and Europe, only Japan has adopted a 
robust regulatory structure for OTC derivatives, having 
amended the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act (FIEA) 
in 2010 to grant the Japanese Financial Services Agency in-
 
 
(Oct 2011). EMIR, however, is the focus of this discussion because it is princi-
pally focused on clearing as opposed to exchanges and trading. 
 142. 2012 O.J. (17), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:201:0001:0059:EN:PDF. But unlike U.S. rules, 
the European regulations do not exempt foreign exchange swaps and have a 
significantly more narrow exemption for noncommercial hedging. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See U.S. and EU OTC Derivatives Regulation ― A Comparison of the 
Regimes, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, Apr. 23, 2012, http://www.sidley.com/US-and 
-EU-OTC-Derivatives-Regulation--a-Comparison-of-the-Regimes-04-23-2012/ 
(last visited Mar. 11, 2014). 
 145. EMIR FAQ, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Dec.18, 2013, http://ec.europa 
.eu/internal_market/financial-markets/docs/derivatives/emir-faqs_en.pdf (spec-
ifying both a top-down and bottom-up means for inclusion similar to U.S. re-
quirements). 
 146. For example, while both regimes envision registration and conduct of 
business rules for dealers, the U.S. regime also extends registration, conduct 
of business and margin/capital rules to major swap participants. The EU re-
gime only imposes limited rules (including margin/capital requirements) on 
non-financial counterparties subject to the clearing obligation. Both regimes 
allocate considerable discretion to regulators and would thus diverge should 
the regulators exercise that discretion differently. For example, it is at least 
possible that regulators in one regime will be more aggressive in defining the 
scope of covered swaps than regulators in the other regime, the result of which 
would be to create large de facto differences between the functioning of the two 
regimes. Significant differences in enforcement may also arise. 
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creased authority to regulate OTC derivatives.147 FIEA calls for 
mandatory clearing of high-volume OTC derivatives as well as 
for other OTC derivatives where the reduction of risk through 
central clearing is deemed necessary for stability of the Japa-
nese market, with decisions regarding specific instruments to 
be left to cabinet officials.148 Capital requirements for Japanese 
derivatives dealers are based on Basel II, which Japan has im-
plemented.149
The same cannot be said for most other countries. Alt-
hough several countries have formed commissions to study the 
issue, none are as far along in implementing a framework for 
regulating OTC derivatives as the United States, Europe, and 
Japan.
 In spite of being at an earlier stage of develop-
ment than U.S. and European regulatory efforts, Japan ap-
pears to be on track in implementing a broadly similar 
regulatory architecture. 
150 In their efforts, countries seem to range from general-
ly amenable but not particularly interested,151
 
 147. See FIN. SERV. AGENCY, OUTLINE FOR THE BILL FOR AMENDMENT OF 
THE FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AND EXCHANGE ACT, available at http://www 
.fsa.go.jp/en/refer/diet/174/01.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2014).  
 to vaguely disin-
 148. FIN. STABILITY BD., OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET REFORMS (2011). 
 149. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM. & COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM., 
JOINT REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL SWAP REGULATION 74 (2012) [hereinafter 
JOINT REPORT]. 
 150. Hong Kong may be closest, proposing an OTC regulatory regime in 
October 2011; however, many aspects of this regime have yet to be worked out. 
H.K. MONETARY AUTH., CONSULTATION PAPER ON THE PROPOSED REGULATO-
RY REGIME FOR THE OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES MARKET IN HONG 
KONG (2011), available at https://www.sfc.hk/sfcConsultation/EN/sfcConsult 
FileServlet?name=otcreg&type=1&docno=1. Singapore would seem to be next, 
having issued a consultation report proposing a regulatory framework for OTC 
derivatives in May 2012 with plans to introduce legislation by the end of 2012. 
MONETARY AUTH. OF SING., CONSULTATION PAPER I ON PROPOSED AMEND-
MENTS TO THE SECURITIES AND FUTURES ACT ON REGULATION OF OTC DERIV-
ATIVES (2012).  
 151. Australia may belong in this category, a country that does not current-
ly regulate OTC derivatives transactions but that released a discussion paper 
suggesting that it would likely harmonize its regulation to comport with that 
of other major jurisdictions. TREASURY OF AUSTL., HANDLING AND USE OF CLI-
ENT MONEY IN RELATION TO OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES TRANSACTIONS 
16–18 (2011), available at http://archive.treasury.gov.au/documents/2231/PDF/ 
DP_Client_Monies_OTC.pdf; see also TREASURY OF AUSTL., COUNCIL OF FIN. 
REGULATORS, OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET REFORM CONSIDERATIONS 31 (2012), 
available at http://www.treasury.gov.au/~/media/Treasury/Publications% 
20and%20Media/Publications/2012/CFR%20report%20on%20over%20the% 
20counter%20derivatives/Downloads/PDF/CFR%20Report.ashx. 
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clined,152 to an apparent lack of interest in any form of OTC de-
rivatives regulation.153 As long as important jurisdictions offer 
no significant regulation of OTC derivatives and those that do 
differ widely in regulatory detail or resources available for en-
forcement, there is significant scope for departures from the 
regulatory regime outlined by the G-20.154
Alert to this prospect, the G-20 at its meeting in Mexico 
City in June 2012, stressed the importance of collective action 
to implement financial stability, focusing special attention on 
the regulation of OTC derivatives.
  
155 Several reports released in 
connection with the Mexico City meetings stressed the need for 
international conformity in derivatives regulation, lauding the 
progress made by leading jurisdictions but cautioning that 
“considerable further work is needed in many jurisdictions to 
fully meet the G20 objectives” and that “[c]lose cooperation 
across major markets will be needed to address overlapping 
regulations.”156 Ultimately, the organization reaffirmed its 
commitment to “multilateralism” and underscored the role of 
the FSB in persuading members to live up to their commit-
ments.157
 
 152. This may include China, which has indicated only that it is consider-
ing whether mandatory clearing is suitable for its markets. FIN. STABILITY 
BD., supra note 
 The underlying concern here—that incomplete cross-
148, at tbls.2 & 6. 
 153. Brazil, which requires mandatory clearing only for exchange traded 
derivatives and has no plans to mandate clearing of OTC derivatives, would be 
in this category. See JOINT REPORT, supra note 149, at 57–60. 
 154. A robust rule structure that is unenforced, of course, is little better 
than no rule structure at all. See generally JOINT REPORT, supra note 149, at 
99. 
 155. See G20, TOWARD LASTING STABILITY AND GROWTH: UMBRELLA RE-
PORT FOR G-20 MUTUAL ASSESSMENT PROCESS (2012). 
 156. FIN. STABILITY BD., PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE G20 RECOM-
MENDATIONS ON FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: STATUS REPORT BY THE 
FSB SECRETARIAT 5 (2012); see also OICU-IOSCO, THE CREDIT DEFAULT 
SWAP MARKET (2012); FIN. STABILITY BD., OTC DERIVATIVE MARKET RE-
FORMS: THIRD PROGRESS REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION (2012); FIN. STABILITY 
BD., OVERVIEW OF PROGRESS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE G20 RECOM-
MENDATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING FINANCIAL STABILITY (2012); FSB-IMF, 
IDENTIFYING THE EFFECTS OF REGULATORY REFORMS ON EMERGING MARKET 
AND DEVELOPING ECONOMIES: A REVIEW OF POTENTIAL UNINTENDED CONSE-
QUENCES (2012). 
 157. G20 Leaders Declaration, THE WHITE HOUSE (June 19, 2012), http:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/19/g20-leaders-declaration (last 
visited Mar. 11, 2014) (“[W]e have agreed that multilateralism is of even 
greater importance in the current climate, and remains our best asset to re-
solve the global economy's difficulties.”). 
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border harmonization will lead to regulatory failure—is ad-
dressed in the next Part. 
III.  REGULATORY ARBITRAGE AND UNIFORM 
REGULATION   
The global nature of finance in general and of derivatives 
in particular makes it theoretically possible for transacting 
parties to avoid regulation by shifting the locus of their trans-
actions from a highly regulated jurisdiction to a less regulated 
one. In the context of derivatives regulation, if a jurisdiction, 
Country A, were to impose mandatory clearing on derivatives 
transactions within its borders, the locus of such transactions 
could easily shift to another jurisdiction, Country B. Moreover, 
were this to occur, the financial system of Country A would be 
no safer from systemic risk notwithstanding its regulatory zeal 
since financial institutions operating within its borders would 
remain exposed to risk as a result of their transactions else-
where. This ability to evade regulation by taking business to 
other jurisdictions is what is commonly referred to as regulato-
ry arbitrage.158
Regulators in the U.S. have been attuned to the possibility 
of regulatory arbitrage from the beginning of the regulatory 
process. In public statements, leading policymakers and regula-
tors have reaffirmed this message. For example, U.S. Treasury 
Secretary Timothy Geithner has emphasized the need to “pro-
tect against cross-border gamesmanship” in financial regula-
tion.
 
159
 
 158. See, e.g., Anupam Chander & Randall Costa, Clearing Credit Default 
Swaps: A Case Study in Global Legal Convergence, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 639, 640 
(2010) (“Because of the possibility of regulatory arbitrage, there is a case not 
just for CCP clearing but also for regulatory convergence or harmonization.”); 
Christian A. Johnson, Regulatory Arbitrage, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and 
Dodd-Frank: The Implications of US Global OTC Derivative Regulation (Oct. 
30, 2012) (unpublished), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2169401 (discussing the regulatory arbitrage problem created by 
the Dodd-Frank Act and the extraterritorial authority given to the CFTC to 
address these problems). 
 Likewise, U.S. Under-Secretary of the Treasury for In-
ternational Affairs, Lael Brainard, testified before Congress 
that regulatory arbitrage “means a ‘race to the bottom’ for 
standards and protections. . . . And it may increase the possibil-
ity of future financial instability, if riskier activities migrate to 
 159. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Treasury, Treasury Sec’y Timothy F. 
Geithner Written Testimony House Fin. Serv. Comm. Fin. Regulatory Reform 
(Sept. 23, 2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press 
-releases/Pages/tg296.aspx.  
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areas with less transparency, looser regulation, and laxer su-
pervision.”160 And CFTC Chairman, Gary Gensler, stated in a 
speech before the European Parliament that: “Effective reform 
cannot be accomplished by one nation alone. It will require a 
comprehensive, international response. The response to the 
global financial crisis lies in efforts by governments to bring 
about a harmonious global regime of financial regulations.”161
The standard response to the possibility of regulatory arbi-
trage is the adoption of a unified regulatory regime—that is, 
the adoption of uniform rules and standards by all relevant re-
gimes.
  
162 The can be accomplished by fiat—when there is a top 
level policymaker with authority to impose rules downward in 
a hierarchical arrangement—a role, for example, that is often 
played by the federal government in the United States when 
divergent policies among the states are deemed undesirable.163
In the context of OTC derivative regulation, U.S. regula-
tors have pursued regulatory uniformity through harmoniza-
tion, on the one hand, in which they have worked across na-
tional borders to urge their foreign counterparts to adopt a 
similar approach to derivative regulation. Failing that, U.S. 
regulators have shown a willingness, on the other hand, to fall 
back on a regulatory mode closer to imposition of rule by fiat—
that is, extraterritorial application of U.S. law. This Part ex-
plores the issues raised by the prospect of regulatory arbitrage 
in derivatives regulation and describes efforts in the U.S. to re-
spond to those issues through regulatory harmonization and 
extraterritorial application of U.S. law. 
 
In the context of global financial regulation, however, there is 
no body with sufficient authority to transcend national sover-
eigns. As a result, regulatory unity must be achieved through 
other means. 
 
 160. See Financial Regulatory Reform: The International Context: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 12 (2011) (statement of Lael 
Brainard, Under Sec’y for Int’l Affairs).  
 161. See Gary Gensler, Chairman, Commodity Futures Trading Comm., 
Remarks Before the European Parliament (Mar. 22, 2011), available at 
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-75. 
 162. See, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections 
Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (arguing in favor of harmonization 
through the imposition of federal corporate law in response to supposed “race 
to the bottom” among states in the design of their corporate law). But see 
ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993) (mak-
ing the opposite point that regulatory competition drives states to adopt effi-
cient corporate law). 
 163. See Cary, supra note 162. 
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A. ARBITRAGE OPPORTUNITIES 
Before proceeding to solve the “problem” of regulatory arbi-
trage, however, it is worth pausing to consider what a charge of 
regulatory arbitrage really implies. The core narrative, ab-
stracted from any particular issue, seems to be:  
A regulated entity’s movement of business from Jurisdiction A, which 
has adopted Regulatory Strategy X addressing Problem Y, to Juris-
diction B, which has not adopted Regulatory Strategy X and in which 
it is therefore less costly to conduct business. 
This definition, however, does not clearly establish regula-
tory arbitrage as a problem to be solved. First, there is no pri-
ma facie reason to believe that Jurisdiction B does not have an-
other, potentially superior means of addressing Problem Y or 
that Jurisdiction A efficiently targets Problem Y such that the 
costs of compliance do not outweigh the probability adjusted 
cost of the harm averted. In order to view regulatory arbitrage 
as a problem and not merely as a manifestation of (potentially 
efficiency-enhancing) jurisdictional competition, a number of 
sub-narratives must be smuggled into the basic definition to 
answer such questions as why Jurisdiction B (or any other ju-
risdiction) would adopt a regulatory strategy that threatened to 
destroy its financial system or why any financial institution 
would willingly move to a financial system that imposed great-
er risk of loss and failure upon it. It may be possible, in some 
instances at least, to provide satisfactory answers to these 
questions focusing on such problems as externalities,164 moral 
hazard,165 agency costs,166 regulatory capture,167 or some combi-
nation of these.168
 
 164. See J.J. Lafont, Externalities, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008) (“Ex-
ternalities are indirect effects of consumption or production activity, that is, 
effects on agents other than the originator of such activity which do not work 
through the price system.”). In the context of regulatory arbitrage, the ability 
of one jurisdiction to impose the costs of activity on another jurisdiction while 
enjoying all of the benefits creates a classic externality problem, often referred 
to in this context as “spillover effects.”  
  
 165. See generally Y. Kotowitz, Moral Hazard, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DIC-
TIONARY OF ECONOMICS, supra note 164 (“Moral hazard may be defined as ac-
tions of economic agents in maximizing their own utility to the detriment of 
others, in situations where they do not bear the full consequences or, equiva-
lently, do not enjoy the full benefits of their actions due to uncertainty and in-
complete information or restricted contracts which prevent the assignment of 
full damages (benefits) to the agent responsible.” (emphasis omitted)). See also 
KEOHANE, supra note 16, at 95–96 (discussing moral hazard in the context of 
international banking). A moral hazard account of the problem, for example, 
might argue that Jurisdiction B has defected from the efficient regulatory 
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The point here is that in order to view regulatory arbitrage 
as a problem to be solved, rather than a natural, even desirable 
outcome, it is not enough merely to note the possibility that 
business may move from one jurisdiction to another. There 
must also be some account of why the preferred regulatory re-
gime is superior to the regulatory choice of the alternative ju-
risdiction as well as some account of why regulators in the al-
ternative jurisdiction are themselves unwilling or unable to 
solve the problem. A more complete definitional structure for 
regulatory arbitrage might thus be: 
A regulated entity’s movement of business from Jurisdiction A, which 
has adopted efficient Regulatory Strategy X addressing Problem Y, to 
Jurisdiction B, which has defected from efficient Regulatory Strategy 
X (for reasons of moral hazard or agency costs or other) and therefore 
fails to adequately address Problem Y and in which it is therefore less 
costly to conduct business. 
This definitional structure foregrounds each of the contest-
able aspects of the claim—that is, the efficiency of Regulatory 
Strategy X and the defection of Jurisdiction B—thus forcing the 
 
strategy because it anticipates that if it is brought to the brink of failure by 
low quality regulation (or for any other reason), other countries will bail out 
its financial system rather than allow it to fail. By defecting from the efficient 
regulatory regime, Jurisdiction B thus enjoys the full benefit (increased finan-
cial activity) and only a portion of the cost (failure of its financial system) of its 
activities. 
 166. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the 
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. 
ECON. 305, 308 (1976) (“[I]t is generally impossible for the principal or the 
agent at zero cost to ensure that the agent will make optimal decisions from 
the principal’s viewpoint . . . . [T]here will be some divergence between the 
agent’s decisions and those decisions which would maximize the welfare of the 
principal.” (citation omitted)). An agency cost account of the problem, for ex-
ample, might argue that Jurisdiction B has defected from the efficient regula-
tory regime because some of its ministers have calculated that their personal 
benefit from increased financial activity outweighs the personal cost of failure 
of the financial system because failure of the financial system, if it ever occurs, 
is off in the indefinite future at which time the ministers are likely to occupy 
other (higher) offices, whereas the benefit of increased financial activity and 
the revenues generated thereby will help them reach higher office. 
 167. See generally Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, The Politics of Gov-
ernment Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture, 106 Q. J. ECON. 
1089 (1991). 
 168. These accounts can (and often do) co-exist. Moreover, similar accounts 
may apply to financial institutions. For example, a financial institution may 
expect a bailout (moral hazard) or be run by managers who are compensated 
more for taking risk than for managing it (agency costs) while at the same 
time benefiting from a rule structure that enables the institution to receive the 
benefits of its activities while imposing the costs on someone else (an external-
ity). 
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party claiming regulatory arbitrage to provide an account of 
each contestable claim. Such an account is critical if regulatory 
arbitrage is to be adequately distinguished from regulatory 
competition.169
The distinction between regulatory arbitrage and regulato-
ry competition is crucial because regulatory competition has 
many salutatory effects. First and most obviously, it reduces 
the transaction costs of regulated entities by allowing them to 
move to the regime with the least costly effective regulation. In 
the context of financial institutions, this is especially signifi-
cant because such savings can translate into lower cost of credit 
for businesses seeking access to capital. Second, regulatory 
competition provides an incentive for regulators in different ju-
risdictions to innovate in search of more efficient regulation. 
More efficient regulation may either achieve the same regula-
tory result at a lower cost or a better regulatory result at the 
same cost. Regulators have an incentive to seek efficient regu-
latory solutions in order to maintain their authority over regu-
lated entities that may otherwise have an incentive to move 
elsewhere. The resulting emphasis on regulatory efficiency 
would prevent policymakers from pursuing agendas that depart 
from or are largely tangential to the underlying purpose of the 
regulation.
  
170 Third, by encouraging regulators to experiment 
and seek innovative solutions to the problems of regulated enti-
ties, regulatory competition generates information about the 
availability and the effectiveness of regulatory alternatives.171
The problem is that in seeking to solve the problem of regu-
latory arbitrage, regulators rarely acknowledge the potential 
for regulatory competition. They are neither made to defend 
their regulatory regime as the most efficient, nor are they 
asked to explain why other regulatory structures are necessari-
ly inferior. This certainly was the pattern at the G-20, where 
mandatory clearing was promoted without either considering 
 
 
 169. See, e.g., Ethiopis Tafara & Robert J. Peterson, A Blueprint for Cross-
Border Access to U.S. Investors: A New International Framework, 48 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 31, 52 (2007) (distinguishing between regulatory arbitrage and regu-
latory competition on the basis of the quality and cost of alternative regulatory 
regimes). 
 170. See supra notes 137–39 and accompanying text (discussing this possi-
bility and providing examples). 
 171. See generally Romano, supra note 16, at 7 (arguing that a regime 
where experimentation was encouraged “would generate information and for-
malize an ongoing testing of assumptions in the search for better regulatory 
solutions”). 
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regulatory alternatives or providing a means for experimenta-
tion in regulatory design.172
B. CREATING UNIFORMITY: EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND 
HARMONIZATION 
 Likewise, in the United States, pol-
icymakers have consistently treated the availability of alterna-
tive regulatory regimes as a problem to be solved, first through 
harmonization, then if necessary, through an exercise of extra-
territorial jurisdiction. 
Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act acknowledges the global 
nature of the derivatives marketplace and directs the Commis-
sions to consult and coordinate with their counterparts over-
seas to promote effective and consistent global regulation of de-
rivatives.173 As already noted, global consistency in this context 
has been taken to mean an international regulatory structure 
organized around mandatory clearing.174 U.S. regulatory au-
thorities have been engaged in conversations of this sort since 
reform efforts began. They have all been aimed at achieving 
uniform regulation through regulatory harmonization.175
Should those discussions fail to achieve a sufficiently uni-
form global regulatory environment, however, the Dodd-Frank 
Act expressly provides the Commissions with authority to pro-
hibit entities from non-compliant jurisdictions from participat-
ing in U.S. markets.
  
176 Under the Act, the Commissions are 
empowered to regulate risk-creating activities, wherever in the 
world they originate, if they “have a direct and significant con-
nection with activities in, or effect on, commerce in the United 
States.”177 Additionally, in language that directly raises the 
prospect of regulatory arbitrage, the Commissions are given 
broad authority to “prevent the evasion” of U.S. rules.178
 
 172. The consideration of unintended consequences emerged only in the 
most recent (Mexico) meeting of the G-20. See FSB-IMF, supra note 
 Alt-
156, at 1.  
 173. Dodd-Frank Act § 752, 15 U.S.C. § 8325 (2012). 
 174. See supra notes 81, 88, and 126 (describing the appearance of manda-
tory central counterparty clearing first as a U.S. policy agenda, followed by its 
articulation as a global commitment). 
 175. See, e.g., JOINT REPORT, supra note 149, at 6–10 (describing formal 
comments received from foreign jurisdictions in connection with international 
swap regulations). 
 176. Dodd-Frank Act § 715, 15 U.S.C. § 8305; id. § 722, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1672 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 
U.S.C.).  
 177. Id. § 722(d), 7 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 178. Id. 
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hough it also refers vaguely to principles of “international comi-
ty,”179 the Act is unambiguous in authorizing U.S. regulators to 
impose uniformity through extraterritorial application of U.S. 
law.180
1. The CFTC Asserts Broad Extraterritorial Regulatory 
Authority 
 In the summer of 2012, U.S. regulators, starting with 
the CFTC, began to wield this power. 
On June 29, 2012, the CFTC released interpretive guid-
ance on “cross-border application of certain swaps provisions of 
the Commodity Exchange Act” (the “Proposed Guidance”).181 
Although it follows Congress in paying homage to the im-
portance of international comity,182
 
 179. Id. § 929Y (not to be codified) (requiring the SEC to solicit public 
comment and conduct a study to determine the extent to which private anti-
fraud rights of action should be extended extraterritorially). 
 in fact, the Proposed Guid-
 180. Congress subsequently questioned the wisdom of such broad extrater-
ritoriality but failed ultimately to restrict it. A bill, H.R. 3283, was subse-
quently introduced in the House of Representatives that would have clarified 
the applicability of Dodd-Frank to non-U.S. swap dealers and market partici-
pants by amending the Commodity Exchange Act and the Securities Exchange 
Act to carving out transactions between U.S. persons and non-U.S. persons. 
H.R. 3283, 112 Cong. (2011). Specifically, the bill provided that the provisions 
of Title VII of Dodd-Frank would not apply to non-U.S. persons as long as the 
parties reported the transaction to a swap data repository. Moreover, the bill 
expressly permitted non-U.S. persons to comply with capital requirements in 
their home jurisdictions rather than those mandated by U.S. regulation. Id. 
After seven months stagnation in the House Committee on Agriculture, the 
bill was committed in December 2012 to the Committee of the Whole House on 
the State of the Union. Bill Summary & Status, 112th Cong., H.R. 3283, 
THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:h.r.3283: (last visited 
Mar. 11, 2014).  
 181. Cross-Border Application of Certain Swaps Provisions of the Commod-
ity Exchange Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,214, 41,238 (July 12, 2012) [hereinafter 
Proposed Guidance]. By framing the release as interpretive guidance rather 
than a proposed rule (in spite of its many rule-like provisions), the CFTC was 
not required to perform a cost-benefit analysis of the proposals in the release. 
See generally Commodities Exchange Act § 15(a), 7 U.S.C. § 19 (2012) (requir-
ing the CFTC to conduct a cost-benefit analysis before issuing an order); 5 
U.S.C. §§ 551–59 (2012) (incorporating provisions from the former Administra-
tive Procedure Act of 1946). This drew complaints by some in Congress. See 
Letter from Scott Garrett (R-NJ) and Randy Neugebauer (R-Tex.) to Hon. 
Gary Gensler, Chairman, CFTC 2 (June 20, 2012). 
 182. See Proposed Guidance, supra note 181, at 41,223 (“The Supreme 
Court has held that ‘an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate 
the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.’ Jurisdiction is 
generally construed, ‘to avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign 
authority of other nations.’ The . . . Supreme Court has [also] noted that the 
principles in the Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law are relevant to 
the interpretation of U.S. law.” (citations omitted)); see also id. at 41,240 
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ance amounts to an aggressive assertion of extraterritorial reg-
ulatory authority.183 The basic structure of the Proposed Guid-
ance is threefold. First, the Proposed Guidance identifies those 
institutions so intertwined with U.S.-facing swap activity that 
they must submit to U.S. regulation, either as swap dealers or 
major swap participants, thereby drawing foreign entities with 
more than a de minimis level of U.S. contact in their swap deal-
ings into the ambit of U.S. regulation.184 Second, it classifies the 
CFTC’s regulations according to whether they will apply to in-
stitutions as a whole (“entity-level requirements”) or to swaps 
on a per-transaction basis (“transaction-level requirements”).185 
Third, it creates a structure for “substituted compliance” ac-
cording to which entity-level regulatory compliance may be 
waived on the basis of a substantially similar regime in the en-
tity’s home jurisdiction.186 Generally, however, the Proposed 
Guidance denies substituted compliance for transaction-level 
regulations, exempting from U.S. transaction-level regulations 
only those transactions that a foreign swap participant enters 
into with a foreign counterparty not guaranteed by or otherwise 
operating as a conduit to a U.S. entity.187
 
(statement of Commissioner Scott D. O’Malia) (“Although the Proposed Guid-
ance expressly states that the Commission will exercise its regulatory authori-
ty over cross-border activities in a manner consistent with principles of inter-
national comity, the Commission’s proposed approach could be described as 
unilateral and dismissive of foreign law, even when those laws may achieve 
the same results sought by the Commission.”) (citation omitted).  
 In other words, the 
 183. The Proposed Guidance attracted significant controversy both inside 
and outside of the CFTC for precisely this reason. Although there were no dis-
sents, two Commissioners filed critical concurrences. See id. at 41,239 (state-
ment of Commissioner Jill Sommers) (noting that the “current document” does 
not contain the same aggressive “[i]ntergalactic” interpretation of regulatory 
authority originally advocated but criticizing the document for “ignor[ing] the 
Commission’s successful history of mutual recognition of foreign regulatory 
regimes”); id. at 41,241 (statement of Commissioner Scott D. O’Malia) (warn-
ing that if the CFTC were to adopt the proposals as rules, it would “take an 
imperialistic view of the swaps market” and rest on a “shaky legal analysis”). 
O’Malia also noted in his concurrence that “if I were asked to vote on the Pro-
posed Guidance as final, my vote would be no.” Id. For an example of the con-
troversy engendered outside of the CFTC, see Editorial, Regulator of the 
World, WALL ST. J., May 27, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10014 
24127887323372504578469280840360860. 
 184. See 7 U.S.C. § 1a(33) (2012) (defining “major swap participant”); see 
also Further Definition of “Swap Dealer,” “Security-Based Swap Participant,” 
“Major Security-Based Swap Participant,” and “Eligible Contract Participant,” 
77 Fed. Reg. 30,596 (May 23, 2012) [hereinafter Final Entity Rules].  
 185. Proposed Guidance, supra note 181, at 41,223–24. 
 186. Id. at 41,227. 
 187. Id. at 41,228 (“[T]he Commission proposes to interpret section 2(i) in a 
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CFTC claims authority to write the rules for all swap partici-
pants worldwide that transact with U.S. entities but promises 
to offer exemptions on a case-by-case basis, depending upon its 
assessment on the comparability in terms of coverage and qual-
ity of foreign regulatory regimes.  
The gateway to U.S. swap regulation is engaging in swap 
transactions, either as a dealer or a participant, above a de 
minimis threshold over a twelve-month period.188 Once an enti-
ty exceeds this threshold amount and must register with the 
CFTC, it is fully subject to U.S. regulation irrespective of where 
in the world it is based.189 The scope the CFTC’s cross-border 
regulatory reach thus turns on the technical question of how 
entities must aggregate transactions in measuring their activi-
ties against the applicable threshold. “U.S. persons” must ag-
gregate all positions, regardless of counterparty, on the theory 
that defaults by foreign and domestic counterparties may 
equally jeopardize the financial stability of the U.S. entity.190 
However, in defining “U.S. person,” the Proposed Guidance in-
cludes both a territorial element as well as an element taking 
into account the potential for the consequences of those entities 
organized elsewhere to have an impact in the United States.191
 
manner so as to require non-U.S. swap dealers and non-U.S. MSPs to comply 
with Transaction-Level Requirements for all of their swaps with U.S. persons  
. . . . [I]n most cases, the Commission does not intend to permit substituted 
compliance for the Transaction-Level Requirements . . . .”). 
 
 188. The de minimis exemption for swap dealers is $3 billion ($8 billion 
during the regulations’ phase-in period). See Final Entity Rules, supra note 
184, at 30,744. CFTC regulations define “major swap participant” as someone 
who is not a swap dealer, but who maintains a “substantial position” in swaps, 
not including commercial hedging, or whose positions create “substantial 
counterparty exposure.” Id. at 30,746. Substantial position has two tests, both 
of which must be satisfied to avoid qualifying as a major swap participant. Id. 
The first measures current net uncollateralized exposure (threshold of $1 bil-
lion, except for rate swaps which have a threshold of $3 billion) and the second 
takes into account future uncollateralized exposure (threshold of $2 billion, 
except for rate swaps which have a $6 billion threshold). Id. at 30,747–48. 
Substantial counterparty exposure is the same test as substantial position but 
with fewer exceptions (for example, not limited to major categories of swaps 
and not exempting commercial hedging) with a threshold for current net un-
collateralized exposure of $1 billion ($3 billion for rate swaps) and a threshold 
for future uncollateralized exposure of $2 billion ($6 billion for rate swaps). Id. 
 189. Proposed Guidance, supra note 181, at 41,223. 
 190. See id. at 41,218. 
 191. The territorial element includes, for example, entities organized in or 
majority owned by individuals residing in the United States. The consequenc-
es element expands the definition of “U.S. person” to include those whose swap 
activities have a “direct and significant connection with activities in, or effect 
on, commerce of the United States.” Id. at 41,218. 
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As a result, entities that are located abroad but whose swap ac-
tivities significantly impact U.S. commerce may directly qualify 
as U.S. persons, obliging them to aggregate all positions in test-
ing whether they qualify under the regulatory threshold.192 
Non-U.S. persons, by contrast, need aggregate only U.S.-facing 
swap positions—that is, those positions that are (i) guaranteed 
by a U.S. entity, (ii) transacted with a U.S. counterparty, or (iii) 
transacted with a counterparty guaranteed by a U.S. entity.193 
Thus, as conceived by the Proposed Guidance, foreign entities 
transacting in swaps may come within the regulatory purview 
of the CFTC either by qualifying directly as “U.S. persons” 
notwithstanding their jurisdiction of organization, or alterna-
tively, upon aggregating their U.S.-facing positions, finding 
that they fall into the new categories of “[non-U.S.] swap deal-
er” or “[non-U.S.] major swap participant.”194
Once a foreign entity is brought within the ambit of U.S. 
regulation, the question becomes the extent to which U.S. regu-
lation applies to its operations and how it may comply with 
those regulations. The Proposed Guidance addresses this issue 
by creating a tiered approach distinguishing entity-level and 
transaction-level rules.
 
195 Entity-level rules are those applying 
to the swap dealer or major swap participant as a whole, in-
cluding rules concerning capital adequacy, the chief compliance 
officer position, risk management, swap data recordkeeping, 
swap reporting, and large trader reporting.196 Transaction-level 
rules, by contrast, are those applying to the individual swap, 
including the clearing mandate, margin and segregation re-
quirements for uncleared swaps, trade execution, portfolio 
compression, recordkeeping and reporting, and business con-
duct rules.197 With the exception of the business conduct rules, 
transaction-level rules apply to every U.S.-facing transaction 
with little opportunity for substituted compliance.198
 
 192. See id. at 41,220. 
 Entity-
level rules also apply to non-U.S. swap dealers and major swap 
participants, but their obligations under these requirements 
 193. Id. at 41,219–20. 
 194. Id. at 41,217–18. 
 195. Id. at 41,224 (“The Entity-Level Requirements apply to registered 
swap dealers and MSPs across all their swaps without distinctions as to the 
counterparty or the location of the swap.”). 
 196. Id. at 41,224–25. 
 197. Id. at 41,225–27. 
 198. Id. at 41,230.  
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may potentially be fulfilled by means of substituted compli-
ance.199
Substituted compliance is, as the name suggests, the op-
portunity for a non-U.S. entity to substitute compliance with its 
home-state regulator for compliance with U.S. swap regula-
tion.
 
200 Under the terms of the Proposed Guidance, substituted 
compliance may be available for non-U.S. swap dealers and ma-
jor swap participants for all entity-level rules.201 When it is po-
tentially available, the ultimate applicability of substituted 
compliance is at the discretion of the CFTC, which promises to 
make its determinations according to a rubric of comparabil-
ity.202 The Proposed Guidance asserts that the CFTC will not 
require that the foreign jurisdiction’s rules be identical to U.S. 
rules in order to be deemed comparable, but rather suggests 
several factors for determining comparability, including (i) 
comparable scope and objectives, (ii) comparable comprehen-
siveness of regulation, and (iii) comparable supervisory capaci-
ty and enforcement authority.203 The Proposed Guidance out-
lines a review process whereby a foreign entity or regulator 
may submit a request to the CFTC to permit substituted com-
pliance. The request would claim comparability, stating the 
specific points of comparison with U.S. regulation and making 
reference to the relevant foreign rules and regulations.204 Ap-
proved requests would lead the CFTC to seek a memorandum 
of understanding with the foreign regulator outlining future in-
formation-sharing and other forms of cooperation.205
Substituted compliance, however, is generally not available 
for transaction-level regulations, and it is important to empha-
size here that central counterparty clearing is a transaction-
level rule.
 
206
 
 199. Id. at 41,227. 
 Hence, once a swap is eligible for clearing, it must 
be cleared. The only question that substituted compliance poses 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 41,229–30. The Proposed Guidance suggests that the standards 
for accepting substituted compliance for the rules relating to risk may be more 
stringent than for the rules relating to transparency, which are likely to be 
acceptable as long as the foreign jurisdiction has a reporting regime and 
makes the data available to the CFTC. Id. 
 202. Id. at 41,232–33. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 41,233. 
 205. Id.  
 206. Id. at 41,230. In some instances, substituted compliance with transac-
tion-level rules may be sought where the foreign entity transacts with a U.S.-
guaranteed entity. Id. 
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for mandatory clearing is whether the clearing requirements of 
a foreign jurisdiction are sufficiently robust to allow the swap 
to be cleared there, not whether the foreign regime has an al-
ternative approach to systemic risk that is comparable in its ef-
fectiveness to mandatory clearing.207 Similarly, notwithstand-
ing assertions that the review process would be “outcomes 
based,”208 the approach to substituted compliance outlined in 
the Proposed Guidance is one of comparing specific rules, 
whether at the entity level or the transaction level, rather than 
considering the quality of the regime as a whole. It is therefore 
difficult to imagine that substituted compliance will be availa-
ble for regimes other than the European Union and, potential-
ly, Japan—regimes that, as described above, have taken an ap-
proach to swap regulation that is similar to the U.S. approach 
both in overall goal and in the details of implementation.209
2. The SEC Offers a Middle Ground  
  
After a long gestation period, the SEC finally issued its 
proposed approach to cross-border swaps activity on May 1, 
2013 (the “Cross-Border Release”).210 Although touted as a 
“middle ground,” less aggressive in its assertion of extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction than the CFTC’s earlier Proposed Guidance, 
the architecture of the SEC’s Cross-Border Release in fact 
largely copies that of the CFTC.211
 
 207. Id. at 41,233–34 (“[W]ith regard to swaps covered by a Commission-
issued clearing requirement, the Commission notes that it expects to find 
comparability with foreign regulatory regimes when (i) the swap is subject to a 
mandate issued by appropriate government authorities in the home country of 
the counterparties to the swap, provided that the foreign mandate is compara-
ble and comprehensive to the Commission’s mandate; and (ii) the swap is 
cleared through a DCO that is exempted from registration under the CEA.”). 
 Like the CFTC, the SEC (1) 
brings foreign security-based swap dealers within its regulato-
ry ambit on the basis of a threshold amount of U.S.-facing ac-
tivity, (2) divides its regulation between entity-level and trans-
 208. Id. at 41,232. 
 209. See supra Part II.B. 
 210. See Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of Reg-
ulation SBSR and Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Registration of Se-
curity-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants, Re-
lease No. 34-69490, 78 Fed. Reg. 30,968 (proposed May 1, 2013) [hereinafter 
SEC Cross-Border Release]. 
 211. See John Ramsay, Acting Dir., Div. of Trading & Mkts., U.S. Sec. 
Exch. Comm’n, Cross-Border at the Crossroads: The SEC’s “Middle Ground,” 
Remarks before the New York City Bar Association (May 15, 2013), available 
at https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171515690. 
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action-level requirements, and (3) offers exemptions to entity-
level requirements based on a theory of substituted compliance. 
With regard to defining those security-based swap dealers 
who must register with the SEC, thereby making the foreign 
entity wholly subject to U.S. swap rules, the SEC offers a nar-
rower, territorially based definition of “U.S. person” than the 
CFTC, omitting the consequentialist element noted above.212 As 
under the CFTC’s rules, the gateway to registration is a de 
minimis threshold in which U.S. persons and non-U.S. persons 
aggregate positions differently.213 While U.S. persons must 
count all positions, under the SEC’s Cross-Border Release, a 
non-US person must aggregate (1) outstanding security-based 
swaps with US counterparties, (2) security-based swaps for 
which it guarantees a U.S. person’s performance, and (3) secu-
rity-based swaps for which it guarantees a non-U.S. person’s 
performance if the guaranteed entity’s counterparty is a U.S. 
person.214
The SEC classifies the entity-level and transaction-level 
rules differently for dealers and swap participants, noting that 
the same requirements do not necessarily apply to each enti-
ty.
 Thus while the technical sweep of the SEC’s registra-
tion requirements may differ slightly from that of the CFTC, 
the rules are structurally identical and likely to result in sub-
stantially similar outcomes. 
215 Moreover, the SEC’s classification scheme divides entity-
level and transaction-level requirements somewhat differently 
from the CFTC—for example, treating margin, trade documen-
tation, confirmation, and portfolio reconciliation rules as entity-
level rather than transaction-level requirements—suggesting a 
somewhat broader scope of substituted compliance for these 
rules.216 Still, as in the CFTC’s Proposed Guidance, the SEC’s 
Cross-Border Release makes central counterparty clearing a 
mandatory rule from which exception cannot be sought.217
 
 212. See SEC Cross-Border Release, supra note 
 As a 
210, at 30,996 (defining 
“U.S. person” to include U.S. natural persons, entities based in the United 
States, and accounts held by U.S. persons). On the CFTC’s additional conse-
quences element, see supra note 191 and accompanying text.  
 213. Compare supra note 193 and accompanying text, with SEC Cross-
Border Release, supra note 210, at 31,145–46. 
 214. SEC Cross-Border Release, supra note 210, at 30,993–95. 
 215. Id. at 31,008–24 (discussing application of entity-level and transac-
tion-level rules to security-based swap dealers); id. at 31,035–37 (discussing 
application of entity-level and transaction-level rules to major security-based 
swap participants). 
 216. Id. at 31,011–15. 
 217. Id. at 31,075. 
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result, any security-based swap that is either (a) conducted in 
the United States or (b) not conducted in the United States, but 
that involves either a U.S. person or a counterparty guaranteed 
by a U.S. person, is subject to mandatory clearing rules.218 The 
question thus becomes whether a foreign regime’s approach to 
mandatory clearing is sufficiently robust to allow the transac-
tion to be cleared under the rules of that regime.219 The SEC’s 
Cross-Border Release allows security-based swap transactions 
to be cleared in the foreign jurisdiction upon a substituted com-
pliance determination for the clearinghouse.220 The SEC sug-
gests that such a determination would be available upon a find-
ing that the foreign clearinghouse has no U.S. person members 
(and therefore is not required to register or seek exemption 
from registration in the U.S.) and is subject to comparable for-
eign regulation (as in its substituted compliance determina-
tions generally).221
Perhaps the greatest difference between the CFTC and 
SEC releases is in the tone in which they discuss substituted 
compliance. The SEC’s approach to substituted compliance is 
more principles-based and less focused on rule-by-rule compa-
rability.
 
222 Chairman White touted this aspect of the proposed 
rules in her Statement announcing the Cross-Border Release.223
[W]e do not envision that the Commission, in making a comparability 
determination, would look to whether a foreign jurisdiction has im-
plemented specific rules and regulations that are comparable to rules 
and regulations adopted by the Commission. Rather, the Commission 
would determine whether the foreign regulatory system in a particu-
 
The Release broadly promises: 
 
 218. The SEC follows a broad territorial approach to swap business con-
ducted in the United States, counting transactions executed, solicited, negoti-
ated, or booked in the United States as “conducted within” the United States. 
Id. at 31,077. However, two foreign entities not guaranteed by any U.S. person 
would not be subject to the SEC’s clearing mandate even if the transaction 
was conducted in the United States. Id. 
 219. See id. at 31,098–99 (discussing under what circumstances the SEC 
would consider substituted compliance on the basis of another regime’s com-
parable mandatory clearing rules). 
 220. Id. at 31,098.  
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. at 31,085. 
 223. Mary Jo White, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Opening 
Statement at SEC Open Meeting (May 1, 2013), http://ftp.sec.gov/news/speech/ 
2013/spch050113mjw.htm (“[S]ubstituted compliance would not be based on a 
line-by-line comparison of the relevant rules in a foreign jurisdiction. Instead, 
in making a substituted compliance determination, the Commission would 
look at key categories . . . focusing on regulatory outcomes rather than the 
particular means of achieving those outcomes.”). 
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lar area, taking into consideration any relevant principles, regula-
tions, or rules in other areas of the foreign regulatory system to the 
extent they are relevant to the analysis, achieves regulatory outcomes 
that are comparable to the regulatory outcomes of the relevant provi-
sions of the Exchange Act.224
In taking into account factors such as the scope and objec-
tives of the relevant foreign regulatory regime, and its en-
forcement capacity, the SEC contemplates that jurisdictions 
that are partially, but not fully comparable might receive a 
substituted compliance determination for specific requirements 
rather than on a regime-wide basis.
 
225
In sum, although the architecture of the SEC’s system is 
substantially similar to that of the CFTC, there is every indica-
tion, at least with regard to substituted compliance, that the 
system will be supplied in a considerably more flexible way 
than the CFTC had outlined in its Proposed Guidance.
  
226 Even 
the SEC, however, is expressly focused on its particular ap-
proach to mitigating systemic risk and not on the broader ques-
tion of whether the foreign authority might adequately contain 
systemic risk through an altogether different approach.227 In 
acknowledging this road not taken, the SEC ultimately falls 
back on its role of implementing U.S. regulatory policy, specifi-
cally the “specific statutory provisions of the Exchange Act 
added by Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act.”228 The SEC’s role in 
other words, is implementing the approach to systemic risk 
voted on by the U.S. Congress—that is, a system built around 
mandatory clearing.229
3. The CFTC and Europe Harmonize Approaches, and the 
CFTC Issues Revised Interpretive Guidance 
  
Having engendered significant international controversy 
with the jurisdictional reach of its original Proposed Guidance, 
the CFTC opened an on-again, off-again series of negotiations 
with European regulators on the topic of cross-border deriva-
 
 224. SEC Cross-Border Release, supra note 210, at 31,086. 
 225. Id. at 31,086. 
 226. Proposed Guidance, supra note 181, at 41,214. 
 227. SEC Cross-Border Release, supra note 210, at 31,086 (“One alterna-
tive to making substituted compliance determinations by looking at separate 
categories of requirements would be to provide substituted compliance across 
the entire set of security-based swap requirements with respect to regimes 
that have implemented regulations consistent with the overall objectives of 
the G20 commitments.”). 
 228. Id. 
 229. See Dodd-Frank Act § 725, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (2012). 
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tives.230 The process was highly politicized and included several 
public denouncements of the CFTC’s position.231 A public letter 
to the U.S. Treasury Secretary signed by nine world finance 
ministers expressed concern that the CFTC’s example would 
produce “fragmentation” and “lack of regulatory coordination” 
leading to reduced efficiency and impairing the ability to man-
age risk.232 Ultimately, however, on July 11, 2013, mere days 
before the CFTC’s rules subjecting foreign entities to U.S. regu-
lation would have taken effect, the CFTC and the European 
Commission (EC) reached agreement to converge on a harmo-
nized approach to cross-border swap regulation.233
Emphasizing several areas in which U.S. and EU rules are 
identical or nearly so, the Agreement promises that each juris-
diction will defer to the other “when it is justified by the quality 
of their respective regulation and enforcement regimes.”
 
234
 
 230. See generally CFTC, Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Re-
garding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,292, 
45,296 n.32 (July 26, 2013) [hereinafter Final Guidance] (noting that the 
CFTC “is engaged in consultations with Europe, Japan, Hong Kong, Singa-
pore, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Brazil, and Mexico on derivatives re-
form. In addition, the Commission’s staff is participating in several standard-
setting initiatives, [and] co-chairs the IOSCO Task Force on OTC Derivatives 
. . . .”). 
 Spe-
 231. See, e.g., Philip Stafford, US-EU Swaps Trading Deal Is Not the End 
of the Story, FIN. TIMES, July 16, 2013 (referring to the process as “intensely 
politicised”). For an example of the public criticisms directed at the CFTC ap-
proach, consider the statements of EC officials Patrick Pearson (“The proposed 
approaches across the globe simply won’t work. They won’t mesh. They won’t 
interact. They will cause conflicts.”) and Emil Paulus (“It is impossible even 
for the most important jurisdictions to think they can control this market even 
by having a very far extraterritorial application of the rules.”). Silla Brush, 
U.S. Swaps Plan Won’t Work Overseas, European Official Says, TREASURY & 
RISK (Nov. 8, 2012), available at http://www.treasuryandrisk.com/2012/11/08/ 
us-swaps-plan-wont-work-overseas-european-official (quoting both). 
 232. Letter from Taro Aso, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of State for 
Fin. Servs., Gov’t of Japan; Michel Barnier, Comm’r for Internal Mkts & 
Servs., Eur. Comm’n; Pravin Gordhan, Minister of Fin., Gov’t of S. Afr.; Guido 
Mantega, Ministry of Fin., Gov’t of Braz.; Pierre Moscovici, Ministry of Fin., 
Gov’t of Fr.; George Osborne, C. of the Exchequer, Gov’t of the U.K.; Wolfgang 
Schäuble, Ministry of Fin., Gov’t of Ger.; Anton Siluanov, Minister of Fin., 
Gov’t of Russ.; & Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf, Fin. Minister, Gov’t of Switz. 
(‘‘Nine International Regulators’’), to Jack Lew, U.S. Sec’y of the Treasury 
(Apr. 18, 2013), available at http://www.fsa.go.jp/inter/etc/20130419-1/01.pdf. 
 233. Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, The Euro-
pean Commission and the CFTC Reach a Common Path Forward on Deriva-
tives (July 11, 2013) [hereinafter Path Forward Release], available at http:// 
www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6640-13 (announcing and reprinting 
the full text of the agreement).  
 234. Id.  
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cifically, “the CFTC has proposed that substituted compliance 
will be permitted for the requirements applicable in the EU 
that are comparable to, and as comprehensive as, those appli-
cable in the US” while “EU law foresees a system of equiva-
lence. . . based on a broad outcomes-based assessment of the 
regulatory framework,” which once determined would enable 
firms to “access and provide their services across the 28 Mem-
ber States of the EU.”235 The Agreement generally contemplates 
that in cases of joint jurisdiction, an entity’s compliance with 
either set of requirements will achieve compliance with both, 
ultimately providing for a regime of regulatory choice.236
With specific regard to mandatory clearing, the Agreement 
again acknowledges “essentially identical processes,” with a 
European pledge to “cover the same classes of interest rate 
swaps and credit default swap” that the CFTC has already 
deemed eligible for clearing.
 
237 Further, the two jurisdictions 
agreed to a “stricter-rule-applies” heuristic in cases of disa-
greement regarding clearing eligibility.238 The CFTC and the 
EC further undertook to allow swaps to be cleared by registered 
clearinghouses in either jurisdiction.239
However, it is in the area of clearing that the Agreement 
highlights the largest unresolved difference between the CFTC 
and the EC approach. Initial margin—that is, the taking of col-
lateral by the clearinghouse as a condition to opening a mem-
 Again, it is worth em-
phasizing that harmonization in this context clearly amounts to 
harmonization around the concept of mandatory clearing. Al-
ternative approaches to managing the systemic risk of OTC de-
rivatives are not contemplated by the agreement. 
 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. For example, in the area of risk mitigation for uncleared trades, 
the agreement notes that because the CFTC regards the requirements under 
EMIR as “essentially identical . . . compliance under EMIR will achieve com-
pliance with the relevant CFTC rules.” Id. Once the EC makes a formal de-
termination as to the equivalency of CFTC requirements, “it can allow market 
participants the choice to comply either with EMIR rules or with the equiva-
lent CFTC rules.” Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. In other words, if an exemption to clearing is available in one ju-
risdiction but not another, the swap would have to be cleared. See Bradley E. 
Phipps & Marc A. Horwitz, European Commission and CFTC Announce a 
Path Forward on Cross-Border Regulation of OTC Derivatives, DLA PIPER (Ju-
ly 11, 2013), http://www.dlapiper.com/global/publications/Detail.aspx?pub= 
8306&RSS=true . 
 239. Path Forward Release, supra note 233 (noting that two EU CCPs are 
already registered with the CFTC, with registration determinations pending 
for four other non-US CCPs). 
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ber account—is currently required of clearinghouses in the U.S. 
to a significantly greater degree than clearinghouses in the 
EU.240 Differences in other technical clearing details—such as 
acceptable forms of collateral and how margin is to be calculat-
ed and when it is to be posted—reprise the larger debate con-
cerning regulatory competition and arbitrage.241 It may be that 
having insisted on big picture uniformity—that is, mandatory 
clearing imposed on a worldwide basis—regulatory authorities 
will remain subject to competition on the technical details of 
implementation.242
In any event, in the wake of the Agreement, the CFTC is-
sued final Interpretive Guidance on cross-border issues as well 
as an Executive Order to provide for additional time to phase-in 
the cross-border rules.
 While this can be a good thing, preventing 
jurisdictions from making inefficient rules regarding, for exam-
ple, the taking of initial margin, it does not expose the larger 
system to the rigors of competition. The larger architecture is 
still imposed by financial market hegemons. Moreover, the ad 
hoc negotiations of world regulators may not be well suited to 
oversee this competition in such a way to ensure that pruden-
tial concerns are adequately addressed but not inefficiently 
burdened. 
243
 
 240. Id. (noting that initial margin coverage is a material difference be-
tween the two regulatory regimes); see also Hal Scott, Op-Ed, Land Mines in 
the Derivatives ‘Path Forward’, WALL ST. J., July 15, 2013, at A13 (“U.S. regu-
lators . . . require a U.S. bank to post more than twice as much collateral for a 
cleared interest-rate swap as do the EU rules for a European bank. Consider-
ing that there is about $500 trillion in outstanding interest-rate swaps . . . this 
difference in rules about collateral is notable.”). 
 The Final Guidance responded to 
comments received and generally made relatively minor altera-
tions to the regulatory structure first outlined in the Proposed 
 241. Path Forward Release, supra note 233 (stating the EU, ESMA and the 
CFTC’s commitment to “work together to reduce . . . regulatory arbitrage op-
portunities”). 
 242. Indeed, there is some evidence that this process is well underway. See, 
e.g., Mike Kentz, Swaps Clients Plan US Bank Exodus, REUTERS (Aug. 12, 
2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/12/markets-credit-idUSL2N0GD 
1JA20130812 (reporting that European clients of U.S. banks have begun to 
move their business to non-U.S. banks in order to avoid getting caught in the 
more rapid implementation of mandatory clearing underway in the U.S. and 
making the point that substituted compliance will not be available for regula-
tory regimes that are not finalized, as in Europe). 
 243. Final Guidance, supra note 230; Exemptive Order Regarding Compli-
ance with Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 43,785 (July 22, 2013) (to 
be codified at 17 C.F.R. ch. 1).  
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Guidance.244 Perhaps, most significant, however, is the discus-
sion of substituted compliance in the Final Guidance, the tone 
of which is considerably more open to the possibility of substi-
tuted compliance than the Proposed Guidance had seemed.245
The Final Guidance sets forth a process for substituted 
compliance determinations that is not substantively different 
from that laid out in the Proposed Guidance, noting that upon 
application, the CFTC will make “outcomes-based” comparabil-
ity determinations along its thirteen regulatory parameters—
that is, the five core entity-level requirements and eight key 
transaction-level requirements.
 
246 Once a comparability deter-
mination is made, it may apply to all entities or transactions in 
a jurisdiction.247 Comparability determinations will be evaluat-
ed every four years to determine whether the comparability 
finding should reissue or changes should be made.248
[A] comparability analysis would begin with a consideration of the 
regulatory objectives of a foreign jurisdiction’s regulation of swaps 
and swaps market participants. In this regard, the Commission will 
first look to foreign regulator’s swap-specific regulations. The Com-
mission recognizes, however, that jurisdictions may not have swap-
specific regulations in some areas, and instead may have regulatory 
or supervisory regimes that achieve comparable and comprehensive 
regulatory objectives as the Dodd-Frank Act requirements, but on a 
more general, entity-wide, or prudential, basis. In addition, portions 
of a foreign regulatory regime may have similar regulatory objectives, 
but the means by which these objectives are achieved with respect to 
swaps market activities may not be clearly defined, or may not ex-
 Most in-
teresting, however, is the extended example the CFTC gives in 
response to requests made in several comments: 
 
 244. See Final Guidance, supra note 230, at 45,308–15 (providing technical 
amendments and guidance in response to comments concerning the definition 
of “U.S. Person”); id. at 45,335–36 (discussing minor modifications to the Enti-
ty-Level/Transaction-Level classification scheme). 
 245. Consider, for example, the acknowledgment that the Commission 
“generally would” permit substituted compliance whenever possible—that is, 
when it finds the foreign jurisdiction’s regulatory requirements are “compara-
ble with and as comprehensive as the corollary areas(s)” in the U.S. Final 
Guidance. Final Guidance, supra note 230, at 45,342. 
 246. Id. at 45342–45. The entity-level requirements are: (1) capital adequa-
cy, (2) chief compliance officer, (3) risk management, (4) swap data recordkeep-
ing, (5) swap data reporting, and (6) large trader reporting. Id. at 45,338. The 
transaction level requirements are: (1) mandatory clearing, (2) margining and 
segregation for uncleared swaps, (3) trade execution, (4) swap trading rela-
tionship documentation, (5) portfolio reconciliation and compression, (6) public 
reporting, (7) trade confirmation, (8) daily trading records, and (9) external 
business conduct standards. Id. at 45,339. 
 247. Id. at 45,344. 
 248. Id. at 45,345. 
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pressly include specific regulatory elements that the Commission con-
cludes are critical to achieving [required] regulatory objectivesFalse 
In these circumstances, the Commission anticipates that . . . it will 
work with the regulators and registrants in these jurisdictions to con-
sider alternative approaches that may result in a determination that 
substituted compliance applies.249
The CFTC expects, in other words, that the process of regu-
latory harmonization organized around substituted compliance 
will be an ongoing process and will include consultation with 
foreign legislators or regulators to craft rules enabling the 
CFTC to arrive at a determination of comparability.
 
250 The 
CFTC subsequently made good on this promise, announcing 
comparability determinations with regard to a variety of entity-
level business practice rules in various jurisdictions, including 
Australia, Canada, the EU, Hong Kong, Japan, and Switzer-
land.251 However, it is important to emphasize, as the CFTC did 
in a footnote to the July release, that comparability is more 
likely to be found for entity-level requirements than for trans-
action-level requirements.252
In sum, whether policymakers have proceeded through as-
sertions of extraterritorial authority or through negotiation and 
harmonization, their efforts have been aimed at global regula-
tory uniformity, specifically built around mandatory central 
counterparty clearing. Uniformity around the idea of mandato-
ry clearing, however, is quite a different thing from uniformity 
around the idea of containing systemic risk. The difference be-
tween these two ideas and the potentially massive implications 
for the global financial system are the focus of the next Part. 
 In other words, foreign jurisdic-
tions may have considerable leeway in how they regulate their 
financial institutions, but eligible swaps must be cleared. 
 
 249. Id. at 45,345. 
 250. Id. at 45,343–44 (foreseeing the need to collaborate with foreign offi-
cials “in developing appropriate regulatory changes or new regulations, par-
ticularly where changes or new regulations already are being considered or 
proposed by the foreign regulators or legislative bodies”). 
 251. See Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Approves Comparability Determina-
tions for Six Jurisdictions for Substituted Compliance Purposes (Dec. 20, 
2013), available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6802-13; 
Business Conduct Rules for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 
Summary of Entity-Level Comparability Determinations, CFTC.GOV (Dec. 20, 
2013), http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/ 
cptable122013.pdf. 
 252. Final Guidance, supra note 230, at 45,343 n.467. 
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IV.  UNIFORMITY, FRAGILITY, AND SYSTEMIC RISK   
Scholars of international law and regulation have often fo-
cused on the problem of how to make and administer uniform 
laws and regulations across jurisdictional boundaries. Much of 
their focus has been on modalities of international rulemaking, 
whether through formal treaties, less formal cooperation of in-
ternational legislative, administrative, and judicial bodies,253 or 
still more informal coordination around sources of “soft law.”254 
Although some scholars have argued in favor of international 
regulatory competition in areas such as corporate,255 securi-
ties,256 and bankruptcy law,257
 
 253. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 14 (Princeton 2004) 
(describing networks of international coordination and cooperation as “pat-
tern[s] of regular and purposive relations among like government units work-
ing across the borders that divide countries from one another and that demar-
cate the ‘domestic’ from the ‘international’ sphere”). See generally Chris 
Brummer, Post-American Securities Regulation, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 327 (2010) 
(emphasizing the role of international regulatory networks in the securities 
regulation); David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight 
Existence of International Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. INT’L. 
L.J. 281 (1998) (discussing the future of international cooperation among 
world regulators); Sungjoon Cho, Globalizing Administrative Law (Oct. 20, 
2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.nyls.edu/global_law_ 
justice_and_policy/wp-content/uploads/sites/137/2013/07/Cho-Globalizing 
-Administrative-Law-October-2011-3.pdf. 
 the focus of much writing in the 
 254. See CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
210 (2012); Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 
J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 171, 179 (2010). 
 255. Frederick Tung, Passports, Private Choice, and Private Interests: Reg-
ulatory Competition and Cooperation in Corporate, Securities, and Bankruptcy 
Law, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 369, 388 (2002) (recommending regulatory choice as a 
means “to spur competition among regulators”). 
 256. Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethink-
ing the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 
914–39 (1998) (arguing in favor of “portable reciprocity” as a means of provid-
ing choice to regulated entities and competition among regulators); see also 
Chris Brummer, Stock Exchanges and the New Markets for Securities Laws, 75 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1435, 1440 (2008) (examining the implications of stock ex-
change-based regulation over national territory-based securities regulation); 
Steven M. Davidoff, Regulating Listings in a Global Market, 86 N.C. L. REV. 
89, 155 (2007) (advocating a form of substituted compliance for foreign listings 
in U.S. markets in order to provide a differentiated regulatory product to U.S. 
investors); Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 
1454 (1997) (arguing that granting stock exchanges greater autonomy as regu-
lators would induce greater regulatory competition in the securities area); 
Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities 
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2392–95 (1998) (advocating the abandonment 
of uniform federal securities regulation in the U.S. in favor of regulatory com-
petition among U.S. states). 
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area of international financial regulation, especially post-crisis, 
is on overcoming obstacles to greater coordination and uni-
formity.258
Uniformity in the management of systemic risk, however, 
is not an unambiguous good. By definition, uniformity crowds 
out alternatives.
 This is a sensible starting point in the area of inter-
national financial regulation, considering not only the cost of 
conflicting or overlapping rules, but also the disregard of na-
tional boundaries shown by systemic risk and the potentially 
catastrophic consequences of financial system collapse.  
259 A uniform regulatory structure is therefore 
insulated from the competition of alternative approaches to a 
problem.260 Such structures are especially prone to becoming 
ossified, unresponsive, and are thus unable to manage emerg-
ing crises.261
The fragility of much of our regulatory structure was re-
cently emphasized in Nassim Taleb’s Antifragile.
 They are, in a word, fragile. 
262 The ulti-
mate goal of institutional design, according to Taleb, ought to 
be the cultivation of institutions that are improved by mis-
takes, randomness, and disorder.263
 
 257. Robert K. Rasmussen, A New Approach to Transnational Insolvencies, 
19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 26 (1997). 
 Such systems are charac-
terized by constant strife or competition and through constant 
 258. See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, The Visible Hand: Coordination Functions 
of the Regulatory State, 95 MINN. L. REV. 578, 583 (2010) (describing “coordi-
nation as an increasingly important impetus for regulatory action” but re-
maining agnostic regarding its desirability in specific cases); Eric J. Pan, The 
Challenge of International Cooperation and Institutional Design in Financial 
Supervision: Beyond Transgovernmental Networks, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 243, 
273–81 (2010) (emphasizing the need for greater coordination among interna-
tional financial law and policymakers to respond to crises); Pierre-Hughes 
Verdier, The Political Economy of International Financial Regulation, 88 IND. 
L.J. 1405, 1437–59 (arguing against unilateral state action in financial regula-
tion and outlining obstacles to achieving greater international uniformity); 
David Zaring, International Institutional Performance in Crisis, 10 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 475, 479–86 (2010) (critiquing the failure of international law institu-
tions to respond in a coordinated or effective way to the financial crisis).  
 259. See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 256, at 1493–94 (describing the conse-
quences of the Exchange Act’s mandate of uniformity on the exchanges). 
 260. See NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, ANTIFRAGILE: THINGS THAT GAIN FROM 
DISORDER 11–12 (2012). 
 261. See id. 
 262. Id. at 19–20. Although ranging widely on the conceptual relationship 
between the fragile, the robust, and the anti-fragile, the clearest implications 
of Taleb’s core concept is the global financial system. See generally id. at 23–27 
(cataloguing implications of the thesis in a variety of areas). 
 263. Id. at 65–84 (referring to “anti-fragile” things—that is, those that are 
improved by external shocks). 
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trial and error and re-evaluation are continually improved.264 
Systems emphasizing uniformity and harmonization, however, 
are by definition not exposed to competition and therefore lack 
the fundamental capacity for trial and error necessary for 
learning and improvement. As a result, such a system is ulti-
mately doomed when a large, unpredictable shock—sometimes 
referred to as “tail risk,” sometimes as “black swans”—finally 
arrives.265
The optimal regulatory structure therefore celebrates di-
versity. It seeks to guarantee the robustness of individual units 
within the system as a whole, but in order to avoid discourag-
ing experimentation and innovation, does not insist that each 
unit within the system regulate risk in the same way.
  
266 In the 
context of global financial regulation, each regulatory regime is 
thus given the opportunity of learning from the innovation and 
experimentation of every other regulatory regime.267
Moving closer to such a system is the task of the next Part. 
In what remains of this Part, I argue that policymakers have in 
fact been devising a fragile system—that is, a global financial 
order that is more rather than less exposed to systemic risk—by 
insisting upon regulatory uniformity organized around the idea 
  
 
 264. See also Charles K. Whitehead, The Goldilocks Approach: Financial 
Risk and Staged Regulation, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1267, 1295 (2012) (“At its 
heart, the Goldilocks approach relies on a real options method of new regula-
tion—staging new rules in order to provide regulators with additional infor-
mation regarding their effect on market conduct and, as necessary, adjusting 
those rules to reflect any unanticipated consequences.”). 
 265. See generally RAGHURAM RAJAN, FAULT LINES: HOW HIDDEN FRAC-
TURES STILL THREATEN THE WORLD ECONOMY 152 (2010) (discussing tail 
risk); NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGH-
LY IMPROBABLE 3–7 (2010) (discussing black swans). Such unpredictable high 
severity events may be increasingly common. TALEB, supra note 260, at 285 
(“Black Swan effects are necessarily increasing, as a result of complexity, in-
terdependence between parts, globalization and the beastly thing called ‘effi-
ciency’ that makes people now sail too close to the wind.”); see also Whitehead, 
supra note 264, at 1273 (“[I]t can be difficult to prospectively assess the impact 
of new regulation on the financial markets. Private actors can be expected to 
minimize regulatory cost, potentially in ways that are less obvious to detect. 
The result may be a rise in new risks or a shift in risk taking—responses that 
regulators can anticipate but may not be able to accurately predict or con-
trol.”). 
 266. A system of uniform regulation discourages experimentation and in-
novation by creating substantial barriers to the enactment of alternative re-
gimes. See supra Part III.B (discussing policymakers’ efforts to implement 
regulatory uniformity). Faced with odds stacked against enactment, a would-
be regulatory entrepreneur is less likely to invest in developing an alternative 
regime than they might otherwise. See id.  
 267. Whitehead, supra note 264, at 1273, 1295. 
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of central counterparty clearing. The sections that follow devel-
op three arguments for believing this to be the case. First and 
most obviously, the regulatory alternative that policymakers 
choose to make the uniform approach may be (or become) inef-
fective and, by virtue of being the only regulatory structure 
worldwide, therefore be unable to prevent a systemic collapse of 
the world financial system. Second, uniform cross-jurisdictional 
rules may induce regulated entities to converge on particular 
business strategies rather than acting in an independent and 
disaggregated manner, thereby increasing coordination and, 
with it, systemic risk. Third and finally, the imposition of uni-
formity across jurisdictions stifles regulatory experimentation 
and the potential development of more efficient regulatory 
structures. 
A. MISTAKES WITHOUT FIREBREAKS 
Uniformity is obviously desirable if the uniform rule is the 
optimal solution to the problem.268 However, financial systems 
generally and international finance in particular are character-
ized by two core attributes, complexity and dynamism, each of 
which belies the assumption of optimality.269 Complexity, in 
which the many parts of a system interact with each other and, 
often, with exogenous elements, in ways that are difficult or 
impossible to predict, is a commonly accepted property of finan-
cial systems.270 Errors in judgment, of course, are especially 
likely in situations of complexity. Behavioral scientists have 
posited a variety of theoretical biases to explain this basic intu-
ition,271 but anecdotal evidence clearly supports it as well.272
 
 268. See RICHARD J. HERRING & ROBERT E. LITAN, FINANCIAL REGULATION 
IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 134 (1995) (“[I]t is easy to be enthusiastic about 
harmonizing the right rules . . . .”). 
 
 269. See generally Saule T. Omarova, Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guardi-
ans: Toward Tripartism in Financial Services Regulation, 37 J. CORP. L. 621, 
629 (2012) (describing the complexity and dynamics in the current global fi-
nancial market). 
 270. See generally FRANCIS X. DIEBOLD ET AL., THE KNOWN, THE UN-
KNOWN, AND THE UNKNOWABLE IN FINANCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT 3 (Princeton 
2010) (discussing complexity in financial risk management as comprised of 
“knowns (K),” “unknowns (u),” and “unknowables (U),” defined respectively as 
situations “where the probability distribution is completely specified,” situa-
tions “where probabilities cannot be assigned to at least some events,” and sit-
uations “where even the events cannot be identified in advance–neither events 
nor probabilities are known”); see also Whitehead, supra note 264, at 1268–74. 
 271. See Geoffrey P. Miller & Gerald Rosenfeld, Intellectual Hazard: How 
Conceptual Biases in Complex Organizations Contributed to the Crisis of 2008, 
33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 807, 813 (2010) (grouping a number of heuristics 
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Given the complexity of international finance, it thus seems un-
likely that policymakers will happen upon the optimal solution 
in fashioning the uniform rule.273
Moreover, even if they do happen upon the optimal solu-
tion, the dynamism of financial markets suggests that the solu-
tion will not be the right one for long.
 
274 Financial markets are 
in constant flux as participants adapt to changing conditions.275 
One of the basic conditions that can change in a financial mar-
ket, of course, is regulation, and the adaptations that market 
participants make to changes in regulation are often unpre-
dictable.276 This “dynamic uncertainty” of financial systems 
leads to unintended consequences and a high likelihood that 
even the most careful and well-meaning policymakers and reg-
ulators will make mistakes.277
 
and decision-making biases, including “tunnel vision,” “confirmation bias,” 
“representative bias,” “oversimplification bias,” and “authoritarian bias,” un-
der the heading of “complexity bias”). 
 Worse still, mistakes made in an 
environment of regulatory uniformity are likely to become en-
trenched as a result of the high sunk costs in achieving the uni-
form rule—laborious international negotiations resulting in 
 272. Consider the scandals of Bernie Madoff, MF Global, the London 
Whale, and Peregrine Financial. See generally Steve Schaefer, Know Your Fi-
nancial Scandals: Libor, Peregrine and the London Whale, FORBES, July 12, 
2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/steveschaefer/2012/07/12/know-your 
-financial-scandals-libor-peregrine-and-the-london-whale/ (last visited Mar. 
11, 2014). 
 273. HERRING & LITAN, supra note 268, at 134 (noting, for these reasons, 
that financial systems present the “very real danger that the wrong rules will 
be harmonized”); see also Whitehead, supra note 264, at 1268–74. 
 274. HERRING & LITAN, supra note 268, at 134 (“[R]ules that may be right 
for the moment will become wrong after they are implemented.”). 
 275. See generally Michael S. Barr, The Financial Crisis and the Path of 
Reform, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 91 (2012) (arguing that the pace of financial inno-
vation may exceed the ability of either regulators or market mechanisms to 
respond). 
 276. See generally Whitehead, supra note 264, at 1295 (“Permitting new 
rules to be adjusted to reflect market feedback can assist in minimizing uncer-
tainty over the rules’ benefits, as well as lower the likelihood that regulation 
will be ineffective or result in unanticipated costs.”). 
 277. Romano, supra note 79, at 2. In Romano’s words:  
[T]he nub of the regulatory problem derives from the fact that finan-
cial firms operate in a dynamic environment in which there are many 
unknowns and unknowables and state of the art knowledge quickly 
obsolesces. In such a context, even the most informed regulatory re-
sponse . . . will be prone to error, and is likely to produce backward-
looking regulation that takes aim at yesterday’s perceived problem, 
rather than tomorrow’s, for regulators necessarily operate under con-
siderable uncertainty and at a lag behind private actors. 
Id. at 2. 
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highly wrought agreements requiring many levels of approval 
and ratification—and the difficulty in achieving consensus to 
change it.278
Regulatory mistakes could prove catastrophic in a regime 
of regulatory uniformity since the imposition of uniformity has 
the effect of eliminating other possible means of constraining 
the risky conduct. Simply put: if every jurisdiction regulates 
conduct in the same way, there will be no firebreaks in the 
event that the regulatory system fails to account for a signifi-
cant risk.
  
279 If the whole world regulates their financial institu-
tions in the same way, then the whole world is exposed if the 
regulations miss a significant source of risk.280
There are several strong reasons to believe that mandatory 
clearing of derivatives may be a regulatory mistake or, at least, 
far less than the total solution it is sometimes portrayed to 
be.
 
281
 
 278. HERRING & LITAN, supra note 
 These arguments, summarized below, suggest that man-
datory clearing will not only fail to solve the problem of system-
ic risk inherent in derivatives transactions but may also con-
tribute to the problem of systemic risk. The key point to 
268, at 134–35 (“The complexity of in-
ternational negotiations means that international agreements are very diffi-
cult to fine-tune after they are made because all parties are likely to find it 
costly to reopen negotiations.”). 
 279. Roberta Romano, Against Financial Regulation Harmonization: A 
Comment 18 (Yale L. & Econ. Res. Paper No. 414, 2010), available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1697348 (characterizing interna-
tional regulatory harmonization as a “source of catastrophic systemic risk” and 
noting that “[w]ith numerous regulatory regimes, there is at least a chance 
that not all regulators will make the same mistake, and accordingly, thereby 
not incentivize all financial institutions to follow the same flawed strategy” 
(citation omitted)). 
 280. See also Alessandra Arcuri & Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Centralization 
Versus Decentralization as a Risk-Return Trade-Off, 53 J. L. & ECON. 359, 374 
(2010) (modeling the different outcomes of centralized versus decentralized 
decision processes and finding that “the choice between centralization and de-
centralization crucially depends on the level of scientific expertise available. If 
advanced expertise is available, centralization guarantees both more accurate 
decisions and less risk. Instead, with poor expertise, while centralization 
yields more accurate decisions, decentralization lowers risk.”); George J. 
Benston, International Harmonization of Banking Regulations and Coopera-
tion Among National Regulators: An Assessment, 8 J. FIN. SERV. RES. 205, 208 
(1994) (surveying theoretical support for international harmonization of bank-
ing regulation and finding that harmonization in general benefited only gov-
ernmental officials, allowing them to benefit important constituencies, or the 
regulated entities, principally by shielding them from foreign competition).  
 281. See Pirrong, supra note 73, at 8. See generally Roe, supra note 16, at 
1700 (“[T]he purported core value of the clearinghouse in containing counter-
party risk and contagion is exaggerated, and sometimes incorrect.”).  
  
1350 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:1291 
 
remember here, however, is that in a world of harmonization, if 
the mandatory clearing solution turns out to be as flawed as 
these arguments suggest, no alternative regulatory structure 
will exist to check the next crisis from spreading contagion. 
1. The Too-Big-to-Fail Clearinghouse 
The fundamental purpose of the clearinghouse is to amass 
risk in hopes of containing it. In doing so, of course, the clear-
inghouse itself is likely to become an important nexus of sys-
temic risk, the failure of which would immediately spread con-
tagion throughout the economy.282 Even the rumor of a 
clearinghouse failure, Ben Bernanke has warned, could be a 
source of contagion.283 In acknowledgment of this problem, reg-
ulators have already designated some clearinghouses as “sys-
temically important” financial institutions, thereby subjecting 
them to greater regulatory oversight.284
But clearinghouses have failed before.
 More may follow. The 
regulators’ calculation thus appears to balance too-big-to-fail 
concerns against less-likely-to-fail hopes. 
285 The fact that 
clearinghouses will be regulated entities does not give one 
much comfort considering the history of failure of other highly 
regulated financial entities.286
 
 282. See generally Julia Lees Allen, Derivatives Clearinghouses and Sys-
temic Risk: A Bankruptcy and Dodd-Frank Analysis, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1079 
(2012); Jeremy C. Kress, Credit Default Swaps, Clearinghouses, and Systemic 
Risk: Why Centralized Counterparties Must Have Access to Central Bank Li-
quidity, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 49 (2011). 
 Moreover, the derivatives dealers 
 283. Ben S. Bernanke, Clearing and Settlement During the Crash, 3 REV. 
FIN. STUD. 133, 133–34 (1990) (analyzing the October 1987 stock market 
crash, and noting, “[r]umors about possible clearinghouse failures added to the 
sense of panic in the markets”). 
 284. See Silla Brush & Matthew Leising, CME, ICE Clearinghouses Desig-
nated Systemic by U.S. Regulators, BLOOMBERG NEWS (May 23, 2012, 11:38 
AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-23/cme-ice-clearinghouses 
-designated-systemic-by-u-s-regulators.html. 
 285. Financial clearinghouses have failed in France (the Caisse de Liquida-
tion, in 1974), Kuala Lumpur (the Commodity Clearing House, in 1983), and 
in Hong Kong (the Futures Guarantee Corporation, in 1987). Bob Hills et al., 
Central Counterparty Clearing Houses and Financial Stability, FIN. STABILITY 
REV. 129 (1999). The Chicago Mercantile Exchange survived failure in 1987 
thanks to a last minute government bailout of its constituent members. See 
Acharya et al., supra note 94, at 401 (noting that the CME President’s claim 
that “if the Merc had not opened that morning, it would not have opened 
again”). 
 286. For a list of recent examples, consider the savings and loans crisis of 
the 1980s and 1990s, the Asian financial crisis of 1997, the accounting scan-
dals of 2001–2002, or indeed, the global financial crisis of 2008. 
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that become clearinghouse members cannot be trusted to man-
age clearinghouse risk because the clearinghouse structure it-
self subverts ordinary incentives to monitor and manage trad-
ing risk.287 Furthermore, the clearinghouses themselves are 
likely to be less qualified than their members at monitoring 
and evaluating complex risks.288
2. The Fragmentation of Netting  
 In this way, the transfer of 
counterparty credit risk to central counterparties does not seem 
to have placed the risk with the party best able to monitor and 
manage it, and one begins to doubt that the too-big-to-fail/less-
likely-to-fail balance has been optimally struck.  
A basic advantage of central counterparty clearing is in-
creased efficiency in netting.289 Netting mitigates the shock of a 
dealer default by providing counterparties a means of offsetting 
losses in some positions with gains in others.290 Its effect is 
most powerful in a system in which all major counterparties 
participate across all of their positions so that the greatest 
number of transactions is available to offset a dealer default.291 
Thus, the preservation of the greatest advantage from netting 
implies a single world clearinghouse through which all prod-
ucts would be cleared.292
 
 287. See Sean J. Griffith, Governing Systemic Risk: Towards A Governance 
Structure for Derivatives Clearinghouses, 61 EMORY L. J. 1153, 1189–1210 
(2012) (discussing moral hazard and free-riding problems associated with 
clearinghouses); accord Kress, supra note 
  
282, at 74 (describing the potential 
moral hazard in clearinghouses requiring “lower collateral requirements or 
default fund contributions in an attempt to attract additional members with-
out regard to safety and soundness” or failing to “monitor the clearinghouse 
for adequate capitalization”). 
 288. See Pirrong, supra note 104, at 48; Yesha Yadav, The Problematic 
Case of Clearinghouses in Complex Markets, 101 GEO. L. J. 387, 399–400 
(2013) (discussing clearinghouse underinvestment in due diligence). 
 289. See supra notes 103–07 and accompanying text. 
 290. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 291. See Manmohan Singh, Making OTC Derivatives Safe―A Fresh Look 5 
(Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 11/66, 2011), available at http:// 
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp1166.pdf (“[I]f there are multiple 
CCPs that are not linked, the benefits of netting are reduced, because cross-
product netting will not take place (since CCPs presently only offer multilat-
eral netting in the same asset class and not across products).”).  
 292. See id. (“A single CCP with an adequate, multicurrency, central-bank 
liquidity backstop that is well regulated and spans the broadest range of de-
rivatives would have been an ideal ‘first-best’ solution.”). 
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This, unfortunately, is not the way in which central coun-
terparty clearing has evolved.293 Instead, multiple clearing-
houses have arisen in multiple jurisdictions, each typically 
clearing only a subset of derivatives or, often, only a single de-
rivatives product.294 This is partly due to natural economies of 
scope—the risks associated with clearing interest rate swaps, 
for example, are different from those associated with clearing 
CDS, resulting in specialization in one product or the other.295 
But it is also due to political exigencies—jurisdictions insist on 
having a clearinghouse within their borders, especially for local 
currency derivative products.296
Fragmentation reduces the power of netting to contain sys-
temic risk.
 The rise of multiple clearing-
houses means fragmented netting. 
297 To see this contrast a world in which there is a 
single clearinghouse clearing all trades for all parties against a 
world (the real one) in which there are multiple clearinghouses 
for different jurisdictions and different products. In the single 
clearinghouse world, losses from the default of a dealer would 
be set off against the maximum number of trades—that is, all 
open positions with that dealer.298
 
 293. Manmohan Singh, The Fallacy of Moving the Over-the-Counter Deriv-
atives Market to Central Counterparties, VOX (Jan. 22, 2012), http://www 
.voxeu.org/article/fallasy-moving-over-counter-derivatives-market-central 
-counterparites?quicktabs_tabbed_recent_articles_block=1 (“We are not mov-
ing the status quo of 10–15 large banks (or ‘pockets’ of risk) to one global 
‘pocket’ (which would maximise netting); we are moving towards something 
like 20–30 ‘pockets’ of risk that include large banks and CCPs.”). 
 In the multiple clearinghouse 
world, by contrast, the only trades available to offset losses 
 294. As described by former ISDA CEO Conrad Voldstad: 
[C]learing may double up the need for collateral. This problem is mul-
tiplied because there will be separate clearinghouses for each product. 
Furthermore, the number of clearinghouses per asset class is forecast 
to be large as many countries will require transactions in their mar-
kets to be cleared in local clearinghouse. 
Conrad P. Voldstad, Address at the Fordham Journal of Corporate and Finan-
cial Law Symposium: Regulation of Over-the-Counter Derivatives 4–5 (Feb. 
13, 2012) (on file with author); see also Henderson, supra note 2, at 8 (noting 
that “different CCPs will specialize in different products. An end-user will be 
unlikely to be able to clear on only one.”). 
 295. See Griffith, supra note 287, at 1519.  
 296. See Singh, supra note 293 (“[T]here will be a plethora of central coun-
terparties since many jurisdictions, such as Australia, Canada, etc., do not 
want to lose oversight of their local currency derivative products to an offshore 
central counterparty.”). European Union regulators, for example, have insisted 
on the continuing existence of a European clearinghouse. See Singh, supra 
note 106, at 5.  
 297. See Singh, supra note 291, at 4. 
 298. Cf. id. at 5. 
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from the default of a dealer are those cleared by that particular 
clearinghouse, a subset of all open positions with defaulting 
dealer.299
Fragmented netting thus implies that clearinghouses will 
be less than optimally effective at containing systemic risk. 
Although clearinghouse interoperability—that is, some form of 
risk mutualization and netting across clearinghouses—could 
mitigate this problem, interoperability does not seem to be on 
the regulatory horizon, at least in the near term.
 Fewer open positions, of course, means greater resid-
ual loss for the clearinghouse to absorb, a problem that will be 
repeated for each clearinghouse in which the defaulting mem-
ber participates.  
300 As a result, 
clearinghouses are likely to respond to the problem of less effec-
tive netting by taking more collateral.301 Likewise, clearing-
houses are likely to place additional requirements on the col-
lateral that they take, requiring segregation and limiting 
rehypothecation.302 Increasing collateral demands, of course, in-
creases transaction costs for all participants in clearing, which 
ultimately increases the cost of capital and limits the effective-
ness of derivatives as a risk management tool.303
3. The Shifting of Systemic Risk 
 
The standard reasoning supporting central clearing is that 
clearinghouses mitigate systemic risk by controlling counter-
party credit risk.304
 
 299. See Singh, supra note 
 But the control of counterparty credit risk, 
even when it is optimally effective, is not the same as the elim-
ination of systemic risk. Fundamentally, central clearing guar-
antees that clearinghouse members will be paid when another 
member defaults. This works partly through netting, described 
above, and partly through a set of preferential bankruptcy 
rules that protect margin collateral from other creditors and 
106, at 8–9. 
 300. See Singh, supra note 293. 
 301. See id. at 3. 
 302. Rehypothecation is simply the right to use posted collateral. See gen-
erally Christian A. Johnson, Derivatives and Rehypothecation Failure: It’s 3:00 
P.M., Do You Know Where Your Collateral Is?, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 949 (1997). In 
the pre-clearinghouse world, collateral was fungible. See Singh, supra note 
106, at 5–9. Multiple clearinghouses require greater collateral segmentation to 
ensure the availability of collateral as posted to a particular clearinghouse. See 
Singh, supra note 293. 
 303. This is the core objection to dealers and explains why other industry 
participants object to mandatory clearing. Voldstad, supra note 294, at 4–5. 
 304. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
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more broadly provide derivatives counterparties with preferen-
tial treatment in bankruptcy.305 Thus, the clearinghouse repli-
cates the classic bankruptcy “setoff” problem, where transfers 
outside of the bankruptcy estate result in less recovery to credi-
tors who are forced to seek recovery through the estate.306
The simple way to see this is to imagine three parties—A, 
B, and C—transacting through a central clearinghouse.
 
Clearinghouses, in other words, mitigate counterparty credit 
risk among clearinghouse members by imposing that risk on 
prospective creditors outside of the clearinghouse. 
307 If one 
of them, C, defaults, the other two are made whole by the clear-
inghouse, whose obligations net to zero.308 From this perspec-
tive, central clearing seems like a very neat means of managing 
counterparty credit risk, but this perspective—focusing exclu-
sively on the parties inside the clearinghouse—is myopic since 
in reality all clearinghouse members would also have important 
creditors outside of the clearinghouse.309 So, injecting a modi-
cum of reality, add a fourth party, D, who transacts with the 
defaulting member, C, but not through the clearinghouse (say, 
in the form of a loan obligation or a guaranty).310 Without cen-
tral clearing, D would be in a better position to collect from C. 
With central clearing, however, D may well collect nothing 
since a large portion of C’s assets—what would otherwise be 
collectibles from A, B, and other trading partners—will be con-
sumed by the clearinghouse to make whole A and B and other 
clearinghouse members.311
 
 305. See Franklin R. Edwards & Edward R. Morrison, Derivatives and the 
Bankruptcy Code: Why the Special Treatment?, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 91, 95–99 
(2005); Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives Market’s Payment Priorities as Financial 
Crisis Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539, 547–49 (2011). 
 So consumed, these assets will not 
 306. See Roe, supra note 16, at 1662–69 (applying the “setoff” problem to 
the context of derivatives clearinghouses); see also Craig Pirrong, Derivatives 
Clearing Mandates: Cure or Curse?, 22 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 48, 50 (2010) 
(“[N]etting effectively changes priorities among creditors; netting improves the 
priority of derivatives counterparties in bankruptcy, and lowers the priority of 
a bankrupt’s other creditors.”); Pirrong, supra note 104, at 47 (“[N]etting effec-
tively gives derivatives counterparties a priority claim on one of the dealer’s 
assets—its winning derivatives positions. This priority shifts wealth from oth-
er creditors to these counterparties, and hence is not a social benefit, but a 
transfer.”). 
 307. This example follows Mark Roe’s example in Part III.B of Clearing-
house Over-Confidence. See Roe, supra note 16, at 1664–69. 
 308. Id. at 1664–65. 
 309. Id. at 1666. 
 310. Id. at 1666–67. 
 311. Id. 
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be available to creditors outside of the clearinghouse, who effec-
tively bear the full brunt of the clearing member’s risk of de-
fault. 
Although this may seem harsh, the imposition of credit 
risk outside of the clearinghouse might nevertheless be defen-
sible from a policy standpoint if all systemically important in-
stitutions transact all systemically important business through 
the clearinghouse.312 This, however, is not the case. Derivatives 
dealers are typically part of massive and deeply interconnected 
financial institutions, many of whose dealings do not involve 
transactions that are cleared by central counterparties.313
More basically, counterparty credit risk is not the only im-
portant source of systemic risk.
 Be-
cause systemically important institutions engage important 
transactions that are not centrally cleared, the imposition of 
risk outside of the clearinghouse may have dangerous systemic 
effects.  
314 Although clearinghouses may 
mitigate counterparty credit risk in the derivatives market, 
they do so by imposing credit risk on other systemically signifi-
cant interconnections.315 The risk of a major derivative counter-
party default, in other words, is merely shifted to other forms of 
interconnection such as interbank loans and the shadow bank-
ing system.316
 
 312. Id. at 1668. 
 Clearly, this in no way solves the problem of sys-
temic risk, and in regime of global uniformity organized around 
mandatory clearing, it leaves the world financial system vul-
nerable to systemic risk. 
 313. In Roe’s words:  
The core American derivatives-trading financial institutions . . . have 
large, deep, recurrent and systemically critical interconnections with 
one another and with the rest of the economy that are outside the 
clearinghouse, such as uncleared (and unclearable) derivatives trans-
actions, widespread old-school lending syndicates, interbank debt . . . 
and the massive new-finance repo market . . . .  
Id. at 1681. 
 314. Cf. id. at 1668 (discussing setoff in the clearinghouse context and not-
ing “[w]hether its basic risk transfer character can arrest systemic risk in any 
major way . . . has yet to be seen”).  
 315. The liquidity benefits enjoyed by clearinghouse members come at the 
expense of those transacting outside of the clearinghouse. Pirrong, supra note 
104, at 54; Roe, supra note 16, at 1670–72. 
 316. See Roe, supra note 16, at 1676; accord Whitehead, supra note 264, at 
1275–76 (“The shadow banking system . . . arose in response to rules that in-
creased the cost to a bank of maintaining assets on its balance sheet. In that 
case, regulation became less effective as a result of the shift in risky conduct to 
outside the regulated entity.”). 
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B. DESTRUCTIVE COORDINATION 
In addition to a lack of regulatory firebreaks, uniform fi-
nancial regulation can contribute to systemic risk by causing 
the behavior of regulated institutions to converge on similar 
business strategies. Professor Charles Whitehead has recently 
focused attention on the unintended consequence of “destruc-
tive coordination”—that is, the tendency of financial regulation 
to channel the behavior of regulated entities and thereby create 
asset bubbles.317 Examples of this phenomenon abound, includ-
ing the Black Monday crash of 1987,318 banks’ overinvestment 
in mortgage-backed securities leading to the financial crisis of 
2007−2008,319 the run on Bear Stearns in the midst of that cri-
sis,320 and the ongoing European sovereign debt crisis.321 As in 
these examples, uniform financial regulation can cause coordi-
nated errors on the part of financial institutions thereby lead-
ing to multiple interconnected failures, potentially leading to 
the collapse of financial systems.322 International regulatory 
uniformity threatens to unleash this risk on a global scale.323
In the derivatives context, the problem of destructive coor-
dination would seem to be worst in a world where there was a 
single world clearinghouse to monitor and manage systemic 
risk. In such a world, derivatives counterparties would tend to 
coordinate their conduct around the risk management require-
ments employed by the governing body of that clearinghouse, 
 
 
 317. See generally Whitehead, supra note 54. 
 318. See id. at 328 (focusing on the automated selling in connection with 
portfolio insurance). 
 319. See Romano, supra note 16, at 17–29 (emphasizing the risk-weighing 
schemes that subjected residential mortgages and securities based on them to 
lower capital requirements than otherwise similar assets). 
 320. See Whitehead, supra note 54, at 352–53 (emphasizing portfolio man-
agers’ use of VaR (value at risk) in hastening the decline of Bear Stearns). 
 321. Romano, supra note 16, at 27–28 (emphasizing the preferential treat-
ment accorded to sovereign debt in the risk-weighting scheme of the Basel ac-
cords, thereby incentivizing banks to invest in sovereign debt and, within that 
officially riskless category, to invest in the debt of the riskiest sovereigns in 
search of higher returns). 
 322. Whitehead, supra note 54, at 326 (“By promoting coordination, regula-
tions and standards can erode key presumptions underlying financial risk 
management, reducing its effectiveness and magnifying the systemic impact of 
a downturn in the financial markets.”). 
 323. Accord Bank for Int’l Settlements Comm. on the Global Fin. Sys., 
Long-Term Issues in International Banking 31 (CGFS Papers No. 41, 2010), 
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs41.pdf (“Convergence to a single risk 
assessment or risk management framework . . . would encourage herd behav-
ior and weaken financial stability.”). 
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resulting in uniformity of conduct, thereby increasing the risk 
of systemic failure. Happily, as noted above, a single world 
clearinghouse does not appear to be on the horizon anytime 
soon.324 Nevertheless, even in a world of multiple clearinghous-
es, destructive coordination could result if the clearinghouses 
were forced by regulators to manage risk in essentially the 
same way, and this unfortunately, does seem to be the case, 
with leading regulators drafting precise guidelines for clear-
inghouse risk management.325
The current environment of clearinghouse segmentation 
also raises the specter of destructive coordination by increasing 
the systemic effect of asset bubbles. To see this, recall as de-
scribed above, that clearinghouses are now and are likely to 
continue to specialize in specific asset classes—for example, 
foreign exchange, interest rate swaps, or CDS.
 
326 As a result, 
they are likely to be susceptible to asset bubbles in the underly-
ing asset. Consider, for example, a clearinghouse specializing in 
CDS that has a member who has suffered severe losses due to a 
bursting of the bubble in residential MBS. The member’s losing 
investments will trigger capital calls from the clearinghouse, 
forcing it to sell assets to cover the capital call.327 This sale of 
assets is likely to come at the worst possible time, flooding the 
market with supply when asset values are already falling—a 
situation often referred to as the “fire sale” problem328
 
 324. See supra note 
—which 
will have the effect of weakening other members of the clear-
300 and accompanying text. 
 325. CFTC, Risk Management Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Or-
ganizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 3698 (Jan. 20, 2011); SEC, Clearing Agency Stand-
ards, 77 Fed. Reg. 66,220 (Nov. 2, 2012); Commission Regulation No. 
153/2013, Regulatory Technical Standards on Requirements for Central Coun-
terparties, 2012 O.J. (L 52/41); Commission Regulation No. 152/2013 Regulato-
ry Technical Standards on Capital Requirements for Central Counterparties, 
2012 O.J. (L 52/37). 
 326. See supra notes 294–96 and accompanying text. 
 327. See Whitehead, supra note 54, at 353–56 (describing the standardized 
system of collateral posting under ISDA’s Credit Support Annex and the way 
in which this system of collateral may have contributed to the financial crisis 
because “[s]tandard provisions in the CSA caused protection sellers to react to 
the increase in CDS prices in the same way and at roughly the same time, 
simultaneously driving prices lower, which in turn required additional sales to 
raise further funds”). 
 328. The problem is triggered by parties being forced to sell into a market 
with very few buyers. Sellers are thus forced to significantly reduce prices in 
order to sell. The discount will be even greater if the market is flooded with 
other sellers forced to liquidate large positions at the same time. See Romano, 
supra note 16, at 15–16.  
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inghouse exposed to the same asset class who will face capital 
calls from the clearinghouse, thereby raising the specter of fur-
ther fire sales and further sharp declines in asset value, thus 
bringing about “the same ugly financial spiral that the economy 
suffered from in the financial crisis.”329 Traders may begin to 
suspect that the clearinghouse itself is weak and seek to sell 
out of their positions, thereby spreading contagion throughout 
the economy in spite of (or, in this example, because of) the 
presence of a central counterparty clearing in the relevant as-
set class.330
C. STIFLING REGULATORY INNOVATION 
  
Finally, uniform financial regulation stifles regulatory in-
novation and ensures the entrenchment of potentially ineffi-
cient regulatory regimes.331 The lack of experimentation may be 
a pervasive problem in the modern regulatory state which typi-
cally evaluates new regulations only when they are adopted 
and even then with a questionable form of cost-benefit analy-
sis.332
 
 329. Roe, supra note 
 The best way to evaluate the efficiency of regulatory re-
gimes is by experimentation and comparison with other regula-
16, at 1679; see also Pirrong, supra note 73, at 23. 
 330. This dynamic is fundamentally a liquidity problem: clearinghouse 
members are forced to post additional collateral precisely when they are least 
able to do so. Id. at 22. As a result, it may be tempting to seek to solve the 
problem by providing the clearinghouse with central bank support, as indeed 
is contemplated in Dodd-Frank Title VIII. The effect of this central bank sup-
port, however, is merely to shift credit risk to the central bank and the gov-
ernments (and taxpayers) that support them. See generally Singh, supra note 
293. 
 331. Paraphrasing Freidrich von Hayek, “[t]he surest way to stifle innova-
tion is to take current best practices and convert them into rigid require-
ments.” GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD 31 (2009) (attributing the paraphrase to 
J.P. Morgan banker Mark Brickell). 
 332. Don Bradford Hardin, Jr., Why Cost-Benefit Analysis? A Question (and 
Some Answers) About the Legal Academy, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1135, 1165 (2008) 
(cataloguing objections to cost-benefit analysis as performed by federal regula-
tors); see also Michael Greenstone, Toward a Culture of Persistent Regulatory 
Experimentation and Evaluation, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 111, 
113 (David Moss & John Cisternino eds., 2009). In his words: 
The current regulatory problem is not a lack of cost-benefit analysis. 
Some form of cost-benefit analysis already underlies most regulatory 
decisions. Rather, the problem is the poor quality of the evidence un-
derlying many applications. Indeed, critics of cost-benefit analysis 
have argued that it can be twisted to produce desired results. One 
major reason for these criticisms is that most cost-benefit analyses 
are not performed in a credible manner. 
Id. 
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tory approaches.333
With regard to derivatives, the first thing to note concern-
ing regulatory alternatives is that many of the proffered bene-
fits of central counterparty clearing—including greater price 
transparency and increased reporting of open positions—are 
available outside of the clearing context.
 This, of course, is antithetical to a regime of 
regulatory uniformity. Seen in this light, regulatory uniformity 
seems likely to perpetuate inefficient regulatory structures and 
also to suppress the very information that would make possible 
an evaluation of the cost and efficacy of the existing regulatory 
structure. 
334 For example, it 
would be a much simpler matter to adopt rules requiring trad-
ers to report prices and positions than it would be to impose a 
wholly new regulatory framework—mandatory clearing—to ac-
complish the same objective. Moreover several commentators 
have suggested alternative regulatory structures to reduce sys-
temic risk in connection with OTC derivatives transactions.335
1. Licensing Third Parties to Monitor Risk and Collect 
Variation Margin 
 
Three of these regulatory alternatives are briefly sketched be-
low. 
A core benefit of central counterparty clearing is risk moni-
toring and collateralization, but there are other ways to achieve 
this basic benefit outside of the clearinghouse context. Moreo-
ver, there is reason to believe that outsourcing certain risk 
monitoring and collateralization functions of the clearinghouse 
may create important efficiencies, both in terms of reduced cost 
and increased effectiveness. 
An initial proposal along these lines has been made by 
Conrad Voldstad, a derivatives pioneer and former president of 
ISDA.336
 
 333. Greenstone, supra note 
 Although generally supportive of clearing, Voldstad 
332, at 118–21 (advocating for a culture of ex-
perimentation—to “[s]tructure [r]egulations so that [e]xperiments are 
[f]easible,” to collect data, to release it publicly, and to provide for ultimate re-
view by an independent review board). 
 334. See Roe, supra note 16, at 1678–79. 
 335. See, e.g., E-mail from Conrad Voldstad to Sean Griffith, Dir., Corp. 
Law Ctr., Professor of Law, Fordham Law School (Nov. 1, 2013, 11:52 AM) (on 
file with author). 
 336. See TETT, supra note 331, at 17 (describing Voldstad as “one of the 
most brilliant minds in the derivatives world”); see also Press Release, Int’l 
Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, Inc.,Robert Pickel Appointed Chief Executive Of-
ficer of International Swaps and Derivatives Association (Nov. 10, 2011), 
available at http://www2.isda.org/news/Robert-pickel-appointed-ceo-of-isda 
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has argued that the aggregate cost of initial margin is exces-
sive, perhaps amounting to trillions of dollars of collateral.337 
His proposal therefore sketches an alternative regime where 
the core benefit of clearing could be outsourced to a third-party 
entity that monitored dealer positions and collected collat-
eral.338
[V]ariation margin is the critical collateral required for safety. Sup-
pose each dealer were to use an entity licensed by regulators to collect 
variation margin collateral across all derivative products on a netted 
basis. You would retain the benefits of netting and capture the main 
benefits of clearing. The same licensed entity could organize the liq-
uidation of dealer portfolios in a dealer bankruptcy, perhaps by col-
lecting some initial margin from the dealer.
 Unlike clearinghouses that, as discussed above, disrupt 
netting sets and thereby render netting less effective, this 
third-party would not operate as a trade intermediary, thus 
preserving the full benefit of bilateral netting across all posi-
tions. The third-party would mark all positions to market on a 
net basis and then take collateral against the residual expo-
sure. In Voldstad’s words: 
339
The proposal would make posting initial margin a term 
that would be agreed between the parties on a case by case ba-
sis. While this might result in some losses, Voldstad estimates 
that such losses would pale in comparison with the savings 
generated by the reduction in stranded initial margin collat-
eral.
 
340 Because the full benefit of netting would be retained, 
the total residual exposure would be smaller than it would be 
in the context of multiple clearinghouses and fragmented net-
ting. The role of regulators, under such a proposal, would then 
shift from designing and implementing an entirely new system 
of derivatives transactions to setting standards and overseeing 
the private entities that arise to monitor and manage risk.341
 
-conrad-volstad-to-serve-as-special-advisor-to-the-board (announcing 
Voldstad’s departure and referring to him as an “industry pioneer”). 
  
 337. Voldstad’s support for initial margining through the clearinghouse is 
strongest in the context of large dealers and users where very large portfolios 
of derivatives make posting initial margin efficient and allow for large scale 
tear-ups of contracts, a process known as “compression.” See E-mail from Con-
rad Voldstad to Sean Griffith, supra note 335. 
 338. See generally Conrad P. Voldstad et al., Remarks at the Fordham 
Journal of Corporate and Financial Law Symposium: Regulation of Over-the-
Counter Derivatives (Feb. 13, 2012) (on file with the author) (during which 
Voldstad offers several suggestions for derivatives reform, of which the third-
party collateral guarantor, described here, is the most radical). 
 339. Id. at 7. 
 340. See E-mail from Conrad Voldstad to Sean Griffith, supra note 335. 
 341. See Voldstad et al., supra note 338, at 7–8 (“It’s up to the industry to 
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A similar proposal, focusing on the role of outside “gate-
keeper guarantors” to core risk monitoring and collateralization 
functions, has been made by Professor Jeffrey Manns.342 Rather 
than outsource the entire clearinghouse function, however, 
Manns argues in favor of requiring clearinghouses to secure 
private guarantors (reinsurers) to cover their potential liabili-
ties above a threshold level.343 Once private reinsurers had thus 
taken “skin in the game,” Manns argues, they would be in a 
better position than government or clearinghouses to monitor 
the risk of derivatives because of the clarity of their incentives, 
their “longstanding experience in assessing and pricing insur-
ance risks,” and their greater ability to respond to industry 
change by altering contracts as opposed to amending regula-
tion.344 In addition to monitoring, reinsurers could insist that 
their clients make changes in their risk exposure by making 
such changes a condition to coverage.345 Manns argues that 
third party reinsurers would also understand the clearing-
house’s collateral needs better than other regulators.346
[Reinsurers] would serve as classic gatekeepers in identifying and 
remedying risks. . . well before government actors even are aware of 
them. Their partial guarantor role would create self-interested incen-
tives to temper clients’ risk taking, which would achieve a far greater 
impact in stabilizing and disciplining markets than blanket govern-
ment guarantees during crises that are rife with moral hazard.
 In sum, 
under this scheme: 
347
The reinsurance entity, acting as a gatekeeper guarantor, 
thus improves the risk monitoring and collateral taking func-
tions of the clearinghouse. 
 
What these two proposals have in common is the underly-
ing view that a third party might be able to perform the core 
 
design a better mousetrap. It’ll be up to the regulators to analyze the mouse-
trap to ensure it is strong and flexible.”). Acknowledging the difficulty of con-
vincing authorities to accept this “initial margin light” proposal, Voldstad has 
also developed an outline for a strongly capitalized clearing house that could 
offer efficiencies in initial margining. See E-mail from Conrad Voldstad to 
Sean Griffith, supra note 335. 
 342. See generally Jeffrey Manns, Insuring Against a Derivative Disaster: 
The Case for Decentralized Risk Management, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1575 (2013). 
 343. Id. at 1588–90. 
 344. Id. at 1611–12. 
 345. Id. at 1612.  
 346. Id. at 1614 (arguing that reinsurers would “have a better appreciation 
of what degree of capital is required to ensure that their clients can live up to 
their obligations” along with the leverage, in the form of the threat to deny or 
withdraw coverage, to get their way). 
 347. Id. at 1612. 
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functions of the clearinghouse more efficiently than the clear-
inghouse itself. Manns’ proposal, offered as a supplement to, 
rather than a substitute for the clearinghouse, does not claim 
to offer the same cost efficiencies as Voldstad’s, gained princi-
pally through efficiencies in netting.348 Both, however, empha-
size similar gains in regulatory effectiveness by injecting a 
third party specialized in risk monitoring and collateralization 
thereby addressing the moral hazard problem inherent in 
mandatory clearing as currently conceived.349
2. Taxing Residual Derivative Liabilities 
  
Another alternative regulatory structure is suggested in a 
working paper by IMF economist Manmohan Singh who, like 
Voldstad, would take the regulators out of the business of rede-
signing the market, and focus them instead on collecting infor-
mation on dealers’ derivative positions so that a portion of the-
se positions—dealers’ residual exposures—could be taxed.350
The details of Singh’s tax-based proposal are as follows: 
Because many derivatives counterparties are viewed as “safe” 
by banks, they are not made to post full value of collateral in 
connection with derivatives trades.
 
Taxing these positions would both provide revenue to the gov-
ernments bankrolling too-big-to-fail financial institutions and 
create an incentive for dealers to minimize their residual expo-
sures. 
351 As a result of not taking 
full collateral, dealers carry residual derivatives liabilities, 
which contribute to systemic risk.352 Singh therefore suggests 
that these residual derivatives liabilities be taxed at a punitive 
rate.353 The cost of this tax, Singh expects, will outweigh the 
business advantage of not taking sufficient collateral from sup-
posedly safe entities, therefore causing banks to take full col-
lateral from all counterparties.354
 
 348. See supra note 
 If banks take full collateral 
from all counterparties, the failure of a large counterparty in 
339 and accompanying text. 
 349. On moral hazard in central counterparty clearing, see supra note 287. 
 350. The paper cited and discussed in this section is Singh, A Fresh Look, 
supra note 291. 
 351. Id. at 5 (listing sovereigns, AAA-rated insurers, large corporations, 
and government-sponsored entities as counterparties that are considered 
“safe” (in varying degrees)).  
 352. Id. 
 353. Id. at 14–16. 
 354. Singh, supra note 293, at 5 (“If a levy is punitive enough, then large 
banks will strive to make derivative liabilities reach zero . . . .”).  
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the OTC derivatives market will create no systemic risk.355
3. Invalidating Speculative Trades 
 
Side-benefits of this tax proposal include the reduced need to 
hedge derivative assets and the overall fairness of the party 
that will ultimately be made to bear derivative losses in a 
bailout (i.e., government taxpayers) benefiting from an alterna-
tive source of tax revenue in the interim.  
Finally, Professor Lynn Stout has argued that systemic 
risk would be reduced if OTC derivatives were subject to the 
common law “rule against difference contracts” and not the 
regulatory regime enacted in 2000 with the Commodities Fu-
tures Modernization Act.356 The crux of Stout’s argument is that 
by reinstating this common law rule courts would no longer be 
responsible for enforcing purely speculative derivative con-
tracts, but rather would only enforce those derivative contracts 
used for hedging, defined by Stout as contracts in which one 
party owns the underlying interest.357 According to Stout, mak-
ing speculative OTC derivative contracts unenforceable would 
channel speculators into private ordering, limit the derivatives 
market, and reduce systemic risk.358
Pointing to the Chicago Mercantile Exchange as an exam-
ple of successful private ordering—that is, a private organiza-
tion where membership requirements enforce effective “margin 
requirements, netting requirements, and a host of other rules 
designed to make sure that, despite the legal invalidity of spec-
ulative contracts, speculating traders would make good on their 
contract promises”
  
359—Stout argues that judicial invalidity of 
speculation may lead to safer derivatives transactions than a 
clearing mandate supervised by public regulators.360
 
 355. Id. 
 By elimi-
nating high stakes speculation from the OTC derivatives mar-
ket or, at least, creating strong incentives for such transactions 
 356. Lynn A. Stout, Regulate OTC Derivatives by Deregulating Them, 32 
REG. 30, 30 (Fall 2009). 
 357. Id. at 33 (arguing that policymakers should “refus[e] to devote public 
resources to enforcing an OTC derivatives contract unless at least one of the 
parties to the contract either owned or was legally obligated to take ownership 
of the asset underlying the contract”). 
 358. Id. at 30–33. 
 359. Id. at 32.  
 360. Id. (arguing that the rule against difference contracts can be seen in 
the private exchanges and self-regulatory regimes established in order to en-
sure parties to derivatives contracts deliver their end of the bargain). 
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to migrate to exchanges, Stout argues, her proposal leads to a 
substantial reduction in systemic risk.361
In any event, the point of this section is not to prove that 
any of these alternative regulatory proposals is superior to cen-
tral counterparty clearing. Each of these proposals would, if ev-
er seriously entertained by a policymaker, no doubt be a source 
of serious debate. But this, in turn, would force the surfacing of 
data necessary to choose one regulatory structure over another. 
That data currently is suppressed by the imposition of global 
uniformity in the form of mandatory clearing. Returning to the 
larger theme of this Part, the imposition of regulatory uni-
formity increases the fragility of the world financial system and 
heightens our exposure to systemic risk. The next Part offers a 
way out of this dangerously stultified regulatory environment. 
 
V.  MORE COMPETITIVE FINANCIAL REGULATION   
International policymaking with regard to derivatives reg-
ulation has failed because it has created a fundamentally frag-
ile system and thereby increased the exposure of the financial 
system to systemic risk, the minimization of which is the stated 
goal of regulation. If, as argued above, diversity and experi-
mentation are desirable components of a successful regulatory 
regime, the question becomes how to design a regulatory super-
structure that is sufficiently serious about systemic risk while 
remaining supple and adaptable. How, in other words, might 
the regulation of derivatives have been designed to accommo-
date diversity and experimentation? 
Effective policy-making starts from a clear diagnosis of the 
problem and proceeds with an open-minded evaluation of all 
potential responses to the problem in search of an effective so-
lution.362 The problem revealed by the 2008 financial crisis was 
not, as is sometimes claimed, that OTC derivatives are or were 
unregulated.363
 
 361. Id. at 32–33. 
 It is rather that they may, in some instances, 
 362. See Richard J. Herring, Remarks at Yale Conference on the Future of 
Financial Regulation 91 (Feb. 13, 2009) (“Public policy should start from a 
clear diagnosis of the problem . . . . It should have clear goals that address the 
problem. It should be efficient in a sense that it accomplishes these goals at 
least cost.”). 
 363. See Editorial: A Long Road to Regulating Derivatives, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 25, 2012, at 12 (“If there is one lesson from the financial crisis that 
should be indelible, it is that unregulated derivatives are prone to catastrophic 
failure. And yet, nearly four years after the crash . . . regulation is a slow work 
in progress.”). 
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contribute to systemic risk. Rather than fixing immediately on 
mandatory clearing as a solution to be implemented, a more ef-
fective response might have been for the G-20 to identify the 
problem—the systemic risk created by OTC derivatives trans-
actions—and to devise a standard for members to meet in de-
signing regulatory structures that respond to this threat. For 
example, the G-20 might have encouraged members to adopt a 
means of regulating derivatives such that member-state finan-
cial institutions would be able to survive the default of their 
one or two largest counterparties. Member- states meeting that 
standard, as evaluated by an expert body identified by the G-
20, would be free to implement their own regulatory schemes, 
while member states failing to meet that standard could be de-
nied access to the market or channeled into another regulatory 
regime.364
All of that, of course, is now water under the bridge. If the 
question turns to what can be done now to build a more robust 
and adaptable regulatory structure going forward, two possible 
approaches, outlined below, appear. The principal difference 
between these approaches is their scope. The first is interna-
tional, the second domestic. 
 This would have preserved the benefits of regulatory 
diversity while also responding to the problem of systemic risk 
at the global level. In failing to respond in this way, the G-20 
essentially adopted a rule when it should have adopted a 
standard. 
A. REFORMING THE GLOBAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE OF 
DERIVATIVES 
Building upon Professor Roberta Romano’s recent proposal 
advocating the creation of a peer review committee to approve 
or deny the petitions of nations seeking to implement banking 
regulations that deviate from the Basel Accords,365 the interna-
tional architecture of derivatives regulation could be rede-
signed to create a review panel charged with approving or 
denying the petitions of jurisdictions seeking to depart from the 
regulatory norm of mandatory clearing.366
 
 364. Such as through the extraterritoriality mechanism proposed by the 
CFTC Guidance, discussed above, at supra Part III.B.1. 
 The G-20 would thus 
 365. The Basel Accords technically are non-binding agreements which 
Committee members agree to enact through domestic law-making. See Mi-
chael S. Barr & Geoffrey P. Miller, Global Administrative Law: The View from 
Basel, 17 EUR. J. INT’L LAW 15, 28 (2006). 
 366. Romano’s proposal is summarized, in part, as follows: 
[T]he proposal formalizes a procedural mechanism for approving de-
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act as the standard-setting body, choosing, in this case, central 
counterparty clearing as the default regulatory structure. The 
review panel would then issue waivers from the standard as 
long as a proposed alternative regulatory structure did not in-
crease systemic risk, a determination that would be supported 
by economic analysis.367
Finding a real world institution capable of functioning as 
such a review panel may not be as challenging as it might at 
first appear. A strong candidate for the job already exists in the 
form of the Financial Stability Board (FSB).
 The goal, however, would be to approve 
departures whenever possible to permit a proliferation of regu-
latory alternatives and avoid the dangerous effects of regulato-
ry uniformity. 
368
 
partures, that would render Basel requirements “off the rack” de-
faults which could be altered in any direction, subject to a peer re-
view. In short, upon presentation in writing of a detailed, reasoned 
analysis to a committee of peer regulators with expert technical sup-
port, nations would be able to adopt regulations that reconfigure or 
reject elements of the Basel regime, or even to replace it with an en-
tirely different regulatory approach. The review committee would un-
dertake an evaluation of a proposal’s impact on global systemic risk, 
with a presumption of approval, to be rebutted by convincing evidence 
that it would, on net, increase global systemic risk. To facilitate flexi-
bility and hence diversity, of international financial regulation, the 
burden of proof to demonstrate an adverse impact on systemic risk—
theoretically or empirically—would be placed on the review commit-
tee, and a decision to disapprove a deviation would require a well-
reasoned written explanation. 
 Consisting of 
members including the central banks of the major national 
economies as well as international organizations—such as the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the European Cen-
tral Bank (ECB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and 
the World Bank—and various international standard-setting 
bodies—including the Basel Committee on Banking Supervi-
sion, the International Accounting Standards Board, and the 
International Organization of Securities Commissioners—the 
Romano, supra note 16, at 10–11. For further details on Romano’s proposal see 
Romano, supra note 79, at 26–27; Romano, supra note 279, at 16–17.  
 367. Romano, supra note 79, at 26–27; see also Romano, supra note 16, at 
69–70 (“The review committee’s task would be to ascertain . . . whether a pro-
posed deviation could be anticipated to impact global system stability . . . . The 
committee’s review would be delimited to a proposal’s impact on systemic risk 
and financial system stability, with an adverse impact the sole criterion for a 
proposal’s rejection . . . .”). 
 368. See generally Stavros Gadinis, The Financial Stability Board: The 
New Politics of International Financial Regulation, 48 TEX. INT’L L. J. 157, 
164–75 (2013) (discussing the role and history of the FSB and its relationship 
to the G-20). 
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FSB is organized “to develop and promote the implementation 
of effective regulatory, supervisory, and other financial sector 
policies.”369 Most importantly, the FSB has considerable exper-
tise in OTC derivatives, having issued several studies of the 
general topic as well as a regular status report on the imple-
mentation of derivatives market reforms.370
It is worth noting, however, that the FSB and its predeces-
sor entity have come under criticism for lacking independ-
ence,
 A review panel se-
lected from or by this body seems well suited to evaluate the ef-
fect of systemic risk posed alternative regulatory structures for 
derivatives. 
371 for succumbing to the groupthink,372 and for generally 
failing to prevent the most recent financial crisis.373
 
 369. Overview, FIN. STABILITY BD.,  
 However, 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/ 
about/overview.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2014). More specifically, the official 
mandate of the FSB is to:  
assess vulnerabilities affecting the financial system and identify and 
oversee action needed to address them; promote co-ordination and in-
formation exchange among authorities responsible for financial stabil-
ity; monitor and advise on market developments and their implica-
tions for regulatory policy; advise on and monitor best practice in 
meeting regulatory standards; undertake joint strategic reviews of 
the policy development work of the international standard setting 
bodies to ensure their work is timely, coordinated, focused on priori-
ties, and addressing gaps; set guidelines for and support the estab-
lishment of supervisory colleges; manage contingency planning for 
cross-border crisis management, particularly with respect to systemi-
cally important firms; and collaborate with the IMF to conduct Early 
Warning Exercises. 
Mandate, FIN. STABILITY BD., http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/ 
mandate.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2014).  
 370. See, e.g., FIN. STABILITY BD., OTC DERIVATIVE MARKET REFORMS: 
THIRD PROGRESS REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION (2012). 
 371. Geoffrey P. Miller, Remarks at Yale Conference on the Future of Fi-
nancial Regulation 97 (Feb. 13, 2009) (noting that the FSF, the predecessor of 
the FSB, had very little funds, resources, or authority and that it was “very 
heavily dependent upon the central banks, whose activities would be the prin-
cipal source of [its] criticism” and therefore lacked “a reliable ability to make 
comments and make reform”). 
 372. Id. at 98 (arguing that the clubby nature of the FSF led to dominance 
by its most powerful members—namely, the Fed, the ECB, and the Bank of 
England—contributing to “groupthink” or “one conventional orthodox set of 
opinions that central bankers who met in Basel tended to adhere to”). Social 
scientists have long recognized that a small but cohesive group can set the 
agenda of a much larger group, especially when the small group include pow-
erful or otherwise well-regarded members. See, e.g., IRVING L. JANIS, VICTIMS 
OF GROUPTHINK: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF FOREIGN-POLICY DECISIONS 
AND FIASCOES (1972) (describing, in general, the various effects of the group-
think phenomena on foreign-policy decisions). 
 373. Miller, supra note 371, at 101 (“It seems to me that the Basel brand 
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with respect to the review panel sketched above, it may be pos-
sible to correct these failings. Fears over a lack of independence 
might be allayed by the adoption of formal mechanisms such as 
a random empanelling of decision-makers and a mandatory 
recusal system.374 Groupthink and status quo bias could be ad-
dressed by allocating the burden of proof on the committee it-
self, rather than the petitioner,375 and by requiring that the 
panel support its findings in written opinions detailing their 
economic analysis.376
In sum, there is both a strong theoretical justification and 
an existing institutional superstructure to support these 
changes to the international architecture of derivatives regula-
tion. Policy-makers have begun to express interest in forming 
such an organization as well.
 
377 However, the type of body advo-
cated in this Article, because it would encourage diversity and 
foster competition rather than consensus, represents a signifi-
cant departure from the way in which these organizations typi-
cally function and entails a partial rejection of what these or-
ganizations have already chosen as the consensus solution—
that is, mandatory clearing.378
B. REVISITING SUBSTITUTED COMPLIANCE: THINKING 
GLOBALLY, ACTING LOCALLY 
 Hence, rather than pinning all 
hope on the reform of international organizations, it may be 
wise to consider ways in which domestic regulators can bring 
about a similar outcome by rethinking the way in which they 
assess substituted compliance. 
If reforming the architecture of international financial reg-
ulation seems like an ambitious policy agenda, it may be possi-
ble to achieve a similar effect—that is, a regulatory environ-
ment that allows for the flourishing of diversity in and 
 
performed poorly and that its reputation is somewhat tarnished by the events 
that have happened. And that does raise a question: Should we look to this av-
enue or mechanism for reforming financial regulation in the future?”). 
 374. Romano, supra note 16, at 74–75. 
 375. Id. at 77–79. 
 376. Id. at 81–83. 
 377. See, e.g., Huw Jones, Global Watchdog Says New Body with Teeth 
Needed to Police Markets, REUTERS (Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2013/11/05/g20-regulation-idUSL5W0IQ2G820131105 (reporting  
remarks by international financial regulators in favor of forming a new organ-
ization with binding powers over its members to ensure global financial stabil-
ity). 
 378. See supra notes 82–90 and accompanying text. 
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competition among alternative regulatory regimes—through 
purely domestic reform. While it is true that the U.S., because 
it does not act alone in dictating world financial policy, cannot 
act alone in granting nations leave to depart from international 
norms, it is also true that the enormous importance of its fi-
nancial markets gives the U.S. a leading role to play in design-
ing and implementing global regulatory policy, a role the CFTC 
has already assumed in the area of swaps regulation.379
Substituted compliance, as already noted, can be used to 
offer a way out of U.S. regulation for foreign persons complying 
with a sufficiently similar regulatory scheme elsewhere.
 
380 Yet 
substituted compliance begs two questions: (i) what is suffi-
ciently similar? And (ii) who decides? The answer U.S. regula-
tors have thus far offered to each of these questions is: (i) a 
comparable set of regulatory requirements, and (ii) we do.381
A better rubric for the analysis of substituted compliance, 
following the reasoning outlined above, is whether the foreign 
regulatory regime increases systemic risk or otherwise under-
mines the stability of U.S. financial institutions.
 If 
the world financial system is to be rendered less rather than 
more fragile, neither of these answers is satisfactory. 
382 This deter-
mination should be fully transparent and, unlike agency cost-
benefit analysis as it is currently practiced, thoroughly sup-
ported by expert economic analysis.383
 
 379. See supra notes 
 The substituted compli-
ance determination in the domestic context would thus parallel 
the decision of the review panel in the international context. 
Foreign regimes or foreign regulated entities could apply for 
193–203 (discussing substituted compliance in the 
context of the CFTC’s Global Guidance); see also Tafara & Peterson, supra 
note 169 (discussing substituted compliance in the context of securities regula-
tion). 
 380. Describing substituted compliance in the context of foreign stock ex-
changes, Tafara and Peterson write:  
Instead of being subject to direct SEC supervision and U.S. federal 
securities regulations and rules, foreign stock exchanges and broker-
dealers would apply for an exemption from SEC registration based on 
their compliance with substantively comparable foreign securities 
regulations and laws and supervision by a foreign securities regulator 
with oversight powers and a regulatory and enforcement philosophy 
substantively similar to the SEC’s. 
Tafara & Peterson, supra note 169, at 32. 
 381. See supra Part III.B.2 (describing current approach of the SEC) and 
Part III.B.3 (describing current approach of the CFTC). 
 382. See supra note 367 and accompanying text (making this argument in 
the international context). 
 383. See generally Hardin, supra note 332. 
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waivers from U.S. regulation, which would be granted as long 
as the alternative regulatory regime was deemed to be equally 
effective at mitigating systemic risk.384
Having settled on this rubric for substituted compliance, 
the question of who should decide remains open. As in the in-
ternational context, a critical issue is for the review committee 
to be independent of the agency responsible for drafting and 
implementing the domestic regulation. Obviously, then, the de-
cision should not be left with either the CFTC or the SEC. 
Where then to locate this decision-maker with our domestic 
regulatory structure? 
 The result of this ap-
proach, like the international review panel outlined above, 
would be to create an opening for the flourishing of a diversity 
of regulatory approaches. 
As an obvious first choice, paralleling the FSB in the inter-
national context, the review committee could be established 
under the aegis of the Financial Stability Oversight Council 
(FSOC), the body created by the Dodd-Frank Act to provide 
comprehensive monitoring to ensure the stability of the finan-
cial system.385 Just as the FSB consists of representatives of the 
leading economies and leading economic policymakers, the 
FSOC has ten voting members representing the most im-
portant federal officials in charge of financial regulatory poli-
cy386 and five non-voting members primarily representing state 
regulatory agencies.387
 
 384. In the context of derivatives regulation, U.S. authorities have chosen 
to implement the international standard. But even if U.S. authorities, in other 
systemic risk contexts, chose an alternative approach, the substituted compli-
ance analysis outlined in the text could still be applied, in which case the ap-
propriate standard (as between the international standard and the U.S. rule) 
would be the one deemed most effective at minimizing systemic risk. 
 This makes the choice of the FSOC prob-
 385. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 111, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).  
 386. These include: the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Comptroller of the 
Currency, the Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the 
Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Chairperson of the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Chairperson of the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission, the Director of the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency, the Chairman of the National Credit Union Administration, and an 
independent member with insurance expertise appointed by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate. Financial Stability Oversight Council: Who Is on the 
Council?, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY (Apr. 10, 2013), http://www.treasury.gov/ 
initiatives/fsoc/about/council/Pages/default.aspx.  
 387. These include: the Director of the Office of Financial Research, the Di-
rector of the Federal Insurance Office, a state insurance commissioner selected 
by the state insurance commissioners, a state banking supervisor chosen by 
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lematic since a body appointed by the leading architects of do-
mestic financial regulation may be more interested in protect-
ing their regulatory turf and preserving the status quo of U.S. 
financial regulation than in providing for a flourishing of regu-
latory approaches.388 A logical second choice of a more neutral 
institution that still has expertise in financial regulation would 
be the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the 
“Fed”), especially considering the Fed’s core duty of “maintain-
ing the stability of the financial system and containing system-
ic risk that may arise in financial markets.”389 Yet, housing the 
power to decide substituted compliance at the Fed runs the risk 
of creating an excessively powerful super-regulator of U.S. 
markets.390
The risk of leaving this determination to the judiciary 
would seem to lie in finding a sufficiently qualified bench. 
Judges, after all, are not chosen for their financial expertise, 
and the decisions of generalist judges in areas involving com-
plex financial matters have been subject to significant criti-
cism.
 This leaves the courts. 
391 It therefore seems desirable to allocate the decision to a 
specialist court, similar to the U.S. Court of International 
Trade, with a limited jurisdictional mandate to consider alter-
native regulatory design in light of the problem of systemic 
risk.392
 
the state banking supervisors, and a state securities commissioner designated 
by the state securities commissioners. Id.  
 The upside of allocating this decision to a judicial body 
is the recognized independence of the federal judiciary, the ex-
 388. See generally Romano, supra note 79, at 29 (noting that “an agency 
could be expected to be predisposed to believe that whatever regulation exists 
is good and hence to oppose exemptions”). 
 389. Mission, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. (Nov. 6, 2009), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/mission.htm. 
 390. See generally Heidi Mandanis Schooner, The Role of Central Banks in 
Bank Supervision in the United States and the United Kingdom, 28 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L. 411, 433–34 (2003) (noting concerns over concentration of power in the 
central banks). 
 391. See Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maxim-
ize? (The Same Way Everybody Else Does—Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Se-
curities Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORY L. J. 83, 96–97 (2002) (critiquing the deci-
sions of the federal judiciary in the securities area as a product of the 
institutional constraints operating upon members of the judiciary). But see Jed 
S. Rakoff, Are Federal Judges Competent? Dilettantes in an Era of Economic 
Expertise, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 4, 13–14 (2012) (emphasizing that 
judges need not be sufficiently expert to perform economic analyses them-
selves, but rather sufficiently expert to judge between competing experts). 
 392. See generally About the Court, U.S. COURT OF INT’L TRADE, http://www 
.cit.uscourts.gov/AboutTheCourt.html (describing the history, jurisdiction, and 
procedures of this unique Article III court).  
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perience of that body in analyzing complex issues of interna-
tional comity, and the clarity of its procedure, including the 
ability to appeal.393
Wherever the decision-making body is ultimately housed, 
however, it is fairly clear that neither the CFTC nor the SEC 
should be left with the discretion to extend its authority inter-
nationally. Some other body, whether domestic or foreign, 
should decide whether foreign jurisdictions take swap regula-
tion sufficiently seriously to waive compliance with U.S. law for 
U.S.-facing counterparties and transactions. Moreover, the ru-
bric for making this decision should not be comparability with 
U.S. regulation, but rather an equally robust approach to the 
underlying problem of systemic risk. Within these basic param-
eters any number of review structures can be conceived. 
 
  CONCLUSION   
This Article has argued that regulatory diversity offers a 
better approach to systemic risk in the context of derivatives 
regulation than does the regime of regulatory uniformity orga-
nized around mandatory clearing. Providing for a diversity of 
regulatory approaches creates a number of benefits, including 
the promotion of innovation and the adoption of efficient regu-
latory structures as well as the production of information about 
successful and unsuccessful approaches to the underlying prob-
lem. None of this should be taken to imply, however, that a re-
gime of regulatory diversity would be less seriously targeted at 
the problem of systemic risk. Systemic risk is indeed an exter-
nality of derivatives transactions, and the transacting parties, 
alone, appear to lack insufficient incentives to contain it. 
The best approach to systemic risk, however, may be one 
that understands and anticipates that regulators and policy-
makers are not infallible and are likely to make mistakes in the 
future, as indeed they have done in the past. In this environ-
 
 393. On the suitability of courts to this role, see ROBERT SCHAPIRO, POLY-
PHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
(2009) (describing the interaction between overlapping spheres of authority as 
“polyphonic federalism” and arguing that these overlapping interactions, me-
diated by the judiciary, may result in superior laws and better fail-safe mech-
anisms for relief of wrongs); Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and Decree: 
International Review of National Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029, 2049–53, 
2062–64 (2004) (presenting a conception of dialectical review between courts 
internationally and domestically and arguing that this type of review pro-
motes innovation). On the failure of regulators and policymakers to take comi-
ty seriously, see supra notes 169–77 and accompanying text. 
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ment, a diversity of regulatory approaches to the same underly-
ing problem may provide greater protection against contagion 
and an outbreak of systemic risk that, under global regulatory 
uniformity, might prove fatal to the world financial system. A 
regulatory super-structure providing for diversity rather than 
uniformity in systemic risk regulation could be implemented 
internationally or domestically.  
 
